[While the agreement, in which TPLF has accepted disarmament, has
been welcomed for bringing the civil war to an end, critics warn of
the dangers of concessions made to the rebel group by the federal
government]
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ETHIOPIAN PEACE AGREEMENT RECEIVES CAUTIOUS WELCOME AMID CONCERNS
OVER WESTERN PRESSURE  
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Pavan Kulkarni
November 8, 2022
Peoples Dispatch
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_ While the agreement, in which TPLF has accepted disarmament, has
been welcomed for bringing the civil war to an end, critics warn of
the dangers of concessions made to the rebel group by the federal
government _

Redwan Hussien Rameto (2nd L), representative of the Ethiopian
government, and Getachew Reda (2nd R), representative of the Tigray
People's Liberation Front (TPLF), signed a peace agreement in
Pretoria, South Africa,, (Photo: Alet Pretorius/Xinhua).

 

On Monday, November 7, senior leaders of the Ethiopian National
Defense Forces (ENDF) and the rebel Tigray People’s Liberation Front
(TPLF) met in Kenya’s capital Nairobi to “work out detailed
modalities for disarmament for the TPLF combatants”, as per the
peace agreement.

The peace agreement was signed between the Ethiopian federal
government and the TPLF in South Africa’s executive capital Pretoria
on November 2, the eve of the completion of two years of the civil war
in northern Ethiopia.

The TPLF had started the war on November 3, 2020, by launching an
attack on Ethiopia’s  largest army base, reportedly killing
thousands of soldiers and looting its armory containing 70% of
ENDF’s weapons stock.

The agreement concluding this war requires the TPLF to be disarmed of
all its heavy weapons, within ten days of the conclusion of the
meeting that started yesterday in Nairobi, although the “ten-day
period could be extended based on the recommendation of the senior
commanders”.

The “overall disarmament of the TPLF combatants, including light
weapons” should be completed by December 2, “within 30 days from
the signing”, adds the agreement, signed after a 10-day-long
negotiation, led by the African Union (AU). The UN had an observer
status on the negotiating table, while the US described its status as
“both.. a participant and an observer
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Formally titled “Agreement for lasting peace through a permanent
cessation of hostilities,” it was referred to as a “peace
agreement” in the joint statement
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by the federal government and the TPLF. Olusegun Obasanjo, AU High
Representative for Horn of Africa, who led the negotiations, also
referred to “peace agreement” in his press address
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signing.

However, US State Secretary Antony Blinken did not acknowledge it as a
peace agreement in his statement
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simply welcomed “the signing of a cessation of hostilities,”
omitting even the word “Permanent,” which is included in the
formal title of the agreement.

CHALLENGES TO DISARMAMENT

His statement, which is “undermining the peace process”, did not
use “the main word, disarmament,” Ethiopian-American journalist
Hermela Aregawi told _BreakThrough News_
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they are distancing themselves from the very thing that will create
peace. It looks like they are giving room for the TPLF to continue to
stay armed,” she opined.

“Credible sources indicate that 90% of the TPLF’s military
capacity had been destroyed. It was forced to agree to disarmament
against its will,” Elias Amare, editor of _Horn of Africa TV_,
told _Peoples Dispatch_.

“Disarm TPLF!” has been a slogan of hundreds of thousands at peace
demonstrations and rallies inside Ethiopia and by the diaspora in
several cities of the US and Europe, condemning their support to the
TPLF. A successful disarmament would be as much a victory of the
Ethiopian civil society movement.

However, some observers remain skeptical about the implementation of
the disarmament. Addressing the press conference
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signing of the peace agreement, TPLF’s spokesperson Getachew Reda,
who led its delegation, had remarked: “I know there are spoilers
from.. inside our ranks… We also know that they would not stop at
nothing to sabotage our peacemaking efforts, and it is only through
our collective resolve that we can hold these spoilers in check.”

