April 13, 2021

A Strong U.S. Response to the 2022 Winter Olympics in Beijing 

If the International Olympic Committee (IOC) has its way, this time next year, Beijing will have hosted the 2022 Winter Olympics, and become the only city in the world to host both the summer and winter games. China will also have scored a major propaganda victory, proving that when it comes down to it, human rights are not really a serious concern for the U.S. and its friends around the world who profess to care.

The Olympics are the most prestigious, esteemed sporting event globally and it is a privilege for a country to be selected as host. Heritage Senior Policy Analyst Olivia Enos writes that China’s track record as host, and its current severe ongoing human rights violations, make it a poor choice to host such a privileged sporting event. In its role as host of the 2008 Summer Olympics, China came under sharp criticism for systematic human rights violations that occurred amidst its host tenure, including possible exploitation of workers involved in building the Olympic infrastructure and alleged use of child labor in products sold at the games.

Now with Beijing slated to host the Olympics again, the circumstances are far more foreboding. China’s human rights record has worsened, not improved. Under President Xi Jinping, persecution of various groups—religious believers, human rights lawyers, and citizen journalists—has intensified. Today, in fact, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is actively carrying out genocide and crimes against humanity against the Uyghurs, a Muslim minority in China. The CCP is subjecting Uyghurs and Tibetans to various forms of forced labor, shuttering churches, irrevocably altering the state of freedom in Hong Kong, threatening aggression against Taiwan and in the South China Sea, and, just within the past year, systematically covered up critical information in the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic. This is just to name a few areas of concern.

While the IOC claims that it is not a political organization, its decision to select China as host country was a political one—one that put the rights of people inside the host country behind the privileges of the government slated to host the event.

Amidst the pandemic, the IOC postponed the 2020 Summer Olympics in Tokyo to 2021. That decision was made on March 24, 2020, just a little over four months before the games were originally supposed to start, on July 23, 2020. Of course, this was done in agreement with the host country, but the agility with which the IOC responded to changing circumstances during the pandemic demonstrates that it is, indeed, practically possible to shift the timeline for hosting the games. It should, therefore, also be possible to postpone the 2022 Olympics in order to select a new host country, given the gravity of China’s ongoing abuses at home and transgressions abroad. It is not too late to postpone.

The Biden Administration has made cooperation among allies and partners the bedrock of its foreign policy. In early April, the Biden Administration took steps in concert with the European Union, the United Kingdom, and Canada to sanction CCP officials for their role in perpetrating atrocities in Xinjiang.

 This type of multilateral action could set the stage for a global effort to pressure the IOC to postpone, and select a new host country for, the 2022 Olympics.

Related: Click here to listen to the China Uncovered podcast episode on the crisis in Xinjiang, featuring guest speaker Dr. Adrian Zenz.

A New Comprehensive China Policy: Principles and Recommendations for a Serious Debate in Congress

Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer (D–NY) has prioritized Senate passage of a major new bill on U.S. China policy. How the bill will come together—a total of eight committee chairs have been tasked with drafting it—remains an open question. Heritage ASC Director Walter Lohman writes that whatever the ultimate vehicle, this bill is a once-in-a-decade opportunity for Congress to develop a comprehensive approach to China. It should adhere as closely to the regular order as possible. In the process, Members should consider the following principles and specific policy recommendations.

In order to fashion a China policy that is in the U.S. national interest, Congress should:

