The Islamic State and al-Qaeda claimed a total of 34 different attacks.
Thirteen attacks by JNIM in Mali have been registered and a total of 21 attacks
by ISWAP throughout Nigeria. Most attacks were small scale clashes with the
Nigerian army, or, in the case of JNIM, with the Malian gendarmerie, although
there are some significant targets to be mentioned.





<[link removed]>
<[link removed]>



CEP-KAS: Sahel Monitoring January 2023



Read CEP-KAS: Sahel Monitoring January 2023 by clicking here
<[link removed]>.



CEP-KAS: Sahel Monitoring Janary 2023

By Pieter Van Ostaeyen



This second monthly analytical report on open source observations of Jihadi
activities throughout the Sahel will focus on the most significant events that
occurred in January 2023.



(N.B.: As we refine our methodology for documenting claimed attacks, we no
longer mention all different attacks per media channel. Instead, we have opted
for the more detailed and correct information provided by The Islamic State’s
weekly newsletter an-Naba’, hence filtering out double mentions, mistakes on
geolocation, etc. Thus, providing a more realistic count of Jihadi claimed
attacks in the region. ISWAP’s posts will be considered when they add
information to claims made in an-Naba’. In the case of JNIM, we mostly rely on
their infographic posted in Arabic, French, and English on their operations
during January 2023.)



Introduction



Whereas the month of December 2022 was quasi exclusively dominated by the
Islamic State’s bay’a campaign to their new “Caliph,” this past month the
social media activity dropped to—what one could refer to as—a normal level.



Most significant events were the attempted attack on the Nigerian President by
ISWAP, a bay’a from local tribes in Northern Mali to Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa
al-Muslimin (JNIM)’s Emir Iyad Ag Ghaly and an attack by JNIM killing “dozens
of Malian soldiers and five Wagner mercenaries.”



Attacks in the Sahel, January 2023



The Islamic State and al-Qaeda claimed a total of 34 different attacks.
Thirteen attacks by JNIM in Mali have been registered and a total of 21 attacks
by ISWAP throughout Nigeria.



Most attacks were small scale clashes with the Nigerian army, or, in the case
of JNIM, with the Malian gendarmerie, although there are some significant
targets to be mentioned.



ISWAP



The majority of the attacks carried out by ISWAP during January 2023 were
aimed at the Nigerian army. Most of the attacks seem to be low-scale
hit-and-run operations resulting in a relatively low casualty count.



On December 29, 2022, however, ISWAP attempted to kill the president of
Nigeria in a coordinated attack on a governmental palace in Kogi. Three guards
were killed in the explosion. The president himself never was endangered during
these operations.



As reported by MilitantWire
<[link removed]>, “In
Nigeria, two significant events occurred between Christmas and the New Year.
The first took place on December 29th with anexplosion
<[link removed]>
in Kogi State. What is particularly newsworthy about the incident is that the
blast occurred while President Muhammadu Buhari was making a visit to Kogi. Some
reporting indicates
<[link removed]>
that the timing of the blast came within minutes of the president’s itinerary.
Members of Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP)claimed
<[link removed]>
that President Buhari was the target of the blast.”



Another notable attack, claimed by ISWAP, was on a church in the area of Kogi.
The numbers of attacks on Christian villages and churches are on the rise
throughout the entire territory of the Islamic State in Africa. This attack can
hardly be regarded as an isolated incident. Likely the attacks on Christians
will continue throughout the following weeks and months.



These attacks demonstrate the increased ability of ISWAP to attack targets
outside their operational center in the northeastern parts of Nigeria. The
attack on the Nigerian head of government is also significant since the country
is heading towardspresidential elections
<[link removed]> on February 25 and are an
indication that ISWAP is developing into a force that seeks to destabilize the
entire country rather than the regions in which they have a strong presence.



JNIM



By far the most interesting event during the month of January were the pledges
of allegiance (bay’a) to Iyad Ag Ghali, the emir of JNIM, by Azawagh tribesmen
in the area of Menaka.The Long War Journal reported: “According to Radio France
Internationale (RFI), theclan notables belonged
<[link removed]>
to the Daoussahak community near the northern Malian town of Inékar, close to
the borders withNiger
<[link removed]>
.”



Pictures of the event were published on January 23; a video followed a day
later. The importance of this message can hardly be underestimated as it was
years ago Ag Ghali was seen in public.



Militant Wire: “The appearances of Ag Ghaly are rare. They usually occur in
the Kidal region, the stronghold of the separatist Tuaregs, mainly the National
Movement for the Liberation of Azawad in northern Mali on the border with
Algeria. Ag Ghaly’s lastappearance
<[link removed]> was
in October 2020 in the Kidal region.”



The most important clash during the month of January manifested itself in an
ambush on the road between Kumara and Macina on January 10. Al-Qaeda affiliates
claim to have killed dozens of Malian soldiers and five Wagner mercenaries.





Near the end of the month az-Zallaqa Media published an overview of JNIM
attacks troughout Mali during January 2023:



Regional Security Deteriorates



At the same time, the current Malian regime continues to hamper the operations
of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
(MINUSMA). At the end of January, both MedEvac and personnel rotation flights
for German troops were disrupted by Malian officials,withholding and delaying
flight permits
<[link removed]>
. This resulted in discussions within Germany about anearly termination
<[link removed]>
of Germany’s troop contribution for MINUSMA, scheduled toend in May 2024
<[link removed]>
. With just over 500 soldiers, Germany is within thetop 10 troop contributing
nations <[link removed]> within MINUSMA and an
early withdrawal would create significant challenges for the operational
activities of the U.N. mission.



Furthermore, the security situation also continuous to deteriorate in Burkina
Faso. While JNIM attacks increasing in the country, the military-led government
demanded the departure of the lastremaining 400 French troops
<[link removed]>
from the country in January. Furthermore, a local volunteer militia, deployed
to stem JNIM expansion, committed a large-scale massacre on civilians,
apparently in revenge for JNIM operations. TheUnited Nations
<[link removed]>
is currently investigating the incident, which demonstrates the risk of
relying on untrained volunteer forces in providing security in a conflict zone.



Conclusion



The number of attacks claimed by Jihadist groups throughout the Sahel in the
month of January 2023, remains rather stable. The areas in which these attacks
took place are more or less the same locations as in December 2022.



The most notable events were the pledges of allegiance to JNIM’s Emir Iyad Ag
Ghaly, JNIM’s attack on Wagner mercenaries, and Malian soldiers and the
attempted attack by ISWAP on Nigerian President Buhari.



Meanwhile, more and more reports are emerging showing how the Russian
mercenaries of the Wagner Group are filling up the security void left by the
French and its NATO allies, after the forced withdrawal from Mali and Burkina
Faso. This will likely lead to a further destabilization of the situation in
both countries.



###





Click here to unsubscribe.
<[link removed]>