Tsegaye (name changed), a prominent Ethiopian academic who has been
closely following the conflict, told _Peoples Dispatch_, speaking on
the condition of anonymity, that the “US continues arming and
training thousands of TPLF fighters masquerading as refugees in
eastern Sudan.” Elias, however, believes “it is too early to worry
about the fighters in eastern Sudan,” and points out that all their
previous armed incursions into Ethiopia over the last months of the
conflict have been decisively defeated by the ENDF.

The agreement also facilitates ENDF’s entry into Mekele. It states
that “the ENDF and other relevant Federal Institutions shall have an
expeditious, smooth, peaceful, and coordinated entry into Mekelle,
which shall be facilitated through the open communication channel,”
set up between senior commanders on November 3.

While arguing for the need of utmost vigilance to ensure the
implementation of this agreement, Elias maintains “it is effectively
game over for the TPLF. It will no longer be capable of threatening
Ethiopia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity on behalf of its
puppet master, the US.”

TPLF TO BECOME A LEGAL POLITICAL PARTY

Tsagaye, however, points out that despite TPLF’s military defeat by
the ENDF on the battlefield, its ‘puppet master’, sitting on the
negotiating table “both as a participant and an observer”, has in
fact manage to secure its proxy’s survival, now as a legal entity.

The multiple stresses in the agreement on “political dialogue” to
resolve “political differences” implies that TPLF will continue
operating as a political party. Tsegaye also argues that couched in
references in the agreement to “reconciliation, and healing”, the
federal government has effectively promised an amnesty to TPLF leaders
for all their crimes.

The federal government has committed in the agreement to “Facilitate
the lifting of the terrorist designation of the TPLF by the House of
Peoples’ Representatives.”

“The people of Amhara and Afar will never psychologically accept
this,” Tsegaye argues. The TPLF troops have committed large-scale
atrocities in these neighboring States it had invaded from Tigray
after the withdrawal of ENDF following the federal government’s
unilateral declaration of ceasefire mid-last year.  Burning of
villages
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of civilians
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of food-warehouses
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of thousands of medical facilities
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among its documented atrocities.

With the help of regional militias of Amhara and Afar, the ENDF pushed
the TPLF – which had reached as close as 200 kilometers to
Ethiopia’s capital Addis Ababa – all the way back into Tigray by
the start of 2022. Under pressure from the US and UN – which had
been portraying it as the aggressor throughout the conflict – the
federal government announced another ceasefire in March.

The TPLF reciprocated, and the ceasefire held out until August 24,
when, only weeks after a delegation by the US and the EU met the TPLF
leaders in Mekele, the TPLF resumed war and invaded Amhara again. Its
southward attack from Tigray targeted Raya, and on the western front,
it attacked the region of Tsegede, Wolkait and Humera.

The TPLF – which had annexed these Amhara lands into Tigray State
when it seized federal power over all of Ethiopia in 1991 – calls
these regions as Southern Tigray and Western Tigray respectively.
During its 27-year-reign over Ethiopia from 1991, the TPLF is alleged
to have committed large-scale and systematic ethnic cleansing
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especially in the region it calls Western Tigray, to rid the Amhara
population from this strategic region on the border with Sudan.

The annexed regions were wrested from the TPLF after fighting during
the initial months of the war, and brought back under the control of
Amhara regional State. Since then, Amhara militias have repeatedly
fought and defended the areas from multiple TPLF offensives.

Arguing that the Amhara people are “a primary stakeholder” in this
conflict, the Amhara Association of America (AAA) had demanded
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“Amhara People’s Negotiations Delegation” be represented in the
negotiations.

It consisted of four main negotiators, backed by a “delegation of
more than 40 Amhara leaders from different segments of Amhara
society.” AAA had argued its inclusion “would promote justice and
accountability for war crimes and ensure any negotiated settlement
receives wide reception and acceptance among Amharas, the largest
stakeholder in the war.”

