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Week of January 26, 2026 [[link removed]] | Iran Unfiltered is a digest tracking Iranian politics & society by the National Iranian American Council

* Iran’s Internal Reckoning: Mousavi and a Broad Domestic Front Reject Foreign Intervention and Demand Accountability [[link removed]]
* Voices from Inside Iran Condemn Brutal Crackdown, Reject Foreign Intervention, and Call for Democratic Self-Determination [[link removed]]
* Opening a Diplomatic Channel Under Military Pressure: Araghchi, Turkey, and Washington’s Coercive Strategy [[link removed]]
* EU Designates Iran’s IRGC as a Terrorist Organization, Triggering Sharp Diplomatic Fallout [[link removed]]
* Iran Executes Another Alleged Israeli Spy Amid Rising Tensions and Post-Protest Fears [[link removed]]
* Iran–U.S. Confrontation: Military Pressure, Domestic Strain, and Trump’s Narrow Deal Strategy [[link removed]]
* Iran’s Post-Protest Economic Breakdown: Currency Collapse, Market Panic, and Escalating Political Risk [[link removed]]
* Iran’s Post-Protest Crisis: Economic Paralysis, Information Blackout, and the Expanding Human Toll [[link removed]]

Iran’s Internal Reckoning: Mousavi and a Broad Domestic Front Reject Foreign Intervention and Demand Accountability [[link removed]]
A new wave of political, civil, and cultural statements inside Iran following the bloody suppression of nationwide protests reveals a growing internal convergence around a central claim: Iran’s crisis is the product of domestic authoritarianism and can only be resolved by the Iranian people themselves —without foreign military intervention and through a peaceful, democratic transition.

At the center of this moment stands Mir-Hossein Mousavi, who issued a forceful statement from house arrest declaring that the ruling system has exhausted both its legitimacy and its capacity to govern . Mousavi, the former prime minister, Presidential candidate and Green Movement leader who disputed the results of the 2009 election that were widely viewed as fraudulent, has been under house arrest since February 2011 without formal charges.

Mousavi describes the recent killings as a historic catastrophe that has added a “black page” to Iran’s long history—one that will be remembered for decades, if not centuries . He argues that years of escalating repression have led the country to a point where the state no longer offers solutions to any of Iran’s overlapping political, social, or economic crises.

Crucially, Mousavi explicitly rejects foreign intervention, warning that the systematic silencing of reformist voices, civil society, and peaceful dissent has itself “rolled out the red carpet” for outside interference . He stresses that responsibility for this dangerous vulnerability lies with the authorities, not with society.

Mousavi proposes a constitutional referendum as the only viable path forward, grounded in three principles: non-intervention by foreign powers, rejection of domestic despotism, and a peaceful democratic transition . He also calls on military and security forces to lay down their arms and withdraw from political power, arguing that they will ultimately refuse to carry the burden of repeating mass violence.

This position takes on sharper meaning when read in direct contrast to the approach advanced by Reza Pahlavi, the former crown prince of Iran who has sought to influence the course of the protests from outside the country . While Mousavi insists that sovereignty, legitimacy, and durable stability can only emerge from an internally driven national process, Pahlavi has openly called for foreign military action and external intervention as a means of overthrowing the Islamic Republic. In this context, Mousavi’s emphasis on non-intervention is not rhetorical; it represents a clear rejection of externally-imposed regime change. His warning reflects a widely held concern inside Iran that foreign military intervention would reproduce cycles of violence, fragmentation, and loss of national agency, rather than deliver democracy. Mousavi’s stance resonates with a broad spectrum of domestic voices who, despite differing backgrounds, converge on accountability, rejection of mass violence, and resistance to foreign-imposed outcomes.

This internally driven, anti-war perspective is further reinforced by Ahmad Zeidabadi, who issued a stark warning against what he described as the reckless convergence of political ambition within both segments of the ruling establishment and parts of the opposition. Zeidabadi cautioned that political adventurism—whether from inside power or from opposition figures operating safely abroad—risks dragging Iran into a dark, inescapable vortex of war, collapse, and permanent destruction. He urged Iranian decision-makers, including President Masoud Pezeshkian, to show courage not through defiance or ideological posturing, but through accepting personal political cost—even public humiliation—if necessary to preserve the country itself. Zeidabadi also appealed for openness toward regional mediation efforts, warning that rejecting diplomacy out of pride or factional rivalry would mark those responsible in history as having consciously sacrificed the nation. Addressing opposition figures abroad, Zeidabadi rejected the instrumentalization of public grief and bloodshed for political agendas, stressing that justice can be pursued indefinitely, but the time to prevent Iran from sliding into war and irreversible collapse is rapidly running out.

The Iranian Writers’ Association condemned the killings as a massacre carried out under near-total information blackout, accusing authorities of abducting the wounded from hospitals, conducting secret burials, and intimidating witnesses, including medical personnel . The association framed the violence as a war against society and warned that repression would not extinguish the struggle for freedom.

The Freedom Movement of Iran described the events as a profound human tragedy and placed full responsibility on the ruling authorities, regardless of competing narratives . While urging restraint and rejecting violence from all sides, the group emphasized that foreign exploitation flourishes precisely when domestic political participation is crushed, and called for an independent truth-finding commission and structural reforms.