1. Go Big. The U.S. competed with the USSR for 40 years in every area of engagement, all within the general framework of containment, and learned to adjust and adapt as conditions warranted. A similar comprehensive approach is warranted with respect to China, certainly different than the Soviet Union, and more complex, and thus needing similarly big ideas.
2. Watch the Congressional Purse. The fact that the federal debt is above $28 trillion and growing, with many looking the other way, does not mean that “money is no object.” Someday, the U.S. will have to make good on these debts. America’s strength lies not in how much taxpayer (and bond holder) money it can promise, but how well it can harness the advantages of its educational and research institutions, its deep markets, and the ingenuity of its people.
3. Stay Engaged. Congress often passes legislation on foreign policy and then forgets about it. In the upcoming China debate, Congress should institute forward-looking procedures requiring affirmation of the policies’ implementation. Carefully constructed certification and reporting requirements can be useful. Conversely, reporting requirements meant to simply prevent a Member from offering a more substantive proposal, are not.
4. Use Waivers Sparingly. Similar to the dynamics around reporting requirements, in processing the dozens of amendments that will be offered on this bill, it will be tempting to agree to the most sweeping of waivers. Members should resist. If their commitment is not strong enough to defend their amendment and force a vote, they should not offer it. U.S.–Chinese relations are headed in one direction for the foreseeable future. It will be exceedingly difficult for the Administration to argue for maximum diplomatic flexibility.
5. Avoid Protectionism. Instead of protectionism, the U.S. should focus on targeted measures that restrict critical purchases from entities controlled by the Chinese Communist Party and allow the United States to take full advantage of its rich network of allies to meet its national security needs.
6. Create a Policy Framework. One need look no farther than the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) to know that congressional policy statements matter. Administrations come and go, but the TRA has remained. Another example is the enduring value of the 1992 Hong Kong Policy Act, on which most action on Hong Kong has been built since. Congress should aim to create the same sort of lasting policy on China policy generally. It should think beyond the length of one session of Congress or one Administration, or the next election cycle.
7. Look Beyond China Itself. China presents the U.S. with many direct challenges. But the U.S. is not alone in this struggle. It has allies in Australia, Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand, and partners in India, Taiwan, Singapore, and throughout Europe. Whether Congress is talking about foreign policy or supply chains, it must keep the broader supportive context in mind.

 

14 Priorities for a Comprehensive China Bill

The following list is not exhaustive. The base China legislation and floor debates will involve many worthwhile proposals. This list is a sample of some of the highest-priority, immediately actionable items.

1. Taiwan. As much as Congress has done over the past few years, much remains to be done. Congress should take action on the provisions contained in the Rubio–Merkley Taiwan Relations Reinforcement Act, including making the director of the American Institute in Taiwan a Senate-confirmed position and helping U.S. businesses and nongovernmental organizations navigate pressure from China on Taiwan-related issues.

Congress should make an unequivocal, binding statement in support of a free trade agreement with Taiwan. The U.S. Trade Representative’s (USTR) institutional tendency is to avoid Taiwan. At the very least, a substantive proposal and debate will force it to face Taiwan.

To help facilitate regular interaction on trade issues, Congress should require the USTR to remove it from the same office dealing with China and put it under the authority of the Assistant USTR handling Japan, Korea, and the Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation. Dealing with China takes up so much of the USTR’s time that there is little left for Taiwan, even if the USTR is inclined to engage it. It often is not, due to Beijing’s sensitivities, another aspect of the gap that separating the functions will help ameliorate.