“CONCESSIONS TO TPLF CAN PROVOKE CONFLICT WITH AMHARA”

The bitterness provoked by the perceived amnesty, ceded to TPLF
leaders in the negotiation from which the Amhara delegation was
excluded, has only been exacerbated by what appears to be a
thinly-veiled reference in the agreement to Wolkait and Raya.

The agreement states that the Federal Government and the TPLF
“commit to resolving issues of contested areas in accordance with
the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia.”

This constitution, Tsegaye points out, was put into effect by the TPLF
in the 90s after it had annexed these regions. The reference to the
constitution in the above statement of the agreement, he argues, is an
indication of the federal government’s intention to return these
areas to Tigray.

Concerning the boundaries of the States, this constitution explicitly
says little beyond, “States shall be delimited on the basis of the
settlement patterns, language, identity and consent of the people
concerned.”

Elias argues that the reference to the constitution was simply a way
of avoiding an impasse in the negotiation, and does not necessarily
imply that the regions will be handed over to Tigray. “The Wolkait
and Humera region have been a part of Amhara for centuries before it
was annexed by the TPLF. The ethnic cleansing it carried out for
decades in order to change the demography of the region is very well
documented. There are provisions within this constitution to appeal to
the upper house for redressal of such grievances. But the TPLF was
using its power to block any such attempts,” he explained.

Elias is confident that the federal government will use these
provisions to ensure that the regions are not returned to Tigray. The
contested Wolkait and Humera regions in the west have an additional
strategic significance in that if returned to Tigray, it would give
the TPLF a corridor to Sudan, whose military junta is known to be
supporting the group.

The lack of clarification from the federal government about these
contested areas has already provoked tensions in Amhara. “This
constitution does not define the boundaries of Ethiopia,” said
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chairperson, Tewodrose Tirfe. However, “we know what they are trying
to say” in this reference to the constitution, he said, adding
“the situation right now on the ground” is that “Wolkait is
being administered by Gondor (district of Amhara), Raya is being
administered by Wollo.”

“We have lost too many innocent lives and too many patriots to lose
Raya and Wolkait again. That is a red line for Amharas, and any
attempt to change that is going to result in additional conflict.”

The Amhara militias have played a critical role, fighting alongside
the ENDF, which, after defeating TPLF’s latest offensive, marched
into Tigray, wresting control of several strategic towns and cities
around Mekele.

DOES THE TPLF HAVE A POLITICAL FUTURE?

The TPLF was in no position to defend its stronghold by the time the
negotiations had begun in Pretoria. Nevertheless, argues Tsegaye, the
“US won back on the negotiating table what it had lost to the
Ethiopian government on the battlefield, namely the political survival
of its main proxy in the region.”

Elias is not convinced that the agreement can ensure TPLF’s
political survival. “600,000 Tigrayans who were forcibly conscripted
by the TPLF and used as cannon fodder in human wave attacks in this
war are said to have lost their lives. This is enormous for a
population of less than 6 million,” he pointed out.

“The TPLF leaders will be questioned back in Tigray, ‘Where are
our children? What did they die for?’ The TPLF has no answer. If a
free and fair election is held as promised in the agreement, we may
well be looking at the end of TPLF’s political future.”

Elias admits however that whether or not opposition parties are
well-organized and strong enough to contest in any such upcoming
election and defeat the TPLF remains unknown. Most of them are
relatively new, formed only after 2018, when pro-democracy mass
demonstrations put an end to TPLF’s 27 years of US-backed
authoritarian rule over Ethiopia, during which opposition parties and
free press were banned.

Even after TPLF’s ouster from the federal government, it remained a
regional force, in power in Ethiopia’s northernmost State of Tigray.
“For more than 30 years since 1991, the TPLF has not allowed free
political activity in Tigray. It had total domination over the
state’s finances and security, and cracked down brutally on any
opposition groups challenging it in Tigray. This will be the first
time an opportunity will be created for opposition parties to contest
the TPLF in a free and fair election,” Elias argues.