From inside prison, Mostafa Tajzadeh characterized the crackdown as the most naked display of rule through fear in modern Iranian history . He accused the Supreme Leader of turning politics into a battlefield, rejected official casualty figures, and called for a national, independent truth commission, warning that while the current order is unsustainable, the direction of change remains uncertain amid the persistent shadow of war.

Former state broadcaster chief Mohammad Sarafraz acknowledged that the scale of bloodshed has rendered official propaganda ineffective , stating that fabricated narratives can no longer conceal reality—an indication of deepening fractures even among former insiders.

Molavi Abdolhamid, the Sunni Friday prayer leader of Zahedan, described the killings as an “organized massacre,” stressing that lethal violence against protesters is religiously forbidden and a violation of international law . He warned that the repression has created a deep and potentially irreversible rupture between state and society.

Imprisoned activist Mohammad Nourizad issued a defiant message from Evin Prison, declaring that years of repression have stripped the government of moral authority and that rule through fear no longer deters dissent.

Cultural figures have also intervened . Acclaimed filmmaker Asghar Farhadi rejected any justification for the violence, describing the events as an unjustifiable tragedy that has shaken Iran’s moral and human foundations.

A collective known as the Group of 17, including figures such as Nasrin Sotoudeh, Jafar Panahi, and Narges Mohammadi, explicitly labeled the killings a crime against humanity . The group identified the Supreme Leader and the structure of religious authoritarianism as the primary obstacle to Iran’s survival and called for a national front to organize a referendum and a constituent assembly, warning that any alternative path risks plunging the country into a destructive cycle of violence.

Academic bodies have echoed these concerns . The Iranian Sociological Association warned that the normalization of mass death would cause long-term damage to social trust, human security, and prospects for peaceful coexistence, emphasizing that no political or military rationale can justify such levels of human suffering.

Taken together, these statements reflect more than mourning and anger . They articulate a shared internal vision that rejects both authoritarian rule and externally engineered regime change, insisting instead on accountability, democratic transformation, and national sovereignty rooted in the will of the Iranian people themselves. In this landscape, Mousavi’s position stands out as a clear articulation of a long-suppressed but persistent idea inside Iran: that lasting peace, legitimacy, and freedom can only be rebuilt from within, not imposed from without.

Voices from Inside Iran Condemn Brutal Crackdown, Reject Foreign Intervention, and Call for Democratic Self-Determination [[link removed]]
A growing number of political figures, human rights activists, civil society actors, and student groups from inside Iran—alongside aligned diaspora organizations—have issued forceful statements condemning the state’s violent crackdown on protesters while explicitly rejecting foreign military intervention and foreign-imposed regime change as a path forward . The statements come as Iran copes with the aftermath of some of its bloodiest days in decades as a result of a major government crackdown on nationwide demonstrations.

At the forefront of these interventions is a major new statement by Mehdi Karroubi, former Speaker of Parliament and a leading figure of Iran’s reform movement, who described the current situation as a national catastrophe rooted in decades of destructive domestic and foreign policies under Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei . In his statement, Karroubi expressed profound mourning for the victims of what he described as an unspeakable crime, extending condolences to families who were denied even the right to hold dignified funeral ceremonies for their loved ones. He emphasized that peaceful protest is a fundamental right, and that protecting citizens’ lives and security is the primary responsibility of the state’s security and law-enforcement institutions. Any failure to uphold this duty—particularly when authorities invoke claims of “foreign agents”—rests entirely with the government itself, according to Karroubi.

Karroubi categorically rejected any attempt to justify the killings, the mistreatment and desecration of victims’ bodies, or the scale of repression unleashed against demonstrators . He called for the formation of a truly independent investigative body, composed of trusted civil society figures, to establish the accurate number of those killed, injured, and harmed, and demanded the immediate and unconditional release of all detained protesters, rather than continued politically-motivated prosecutions.

Placing responsibility directly on Iran’s highest authority, Karroubi stated that Iran’s current disastrous condition is the direct outcome of Ali Khamenei’s domestic and international policies, citing in particular the costly and ultimately fruitless nuclear project and the devastating impact of two decades of sanctions on Iranian society . He dismissed official claims that the state recognizes the right to protest, pointing to a long record in which lawful demands in demonstrations were met with batons, bullets, beatings, arbitrary detention, home raids, and years of unlawful confinement.

Crucially, Karroubi stressed that freedom and democracy are achieved through the awakened will and unity of a nation—not through foreign bombs . He warned that sustained repression has pushed society to such a breaking point that many citizens no longer even trust sincere warnings about the catastrophic consequences of foreign military intervention. The same people now labeled as “rioters” or “terrorists,” he noted, were once celebrated for their sacrifice and courage in defending Iran during the Iran–Iraq war. As a peaceful and legitimate way out of the current crisis, Karroubi identified a free and fair referendum as the only viable path to restoring the people’s right to self-determination.

