[The majority of the population is already in favor of a speedy
end to the war. But what bodes ill for the authorities is the
confusion, disunity and mutual claims of the upper classes.]
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PUTIN’S RUSSIA, FRONT AND REAR  
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Boris Kagarlitsky
November 14, 2022
Russian Dissent
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_ The majority of the population is already in favor of a speedy end
to the war. But what bodes ill for the authorities is the confusion,
disunity and mutual claims of the upper classes. _

A person holds a Russian Passport at the Vaalimaa border crossing
point between Russia and Finland,

 

After a series of heavy defeats in September and early October,
Russian troops managed to stabilize the front in early October. This
was partly due to the assistance of Iranian drones in the field of
combat, which were not very effective on their own, but delivered
strength in numbers - about two and a half thousand of them. The
Iranians themselves of course denied the deliveries, but even on the
official Russian television observers kept blurting out the truth,
referring to the devices’ Iranian origin. At the same time,
inevitable questions arose - Why, without the help of Iran, which has
been under sanctions for many years, could Russian troops not get this
type of modern weapon?

Another factor in the stabilization of the front was the replenishment
of combat units with a large number of the mobilized. Although even
according to official data most of those called up remained in the
rear - having neither weapons, nor uniforms, nor training - those
recruits who were sent to Ukraine turned out to be enough to increase
the density of battle formations for a short time, and to plug the
gaps that arose in them.

By the end of October, however, the situation began to worsen again.
It was quickly discovered how to shoot drones down; this was done not
with the help of modern anti-aircraft missiles, which cost more than
the drones themselves, but through the use of traditional
anti-aircraft guns and machine guns, the same that had been used
during the Second World War. Shooting at drones with hunting rifles
from balconies and windows of apartment buildings has become such a
frequent occurrence in Ukraine that the authorities were forced to
intervene, fearing casualties. And the arrival at the front of a large
number of untrained and poorly disciplined Russian conscripts, who
were often commanded by completely incompetent and unmotivated
officers - themselves often freshly mobilized - led to a rapid
increase in casualties, frequent squabbles with mercenaries, and a
number of scandalous cases of unauthorized abandonment of combat
positions. In addition, the increase in the number of troops has
exacerbated problems with their supply chain (and material support has
never been a strong point of the Russian army).

Nevertheless, there was another important factor holding back the
Ukrainian offensive - the spring thaw. It was possible to move forward
for long distances only along the roads, leaving the invaders
vulnerable to artillery fire. Lacking a large arsenal of heavy
equipment and wary of unnecessary losses, the Ukrainian commanders
preferred to engage in positional battles, shooting at Russian units
with long-range artillery, in which they had an advantage. On the
right bank of the Dnieper, where the entire territory occupied by
Russian troops was shot through, holding Kherson turned into a
hopeless task for the defenders. The evacuation of civilian personnel
began (including the pro-Russian regional administration), monuments
began to be taken out of the city, including even the coffin with the
body of Prince Potemkin, the founder of the city. The deputy head of
the pro-Russian administration, Kirill Stremousov, said that troops
began to leave for the left bank, though this was never confirmed. On
the evening of November 3 (the “national unity” holiday invented
during Putin’s rule), the Russian flag was lowered on the building
of the regional administration, although the Ukrainian units were
still several tens of kilometers from the city. The Russian command is
still not ready to surrender Kherson, but it is already well aware
that it will not be possible to keep it.

And yet, the main problem for the Kremlin authorities is not bad news
from the front, but the growing crisis in the rear. Sociological
surveys show that the majority of the population is already in favor
of a speedy end to the war. Numerous cases of riots and protests among
conscripts demonstrate that the mobilization idea, if not completely
failed, has been accompanied by unacceptably high costs. The ruling
circles may, of course, disregard public opinion, but the
dissatisfaction of the people who are to be given weapons must be
somehow be addressed. It was decided to announce the cessation of
mobilization due to the fact that “all tasks were completed.”
However, in this case, true to their usual methods, the Kremlin
leaders left the situation extremely ambiguous. Putin made a statement
about the termination of mobilization, but there has been no decree or
any other document abolishing the call-up of reservists. Therefore,
roundups of young men continue, although not with the same intensity.

Protests continue, some of which are successful. Separate groups of
conscripts ensured that they were not sent to the front, and some were
even sent home. In Kazan, the rebellious mobilized men threatened the
units of the Russian Guard, which had spposedly been sent in to pacify
them. But it is typical that such protests did not take the form of a
broad all-Russian movement. Each situation remained local, unrelated
to similar protests that were taking place at times just a few
kilometers away. The weakness and ineffectiveness of the protests once
again revealed the characteristic problem of Russian society, in which
disunity reigned. Due to the extremely weak social ties and the low
level of solidarity, the ability of modern Russians to engage in
spontaneous solidarity actions is minimal, and the authorities have
very effectively destroyed all mechanisms of civil coordination.
Russian society is like a kind of inert substance, the molecules of
which practically do not interact. It remains to be seen if the
country will be in this state forever, as the war and mobilization
have already changed a lot.

But what bodes ill for the authorities is not the dissatisfaction of
the lower classes, but the confusion, disunity and mutual claims of
the upper classes. Yevgeny Prigozhin, who heads the Wagner Private
Military Company, and the head of Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov, have not
only created their own private armies, but are also openly at odds
with the Russian military. These two have not only driven the
commander of the Central Group of Forces, General Alexander Lapin, to
submit his resignation, but reports of armed skirmishes between the
army and the Wagnerites come literally every week. The struggle for
Putin’s legacy is already in full swing, and the ruler himself, who
has lost his former grip, can only hope to contain these conflicts,
not to prevent or resolve them.

A political crisis inevitably and naturally follows military failure.
It remains only to wait for accumulating, insoluble problems to
explode the situation.

TRANSLATED BY DAN ERDMAN

_BORIS YULYEVICH KAGARLITSKY
[[link removed]] (Russian
[[link removed]]: Бори́с
Ю́льевич Кагарли́цкий; born 29 August 1958) is a
Russian Marxist [[link removed]] theoretician
[[link removed]] and sociologist
[[link removed]] who has been a political
dissident [[link removed]] in
the Soviet Union [[link removed]]. He is
coordinator of the Transnational Institute
[[link removed]] Global Crisis
project and Director of the Institute of Globalization and Social
Movements
[[link removed]] (IGSO)
in Moscow [[link removed]]. Kagarlisky hosts
a YouTube [[link removed]] channel Rabkor,
associated with his online newspaper of the same name and with
IGSO. _

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* Boris Kagarlitsky
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* Russia
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* Ukraine
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