However, until such an election can be “held under the supervision
of the Ethiopian National Election Board”, the agreement states that
Tigray will be governed by “an inclusive Interim Regional
Administration” – inclusive of the TPLF, that is. It remains to be
seen whether under the rule of such an administration, opposition
parties will be able to freely organize and campaign against the TPLF.

TPLF’s victory in the election in Tigray would also win it a share
of power in the federal government against which it had taken arms.
“The Federal Government shall ensure and facilitate the
representation of the Tigray region in the federal institutions,
including the House of Federation, and House of Peoples’
Representatives,” the agreement states.

Nevertheless, Ethiopian civil society and diaspora organizations have
exuded confidence of being able to tackle the TPLF on the political
field, and have largely welcomed the agreement which ends the military
conflict.

The TPLF has agreed “that the Federal Democratic Republic of
Ethiopia has only one defense force”, which is the ENDF. It has
committed to “[r]efrain from aiding and abetting, supporting, or
collaborating with any armed or subversive group in any part of the
country” and “from conscription, training, deployment,
mobilization, or preparation for conflict and hostilities”. It has
also committed to “[h]alt any conduct that undermines the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ethiopia, including
unconstitutional correspondence and relations with foreign powers”.

Elias argues it is of relevance that nowhere in the agreement, or in
any of the addresses by African leaders to the press conference in
Pretoria following the signing of this peace deal, was the TPLF
referred to as the Tigray Defense Forces (TDF) or Tigrayan
authorities. The latter terms, used by the US and the UN, rendering
the TPLF an air of legitimate authority, have been refuted by the AU,
Elias observed.

“AU HAS REFUSED TO SCAPEGOAT ERITREA”

He also finds the absence of any reference to Eritrea in the agreement
or in the press addresses after the signing to be noteworthy. The TPLF
had initially set the withdrawal of Eritrean troops – who are
alleged to be in Tigray to assist the ENDF’s campaign against the
TPLF – as a non-negotiable requisite for peace. The US, EU and the
UN, had all amplified the TPLF’s demand for withdrawal of Eritrean
troops.

For Eritrea, nothing less than its peaceful relations with Ethiopia
will be at stake if the TPLF is successfully resurrected by the West.
It was the TPLF which, while ruling Ethiopia with the support of the
US, had led the country into a war against Eritrea. Following its
ouster from federal power in 2018, Abiy Ahmed, who subsequently took
charge as the prime minister, signed a peace deal with Eritrea which
won him the Nobel Peace prize. The TPLF opposed the deal.

“Remember, after starting this war against the Ethiopian government,
it was the TPLF which fired rockets into Eritrea, dragging it into
this conflict. The AU knows this,” Elias said. By its omission of
any mention of Eritrea in the agreement or in the subsequent press
conference, the AU, he argued, has refused to play along with the
western attempts “to scapegoat Eritrea and deflect attention from
the aggressor, which is the TPLF.”

Elias maintains that the successful conclusion of a peace agreement in
Pretoria is a victory not only for the people of Ethiopia and its
neighbors with a common stake in peace in the Horn of Africa, but also
for the AU. Despite all the efforts by the US and EU to skew the
negotiation in favor of the TPLF – and what was perceived by many
Ethiopians as an impartial conduct of the UN weighed down by western
pressure – the AU, he argues, upheld respect for Ethiopia’s
sovereignty.

The peace agreement, he said, is a realization of its slogan
“African solutions for African problems”. In its realization,
Elias reads the declining US hegemony and sees the first rays of a
dawning multipolar world.

Tsegaye arrives at a different conclusion from the contents of the
agreement. The “ruling elite” in Africa – in the Ethiopian
government or at the AU – remain “neo-colonial, in character”.
Their interests, he argues, are “heavily dependent on Western
finance capital”. Therefore, it is only so far they can walk their
anti-imperialist talk before striking a compromise and “agreeing to
let the US to retain its main main proxy in the region, now operating
as a legal political entity in partnership with the government.”

* Ethiopia
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* Tigray
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