These positions have been reinforced by Mehdi Mahmoudian, a human rights activist and transitional political figure speaking from inside Iran, who is among the signatories of the so-called “Statement of the Group of Seventeen .” That statement directly names Ali Khamenei as personally responsible for the recent killings, declaring that “the only path to saving Iran lies in prosecuting all those who ordered and carried out repression, ending the inhumane and un-republican system in power, and forming a broad national front to hold a referendum and convene a constituent assembly—so that all Iranians, across political orientations, can democratically and consciously decide their political future.” The statement has been signed by a broad spectrum of prominent figures inside and outside Iran, including Narges Mohammadi (via her office), Nasrin Sotoudeh, Manzar Zarabi, Abolfazl Ghadyani, Hatem Ghaderi, Abdollah Momeni, Vida Rabbani, Saeed Madani, Sedigheh Vasmaghi, and several others—many of whom have endured long-term imprisonment, harassment, or systematic repression.

In an interview with BBC Persian journalist Farnaz Ghazizadeh, Mahmoudian stated unequivocally that Ali Khamenei bears responsibility for the killings during the bloody protests of Dey and must step aside and face prosecution . Addressing claims that no meaningful fractures exist within the ruling system, he argued that the government is suffering from deep crises of inefficiency and legitimacy, adding that it can no longer even satisfy its own base, and that its own forces are facing mounting economic and social pressures. According to Mahmoudian, cracks have already emerged within the power structure and will continue to widen.

At the same time, Mahmoudian explicitly rejected foreign military intervention, stating that no patriotic Iranian would ever support an external attack on their own country . He warned that foreign war would undermine domestic democratic agency, deepen social fragmentation, and derail the possibility of a homegrown, accountable transition.

Alongside these internal voices, aligned diaspora groups such as the Iranian Republicans Solidarity Group have emphasized that these statements do not reflect foreign propaganda or external agendas, but rather the lived reality of Iranian society , echoing experiences from streets, prisons, hospitals, mourning households, and everyday life during one of the most violent periods in Iran’s modern history. Despite censorship and repression, they stressed, this reality has not been silenced.

These voices have strongly condemned the systematic killing of protesters, the use of live ammunition against unarmed civilians, mass arrests, torture, sexual abuse, denial of medical care to the wounded, and the criminalization of protest, describing these acts as crimes against the Iranian people and an indelible stain on the ruling system . They have rejected efforts to delegitimize demands for political change through labels such as “rioter,” “foreign-linked,” or “terrorist,” reaffirming that the rights to protest, political participation, and self-determination are among the most fundamental rights of any nation.

At the same time, these statements draw a clear and explicit line against monarchist and Pahlavi-aligned political currents that have openly called for U.S.–Israeli military action against Iran . Many of the voices emerging from inside Iran reject any project of change imposed through external military force, warning that such approaches erase the agency of Iranian society, risk catastrophic civilian harm, and ultimately reproduce violence, dependency, and authoritarianism rather than democracy. From this perspective, foreign intervention—regardless of the language used to justify it—is incompatible with genuine democratic self-determination and poses a direct threat to Iran’s sovereignty and social cohesion.

Inside Iran’s universities, similar language has emerged . Students from the Sharif University of Technology’s Faculty of Computer Engineering declared that “the time for silence has passed.” Describing blood flowing through neighborhoods and civilians shot in streets and alleys, they rejected official narratives that recast victims as criminals or “terrorists,” noting that the same people once praised as a “noble and courageous nation” are now labeled “rioters,” “thugs,” and “terrorists.” Those killed, the students wrote, refused to accept a life of humiliation under authoritarian rule and instead faced death from the guns of forces tasked with protecting the public, not killing it.

Taken together, these statements—from senior political figures, imprisoned human rights activists, civil society leaders, and student voices inside Iran—form a rare and coherent chorus . They condemn the regime’s violent repression and insist that Iran’s future must be decided by its own people through peaceful, democratic means. Many explicitly reject monarchist and foreign-backed interventionist projects and the prospect of U.S.–Israeli war on Iran. At a moment of profound national trauma, they argue that lasting change can only emerge from truth-telling, accountability, and collective civic agency—not from imposed solutions, dynastic restoration, or the politics of war.

Opening a Diplomatic Channel Under Military Pressure: Araghchi, Turkey, and Washington’s Coercive Strategy [[link removed]]
As the United States intensifies its military posture against Iran and President Donald Trump repeatedly raises the prospect of military action, Iran’s foreign minister Abbas Araghchi has moved to test whether diplomacy can still be salvaged from within an openly hostile and militarized environment . His visit to Turkey reflects a deliberate effort—coordinated with Ankara—to prevent a rapidly escalating standoff from eliminating all political exits.

Speaking in Istanbul, Araghchi sought to make clear that Iran is not rejecting diplomacy, but that “negotiations cannot take shape under the shadow of threat .” He emphasized that no direct meeting between Iranian and U.S. officials has been scheduled, and that Tehran will only engage in talks that are meaningful, balanced, and fair. At the same time, he underscored Iran’s readiness for multiple scenarios, stating that the country is prepared both for diplomacy and for conflict, while warning that direct U.S. involvement would fundamentally change the scale and consequences of any war, potentially pushing it beyond a limited bilateral confrontation.