2. Xinjiang. Congress should direct the Administration to tackle forced labor in China by requiring an expansion of existing cotton and tomato Withhold Release Orders (WROs) to a region-wide level for a two-year period. Congress should provide that, if an overwhelming percentage of goods apprehended by the U.S. Customs and Border Protection under the expanded WRO are found to have been produced with forced labor, the U.S. must institute a region-wide rebuttable presumption that goods produced in certain sectors of Xinjiang are produced with forced labor. In addition to addressing forced labor, Congress should extend Priority-2 refugee status to Uyghurs fleeing persecution in China.
3. Hong Kong. Congress should extend safe haven protections to Hong Kong citizens facing newfound persecution by declaring them eligible for P-2 refugee status. According to U.S. refugee laws, a refugee is an individual who has experienced, or has a well-founded fear of future, persecution on account of “race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” The Department of Homeland Security should remain in charge of evaluating the eligibility of individuals seeking refugee status.
4. U.S.–Chinese Space Cooperation. Congress should codify prohibitions on U.S.–Chinese space collaboration in what is currently renewed annually in the appropriations process, and expand congressional notifications to include the Senate Foreign Relations and House Foreign Affairs Committees. Congress should also tighten executive branch waiver authority, or scrap it altogether in favor of the direct approach to military-to-military engagement in the FY 2000 NDAA.
5. The Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development (BUILD) Act. Congress should reform the BUILD Act to make it explicitly about countering Chinese influence. What makes U.S. government-provided foreign infrastructure financing and risk insurance at all palatable is its place in a broader China strategy. That place should be made clear in the law that authorizes the new International Development Finance Corporation. Funds should also be made subject to the regular appropriations process so that Congress can maintain sufficient oversight.
6. Chinese Cyber Theft. Congress should codify Executive Order 13694, which blocks property of foreign entities engaged in cyber theft and other cyber malicious activities, expand the action to physical theft and deemed exports, and decouple the sanctions from reliance on the International Emergency Economic Powers Act.
7. Confucius Institutes. Congress should require universities and K–12 schools to disclose their financial ties to Confucius Institutes—nationwide propaganda organizations, masking as cultural institutions, sponsored by the Chinese government. Shortly after taking office, the Biden Administration withdrew a rule proposed late in the Trump Administration to do so. Congress should require it to be reinstated. As for the purported purpose of the institutes to encourage the study of Mandarin, there are alternative ways of ensuring a sufficient pool of Mandarin speakers is available for U.S. government service.
8. Easing Export Controls on India. Congress should revise the Arms Export Control Act to include India among a special group of NATO alliance members and key non-NATO partners (Australia, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea) facing lower regulatory hurdles to U.S. arms exports.
9. Chinese Influence within International Organizations. China is using economic and diplomatic pressure to secure support in international organizations. Congress should authorize the Administration to use aid and other incentives as a counterweight. Beijing has also clearly signaled its desire to put Chinese nationals in positions of authority in the United Nations system. The U.S. needs to be well prepared for appointments and elections. It should develop a robust list of prospective candidates and ongoing procedures to campaign and rally support for these candidates.

Congress can help by establishing an office to coordinate this process and renew the congressional reporting requirement on the status of U.S. employment in the U.N. to help keep track of progress. Finally, Congress should use its financial leverage to enhance U.N. transparency, whistleblower protections, and accountability, which help to reveal malfeasance in the U.N. system.

10. Rare-Earth Minerals. Congress should address concerns about supplies of rare-earth minerals by focusing on reform at home. It is not China that has made these minerals difficult for the U.S. to secure, but domestic regulation. Actions that Congress can take to get at the problem include clearly defining “navigable waters” in the Clean Water Act to strictly limit federal authority, prohibiting pre-emptive and retroactive vetoes under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, empowering states to manage their water resources, repealing the National Environmental Policy Act, reforming the Endangered Species Act, prohibiting the use of the social cost of carbon in regulatory proceedings, and eliminating agencies’ ability to regulate greenhouse gases.
11. The 2022 Winter Olympics. Congress should encourage the International Olympic Committee to postpone the 2022 Beijing Olympics and select a new host country. In the absence of such a change, Congress should call for an international diplomatic boycott. This means no official attendance beyond what is necessary for the participation and security of U.S. athletes.
12. Religious Liberty. Congress should require the Administration to issue a report listing individuals and entities sanctionable under the Global Magnitsky Act, along with explanations for why they may not yet be sanctioned.
13. Banking-Sector Reform. Congress should reduce impediments to competition in the financial-services sector so that people will want to invest in U.S. markets instead of in other countries. To strengthen the U.S. financial-services sector and attract more investment and capital formation, Congress should implement reforms, such as creating new charters for financial firms that eliminate activity restrictions and reduce regulations in return for straightforward higher-equity or risk-retention standards, as well as adjusting the currency-transaction-report threshold for inflation from $10,000 to $60,000 and the non-bank reporting threshold for inflation from $3,000 to, $10,000 and repealing the beneficial ownership reporting regime on small businesses.
14. Digital Currency. Congress should respond to China’s plans for creating a digital currency by fostering innovation at home. The United States cannot assert significant influence over China’s digital currency plans. It can, however, orient its own policies to create a prosperous environment for America’s financial innovations. Congress should remove barriers to market entry for alternative monies, and ensure that no single type of money enjoys a regulatory advantage. At a minimum, Congress should amend “legal tender” laws, eliminate capital gains tax disadvantages, and modify private coinage statutes.