Turkey – a formal treaty ally of the United States through NATO – has played a central enabling role in this diplomatic effort . Ankara has openly opposed a military operation and argued for reopening diplomatic space through a narrow, step-by-step process, beginning with the nuclear issue. Turkish officials have stressed that they do not want Iran isolated and that a new war would destabilize the entire region. For Tehran, Turkey’s posture provides political cover to pursue de-escalation without appearing to yield under pressure.

This diplomatic push unfolds against an unmistakable backdrop: Washington has adopted a posture of coercion, combining expanded military deployments, renewed economic pressure, and conditional openness to negotiation . The apparent objective is compressing Iran’s decision-making window—keeping the possibility of attack visible and credible, while presenting diplomacy as an option only within parameters largely defined by the United States.

In recent days, this approach has been reinforced through new U.S. sanctions, targeting senior Iranian officials and financial networks linked to state institutions . Washington has framed these measures as part of a broader effort to raise the economic and political cost of resistance, while making clear that pressure will continue unless Iran changes course. The sanctions campaign is designed not only to restrict resources, but to demonstrate endurance and escalation capacity alongside military force.

President Trump has amplified this message with repeated and blunt statements, stressing that “all options are on the table” while simultaneously asserting that he prefers a deal—typically described as one focused on preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons . Notably, Trump’s recent rhetoric has tightened the public scope of U.S. demands, emphasizing the nuclear file while leaving other issues largely unspoken, even as military threats remain explicit and continuous.

Senior U.S. officials have reinforced this posture . Secretary of State Marco Rubio has warned that Iran will not be allowed to use diplomacy to buy time, insisting that any negotiations must produce concrete outcomes and that pressure will intensify if they do not. Rubio has framed talks not as confidence-building, but as a compliance test under sustained pressure.

At the same time, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has emphasized that the U.S. military is fully prepared to execute any decision the president makes, underscoring that deployments in the region are operational, not symbolic . Taken together, presidential rhetoric, cabinet-level warnings, sanctions escalation, and visible force projection are designed to leave Tehran with no illusion that Washington lacks either the will or the capacity to strike, even as it claims to keep diplomacy open.

Iran’s response has been cautious but firm . Iranian officials reject the premise that negotiations conducted under overt military threat can be genuine, arguing that such talks amount to dictation rather than diplomacy. Araghchi’s remarks in Turkey directly addressed this logic: Iran is prepared to participate in diplomatic processes, including discussions related to its nuclear program, but will not negotiate under coercion or accept imposed outcomes.

At the same time, Tehran appears keenly aware of the costs of escalation . With internal political strain and economic fragility already limiting room for maneuver, Iran’s leadership is attempting to reopen diplomatic channels without signaling capitulation. Regional mediation—particularly by Turkey—has thus become a critical de-escalation tool, allowing Iran to signal openness to talks while insisting that the military shadow be lifted.

What emerges is a highly unstable equilibrium . Washington is signaling that it wants a deal—but only under the pressure of overwhelming force. Iran is signaling that it wants diplomacy—but not conducted at gunpoint. Whether this effort to reopen political space succeeds will depend not on stated willingness to talk, but on whether the United States is prepared to reduce the coercive conditions under which any negotiation would occur.

EU Designates Iran’s IRGC as a Terrorist Organization, Triggering Sharp Diplomatic Fallout [[link removed]]
The European Union has formally designated Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a terrorist organization, marking one of the most consequential escalations in EU–Iran relations in recent years . The decision was adopted unanimously by the bloc’s 27 foreign ministers and framed by EU officials as a response to Iran’s violent repression of nationwide protests, including the use of lethal force, arbitrary detentions, and prolonged internet shutdowns.

Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi condemned the move, calling it “a major strategic mistake” and accusing Europe of fueling regional instability rather than helping prevent a broader war . Araghchi argued that while multiple countries are actively working to avert a full-scale regional conflict, no European state is among them, and instead the EU is “fanning the flames of crisis.” He also described Europe’s posture as selective and hypocritical, saying the bloc failed to act over Israel’s war in Gaza while claiming to defend human rights in Iran, a stance he characterized as a publicity exercise masking Europe’s declining influence.

Iranian state media echoed the criticism, labeling the EU decision hasty, politically motivated, and inconsistent with the bloc’s own legal standards . Foreign Ministry spokesperson Esmaeil Baghaei warned that branding an official branch of a country’s armed forces as “terrorist” violates fundamental principles of international law and would carry serious political and legal consequences.

On the EU side, Kaja Kallas, the bloc’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, said the decision followed a lengthy internal process in which member states debated their positions . She emphasized that initially Europe lacked full visibility into the scale of the crackdown, but once evidence of “bloody repression” became clear—along with internet blackouts and mass arrests—the EU concluded that a firm response was necessary. In a public message, Kallas stated that “repression cannot go unanswered.”

Alongside the designation, the European Council announced new targeted sanctions against senior Iranian officials , including Interior Minister Eskandar Momeni, Prosecutor General Mohammad Movahedi Azad, and Tehran Revolutionary Court Judge Iman Afshari, citing their roles in the violent suppression of peaceful protests and arbitrary detentions of political activists and human rights defenders.

The EU had abstained from a terrorist designation targeting the IRGC following the 2022 Woman, Life, Freedom movement. The U.S. designated the IRGC a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) in April 2019 as part of the first Trump administration’s so-called “maximum pressure” campaign, which at the time was viewed as a highly unusual and provocative step to label the entirety of a branch of a nation’s armed forces as a terrorist group. Iran maintains forced conscriptions, and many men are automatically assigned – often against their will – to serve within the IRGC. Significant military escalations between the U.S. and Iran have followed the designation, including the assassination of the influential Iranian general Qassem Soleimani in 2020 and the bombing of Iran’s nuclear program in June 2025. The designation also appeared to represent a stumbling block in negotiations aimed at reviving the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) under the Biden administration, with Iran insisting that the designation be removed.

The designation carries potentially far-reaching legal and economic implications . By labeling the IRGC a terrorist organization, EU member states may now pursue asset freezes, seizures, and criminal proceedings against IRGC-linked companies, networks, and individuals within European jurisdictions. Given the IRGC’s deep footprint across Iran’s economy, the move is likely to prompt European banks and firms to sever remaining ties with Iranian businesses, fearing legal exposure from any connection—direct or indirect—to IRGC-affiliated entities.

At the same time, some European officials and analysts caution that the impact could be largely symbolic if enforcement proves uneven . France, which had previously been among the principal holdouts, had earlier described the designation as mostly symbolic, arguing that the IRGC and many of its commanders were already under extensive EU sanctions for human rights abuses, involvement in Iran’s nuclear and missile programs, and military support to Russia in the war against Ukraine. From this perspective, the practical change hinges less on the announcement itself than on how swiftly and uniformly member states translate the designation into domestic law and judicial practice.

Ultimately, the impact of the EU’s decision will depend on coordinated implementation across the bloc—including consistent prosecutions, asset actions, and compliance by financial institutions—as well as on how Iran responds politically and economically . What is already clear is that the move has deepened the rift between Tehran and Brussels, hardening positions at a moment of heightened regional tension and international scrutiny of Iran’s internal repression.

Iran Executes another Alleged Israeli Spy Amid Rising Tensions and Post-Protest Fears [[link removed]]
Iranian authorities have announced the execution of another individual accused of espionage on behalf of Israel, marking the second such execution in less than a month and fueling concerns over a broader post-protest crackdown . According to Mizan News Agency, the media arm of Iran’s judiciary, Hamidreza Sabet Esmailpour was executed at dawn after his death sentence was upheld by the Supreme Court. Iranian officials say Esmailpour was arrested in May 2025 and convicted of spying for Israel and its intelligence service, Mossad.

The judiciary claims that Esmailpour was involved in transmitting classified documents and sensitive information and had cooperated with Israel in acts of sabotage targeting missile facilities linked to Iran’s Ministry of Defense in 2022 . Mizan reported that the execution was carried out following final judicial approval, though no independent evidence has been made public and no details have been provided regarding the transparency of the trial or Esmailpour’s access to legal counsel.

Esmailpour is the second individual executed within a month on charges of spying for Israel . On January 7, Ali Ardestani was executed after authorities accused him of “espionage for Israel’s intelligence agency, Mossad.” According to Mizan, Ardestani was described as a “key Mossad asset inside Iran” who allegedly transferred “sensitive national security information” to Israel. The judiciary claimed he had carried out photography and video recording of “specific locations” and “sensitive targets,” and that this information was later transmitted to Israeli intelligence.

The report further alleged that Ardestani received payment in cryptocurrency and that his actions were motivated by the prospect of obtaining a British visa and a “million-dollar reward .” Mizan also claimed that he had direct, in-person contact with a Mossad operative, though no additional details or evidence were provided. Iranian authorities did not release any photograph of Ardestani and did not disclose when he was arrested, the length of his detention, the prison in which he was held, or the location of the execution. The judiciary also did not clarify whether other individuals were arrested or prosecuted in connection with the case.

Executions of Iranian nationals convicted of espionage have increased sharply since the spring, particularly after the first direct military confrontation between Iran and Israel. Human rights organizations have long warned that such cases are often handled behind closed doors, raising serious concerns about due process and politically motivated use of the death penalty.

The execution of Esmailpour also comes amid heightened international scrutiny following claims by Donald Trump that Iran had stopped as many as 800 executions—a claim that Iranian authorities have not independently confirmed . Rights advocates warn that such statements risk obscuring a more alarming reality. In the aftermath of the bloody crackdown on nationwide protests, there is growing concern that Iranian authorities may move toward executing detainees arrested during the unrest, particularly under broad and vague charges such as espionage, sabotage, or “enmity against God.” Human rights groups caution that mass arrests, closed trials, and the politicization of the judiciary significantly increase the risk that executions may be used as a tool of intimidation rather than justice.

Iran–U.S. Confrontation: Military Pressure, Domestic Strain, and Trump’s Narrow Deal Strategy [[link removed]]
A new phase of confrontation between Iran and the United States is unfolding, shaped by an unusual convergence of external military pressure, internal political unrest, and deepening economic instability . The standoff follows Iran’s recent wave of nationwide protests and the lingering aftershocks of the twelve-day regional war, creating a volatile backdrop in which both escalation and diplomacy carry high risks.