Related: Click here to read Heritage ASC Director Walter Lohman's commentary on why the Biden administration should say no to new trade deals with China

As China Builds Islands, Biden Administration Must Assert Itself in Vital Shipping Artery

As the Biden administration strives to reinforce ties with key Asian allies from India to Japan, tensions in the South China Sea region are again on the rise.

Both the Philippines and Vietnam have expressed concern as hundreds of Chinese fishing boats congregate near Whitsun Reef in the Spratly islands. Heritage Senior Research Fellow Dean Cheng writes that China has used such fishing fleets in the past to help seize control of other disputed islands and otherwise press its claims. Many of these fishing boats do double duty as part of China’s extensive maritime militia in a new expression of “people’s war at sea,” especially in the South China Sea.

China has built artificial islands atop several of the reefs that it controls, wreaking environmental havoc in the process. These new islands total some 3,200 acres, dwarfing all other land reclamation in the area by orders of magnitude. Three of these new islands now boast 10,000-foot runways, sufficient to support large airliners—or high performance combat aircraft. Artillery and missile emplacements have been identified on them.

China claims almost the entire South China Sea, the carotid artery of global trade, with some $5 trillion worth of shipping and goods passing through. The impact of even a week’s delay in shipping has been seen with the Suez Canal blockage; the impact of interference with the South China Sea would be at least as bad.

Given the Biden administration’s insistence on the centrality of climate change, Beijing may well believe that this White House will make quiet concessions on the South China Sea, in exchange for renewed promises of eventual cutbacks in Chinese greenhouse gas emissions.

In Anchorage, China’s senior diplomats made clear that they could buffalo their counterparts, disregarding agreed-upon time limits, and chastising America for not treating their “guests” with more respect even while acting in an insulting manner.

The South China Sea is likely to be one of the areas where Beijing probes to see whether the U.S. is mush or steel.

Related: Click here to listen to the China Uncovered podcast episode on China's false maritime claims and artificial islands, featuring guest speaker Gregory Poling.

April 16, 2021 @ 10:00 am EDT - VIRTUAL EVENT: U.S.-Taiwan Partnership in the Pacific Islands

The Pacific Islands are an important area of cooperation for the United States and Taiwan, as both have major interests at stake in the region.

For the U.S., the Pacific Islands are critical to the Indo-Pacific strategy and its status as a resident power in the Western Pacific. Guam, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and American Samoa are all part of the United States. Furthermore, the U.S. has maintained close political, economic and especially security relationships with Federated States of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, and Palau under the Compacts of Free Association.

The Pacific Islands are indispensable to Taiwan’s political status. Taiwan and China and continue to compete over diplomatic support, with the Pacific Islands being a hotly contested battleground. Currently, four Pacific Island nations have diplomatic relations with Taiwan.

For years, The Heritage Foundation has not only called for increased cooperation between the U.S. and Taiwan, but also U.S. support for Pacific Island nations. Both of these objectives serve to counter China’s efforts to push the U.S. out of the region. Join us for a discussion with Sandra Oudkirk, Deputy Assistant Secretary, U.S. Department of State, and Chung-Kwang Tien, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan) on these important strategic issues and the importance of cooperation for the U.S., Taiwan, and our partners in the Pacific.