U.S. President Donald Trump has framed the moment with stark language, announcing that a “massive armada” led by the aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln is moving toward Iran and warning that any future strike would be “far worse” than previous attacks . At the same time, Trump’s message points clearly to his preferred endpoint: a deal focused exclusively on Iran’s nuclear program. His most recent public statement on Truth Social notably avoided references to internal repression, Iran’s missile capabilities or regional proxy network, and instead focused on a single demand—no nuclear weapons—while urging Tehran to return agree to a deal toward that end.

This dual message of threat and invitation reflects a familiar Trump-era approach: compressing the decision-making window through visible military intimidation while preserving a narrowly defined diplomatic off-ramp . President Trump’s rhetoric varies significantly on Iran and other issues, making it highly difficult to ascertain what his bottom line might be. If one can take his most recent statement at face value, which is not a given, the focus on no nuclear weapons is a scope that could be conceivable in Iran. Yet Iran has ample reason to doubt any entreaties, given the surge of U.S. military forces in the Middle East, ongoing threats and separate demands that were issued just days ago. Moreover, it was little more than half a year ago when Iran was bombed while at the negotiating table, seeking to hammer out details on a deal ostensibly aimed at ensuring Iran did not obtain a nuclear weapon.

Beyond the external standoff, Tehran is operating under intense internal strain following the violent suppression of nationwide protests and a worsening economic crisis . Security forces’ lethal response to demonstrations, mass arrests, and widespread reports of civilian casualties have further eroded public trust and amplified international scrutiny. At the same time, the sharp depreciation of the rial, soaring prices of basic goods, disruptions caused by internet shutdowns, and prolonged market paralysis have placed extraordinary pressure on households and businesses. Together, these political and economic shocks have significantly narrowed the regime’s room to maneuver, making prolonged confrontation with the United States far more costly and heightening the leadership’s sensitivity to any external escalation that could further destabilize an already fragile domestic environment.

The military posture reinforcing Washington’s message is substantial . The deployment of a carrier strike group, combined with announced U.S. air exercises across the Middle East, is designed to demonstrate readiness, endurance, and escalation dominance. These moves serve multiple purposes simultaneously: deterring Iranian preemptive action, reassuring regional allies, and reinforcing the credibility of U.S. threats should diplomacy fail. While such deployments do not automatically signal an imminent decision to go to war, they sharply reduce Tehran’s ability to dismiss the pressure as merely symbolic.

Iran’s reading of these developments remains cautious and ambiguous . Iranian officials publicly reject claims that Tehran is seeking negotiations and insist that diplomacy cannot proceed under military threat. Yet at the same time, regional mediation efforts—particularly by Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey—have intensified, indicating that indirect diplomatic channels remain open. Turkey has explicitly urged Washington to pursue a step-by-step approach beginning with the nuclear issue, warning that piling multiple demands onto Tehran at once could be politically humiliating and unsustainable for Iran’s leadership.

Parallel to these diplomatic signals, Iran-aligned regional actors have reactivated deterrent messaging . The Houthis in Yemen have released new propaganda revisiting earlier attacks on commercial shipping and warning that maritime routes in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden remain vulnerable. In Iraq and Lebanon, allied armed groups have declared that any attack on Iran would be treated as an attack on the broader “axis of resistance,” raising the prospect of a multi-front escalation involving U.S. forces, Israel, and critical energy and trade infrastructure.

This proxy signaling is central to Iran’s deterrence doctrine . Rather than relying solely on direct confrontation, Tehran emphasizes its ability to impose asymmetric costs across the region, particularly at moments when global energy markets and maritime trade are already fragile. Even if Iran seeks to avoid a full-scale war, the activation—or perceived activation—of these networks increases uncertainty and the risk of unintended escalation.

Meanwhile, Washington is reinforcing pressure through diplomatic and legal mechanisms, encouraging partner countries to more rigorously enforce international restrictions and sanctions related to Iran . This layered strategy—military presence, economic pressure, and diplomatic isolation—suggests a coordinated effort to narrow Iran’s strategic options while keeping negotiations formally open.

Three broad trajectories now appear plausible . The first is de-escalation into talks focused narrowly on nuclear constraints, potentially yielding a limited agreement both sides could present as a success. The second is a prolonged pressure standoff, in which military deployments and proxy threats persist without crossing into open war—an inherently unstable equilibrium vulnerable to accidents and miscalculation. The third is a serious military escalation, triggering broader regional responses that neither side necessarily fully intends.

For now, the dominant pattern is coercive diplomacy under extreme pressure . Trump is signaling that he prefers a deal—but only on his terms and under the shadow of overwhelming force. Iran, facing mounting internal unrest and economic distress, appears determined to avoid the appearance of capitulation while reminding Washington that escalation would not remain contained. Whether this confrontation ends at the negotiating table or slides into a wider conflict will depend less on stated intentions than on how each side interprets the other’s red lines in the days ahead.

Iran’s Post-Protest Economic Breakdown: Currency Collapse, Market Panic, and Escalating Political Risk [[link removed]]
Iran’s economy has entered a phase of acute instability following the recent nationwide protests and their violent suppression . What distinguishes the current moment is not merely inflation or currency depreciation, but a simultaneous breakdown across foreign exchange, gold, and capital markets, driven by political shock, prolonged information disruption, and rising fears of external military escalation.

For the first time, the price of the U.S. dollar in Tehran’s informal market surpassed 150,000 tomans, with exchange dealers and online trading channels reporting levels above 152,000 tomans . Pricing in Tether (USDT)—a cryptocurrency widely used in Iran as a proxy for the dollar—has broadly confirmed these levels, underscoring the scale of market anxiety and the erosion of confidence in the national currency. The euro rose to over 181,000 tomans, while the British pound approached 209,000 tomans, each setting new historical records.

This currency shock coincided with a surge in global gold prices, with the international price of gold exceeding $5,000 per ounce . The impact on domestic markets has been immediate and severe: the Imami gold coin climbed to roughly 182 million tomans, while the new-design full coin exceeded 180 million tomans, pushing gold further out of reach for much of Iran’s middle class.

These sharp movements followed three weeks of widespread internet disruption, during which many markets were closed or operating only partially . During that period, exchange rates appeared largely frozen. The subsequent surge reflects both a release of suppressed demand and the return of acute political uncertainty.

The most striking indicator of systemic stress has emerged in the stock market. Under normal conditions, a weakening rial tends to lift the shares of export-oriented firms—particularly in petrochemicals and steel—whose revenues are dollar-denominated . This pattern has broken down. Instead, Iran’s main stock index fell by more than 114,000 points in a single session, closing near 4,000,974, marking the fourth consecutive trading day with losses exceeding 2 percent. Since the start of the week, the market has shed nearly 10 percent of its value.

The continued outflow of retail capital from the stock market points to a collapse of investor confidence and a belief that political and security risks now outweigh any inflation-hedging rationale . The simultaneous rise of the dollar and fall of equities signals not a conventional inflationary cycle, but growing fears of systemic disruption—reinforced by speculation over a potential U.S. military strike against Iran amid heightened regional tensions.

On the policy front, the government of President Masoud Pezeshkian has eliminated preferential exchange rates and shifted subsidies toward the end of the supply chain. While presented as a reform measure, this move has failed to stabilize currency or gold markets and has instead intensified public concern over accelerating living costs.

According to the Statistical Center of Iran, average consumer prices rose by 60 percent year-on-year from January 2024 to January 2025, the highest point-to-point inflation rate ever officially recorded by the agency . With the latest currency shock, inflationary pressures are expected to deepen further, particularly for essential goods and services.

The prolonged disconnection from the global internet has compounded the crisis . Government officials have acknowledged that the shutdown inflicts losses of at least $35 million per day, with especially severe consequences for digital businesses, online commerce, logistics, and service sectors. Over several weeks, the cumulative economic damage has been substantial.

Taken together, the convergence of currency collapse, soaring gold prices, stock-market decline, capital flight, and sustained information blackout reflects a profound loss of confidence in Iran’s economic and political trajectory . Absent a meaningful easing of political tensions, restoration of stable information flows, and reduction in the risk of external conflict, Iran’s economy is likely to remain locked in a volatile cycle of price shocks, declining investment, and intensifying pressure on households already burdened by many years of high inflation.

Iran’s Post-Protest Crisis: Economic Paralysis, Information Blackout, and the Expanding Human Toll [[link removed]]
In the weeks following Iran’s most recent nationwide protests, the country has entered a deeper and more complex phase of crisis — one defined not only by violent repression, but by economic paralysis, a prolonged information blackout, and an expanding human toll that continues to surface despite unprecedented restrictions on reporting.

One of the clearest indicators of systemic strain has been the extended disruption of internet access . Iran’s Minister of Communications has acknowledged that the blackout is inflicting daily losses of approximately 5,000 billion tomans on the overall economy, including around 500 billion tomans per day to the digital economy alone. According to official estimates, nearly 10 million people are employed in digital and internet-dependent sectors, and the average resilience of online businesses is roughly 20 days—a threshold the country is now approaching. Senior figures in Iran’s computer and IT guilds warn that beyond direct financial losses, the shutdown is eroding user trust, international rankings, and accelerating elite and talent migration, with long-term damage likely to far exceed current estimates.

The economic consequences of the blackout have become increasingly visible . Images circulating on social media show traders lining up at Tehran’s Chamber of Commerce to access the internet for just 20 minutes per day, under supervision, after signing formal pledges. Business leaders describe this arrangement as wholly inadequate—barely enough to check email—underscoring how deeply the restrictions have disrupted trade, logistics, and international transactions. For many firms, this has effectively frozen operations, reinforcing uncertainty and caution rather than confidence.

Financial markets have also reacted sharply . Iran’s stock exchange recorded its steepest single-day decline on record, with the main index falling by over 121,000 points, while the equal-weight index dropped by more than 27,000 points. Analysts and officials alike attribute the sustained selloff to a deteriorating post-protest outlook, compounded by growing fears of a U.S. military strike and broader geopolitical escalation. As capital exits the stock market, liquidity has flowed toward foreign currency and gold, further destabilizing the macroeconomic environment.

This external threat perception has become an additional factor keeping the country in a state of heightened uncertainty and alert . Even absent a confirmed decision in Washington, continued discussion of military “options,” deterrence signaling, and the possibility of expanded sanctions or covert disruption have reinforced the sense that Iran’s post-protest crisis is not solely domestic. For households and businesses alike, the risk calculus is shaped not only by inflation and repression, but by the fear that sudden escalation could trigger sharper currency shocks, supply disruptions, and deeper instability—making any calm feel provisional.

At the same time, the government continues to project an image of control and reform . Officials highlight a recent pause in the rial’s depreciation, noting that after spiking to roughly 142,000 tomans per U.S. dollar during the height of the protests, the rate has stabilized around 138,000–140,000 tomans. While authorities frame this as evidence that market “hype” has subsided and policy reforms are taking effect, the level itself reflects a severe erosion of purchasing power, and the calm has coincided with extraordinary coercive measures rather than restored trust.

Indeed, economic stabilization has unfolded alongside an expansion of repression and legal intimidation . Government officials and judicial authorities have openly warned that support for protests—whether through street participation or online expression—may constitute cooperation with hostile foreign states, a charge that carries the potential penalty of full asset confiscation, even in the absence of direct involvement in violence. This framing has significantly widened the scope of vulnerability for business owners, professionals, artists, athletes, and ordinary citizens.

The human cost of the crackdown continues to grow . Accurate nationwide casualty figures remain unavailable, but independent human rights organizations estimate that thousands have been killed or injured since the protests began in mid-January. The Human Rights Activists News Agency (HRANA) has confirmed at least 5,149 protester deaths as of January 25, while reporting that more than 17,000 additional cases of possible fatalities remain under investigation. Rights groups warn that the final confirmed toll could be several times higher, given the scale of violence, reporting restrictions, and the prolonged internet blackout.

Alongside these independent estimates, Iranian authorities have advanced a sharply different official narrative . According to a statement by Iran’s foreign minister Abbas Araghchi, government figures place the total number of those killed during the recent protests at 3,117. He claims that 690 of those killed were “terrorists,” while asserting that 2,427 victims were security personnel and civilians.

The stark discrepancy between official and independent figures highlights the opacity surrounding the crackdown and the absence of any single, official and transparent mechanism for verifying casualties . Human rights advocates argue that the government’s broad use of labels such as “terrorist” mirrors past protest crackdowns, where such classifications were used to delegitimize dissent and justify the use of lethal force.

Medical data has provided grim corroboration of the scale of violence . Iran’s leading ophthalmology hospital in Tehran reported that approximately 1,000 patients with severe eye injuries—many caused by shotgun pellets—were treated in the days following the protests’ peak, including dozens who lost vision in both eyes. Hospital staff described overflowing wards and a predominance of young patients, underscoring the lasting physical consequences of violence used by security forces.

Despite official denials, reports of pressure on injured protesters to avoid seeking treatment have persisted . While health officials urge the public to seek medical care and deny coordination with security forces, earlier accounts documented the presence of security agents at hospitals during the protests’ most violent days, reinforcing fear among the wounded.

The violence has also cut across traditionally loyal constituencies . Authorities have confirmed the deaths of seven clerics, damage to dozens of mosques, and casualties among security forces, including members of the Revolutionary Guards and Basij. Intended to underscore the scale of unrest, these acknowledgments instead highlight how deeply the crisis has penetrated Iranian society.

Individual stories have become symbols of national trauma . One widely shared video shows a father searching among rows of body bags at Tehran’s forensic center, repeatedly calling out his son’s name—“Sepehre Baba.” Attempts by state media to recast or neutralize the footage have failed, and the phrase has become shorthand for the protests’ brutality and the anguish of families still searching for answers.

Arrests continue as well . Provincial officials report hundreds of detentions in individual provinces, often describing detainees as “ringleaders” of unrest, while broader figures remain unavailable due to restricted reporting. Senior judicial officials reiterate that those accused of armed action or threats to “national security” will receive no leniency, reinforcing a narrative that increasingly blurs the line between peaceful protest and violent crime.

As the blackout enters its third week, international internet monitoring organizations report that only a handful of pre-approved services remain intermittently accessible , and that brief spikes in connectivity have created a misleading impression of restoration. In practice, Iran remains largely cut off from the global internet.

Taken together, Iran’s post-protest reality is one of fragile stasis sustained by force, under domestic repression and the shadow of potential external escalation . The state has managed to temporarily halt the currency’s free fall and impose surface-level order, but at the cost of deepening economic dysfunction, eroding property rights, paralyzing digital life, and inflicting irreversible human harm. Whether this moment of imposed calm can translate into genuine stability remains deeply uncertain. Without transparency, legal security, restored connectivity, accountability for violence, and a reduction in the perceived risk of sudden external escalation, the current equilibrium appears less like recovery—and more like a pause before the next rupture.

***

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