 | January 28, 2026 This month’s newsletter features an update to our table that details Iran's missile arsenal, which remains one of the largest and most diverse in the Middle East despite recent losses in several rounds of fighting with Israel. Iran responded to its poor performance in those exchanges by seeking to improve the maneuverability of its missiles, including by testing a new ballistic missile reportedly guided by electro-optical seekers. The newsletter also features profiles of China-based entities involved in the proliferation of a German-designed engine that powers Iran’s Shahed-136 suicide drones, as well as news about Iran’s efforts to replenish its missile stocks, the impasse between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) over access to bombed nuclear sites, and illicit Iranian sales of jet fuel and explosives ingredients to the military junta in Myanmar. Additions to the Iran Watch library include U.S. counterproliferation sanctions announcements and additional “maximum pressure” sanctions in response to the Iranian government’s violent crackdown on protesters. Was this email forwarded to you? Sign up to receive the newsletter in your inbox, or view the newsletter in your browser. |
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| Test launch of the Qassem Basir missile. (Photo Credit: Iranian Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics) |
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| This table sets forth what is publicly known, claimed, or estimated about the capabilities of Iran's ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and space launch vehicles. Since the last update, Iran expended hundreds of missiles during its June 2025 war with Israel, as well as two other exchanges of fire in 2024. Israeli strikes on those occasions damaged Iran’s stockpiles, launchers, and missile production capabilities. Iran responded to its missiles’ poor performance in evading air defenses by seeking to improve the maneuverability of their warheads and reentry vehicles, including by testing a “Qassem Basir” ballistic missile reportedly guided by electro-optical seekers. |
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| A family of Chinese companies linked to a Germany-based aircraft engine producer has lurked in the background of the proliferation of Iranian-designed Shahed-136 suicide drones. |
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| Iran and Myanmar’s foreign ministers meet in Kampala, Uganda, in October 2025. (Photo Credit: Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs) |
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| January 26, 2026: Iranian sales of jet fuel and urea to Myanmar have enabled a bombing campaign by Myanmar's military junta. Two sanctioned Iranian tankers, Reef and Noble, together delivered approximately 175,000 tons of jet fuel in nine shipments between October 2024 and December 2025. The vessels manipulated their AIS trackers to make it appear that they were travelling between Basra, Iraq, and the port of Chittagong in Bangladesh, when in fact they were transporting fuel from a National Iranian Oil Refining and Distribution Company (NIORDC) refinery in Bandar Abbas to the Myan Oil Terminal near Yangon. The Myan terminal is connected to entities that have been sanctioned for supplying the junta with jet fuel. In the past three years, Iran has also supplied Myanmar with an estimated 400,000 to 600,000 tons of urea annually. The bulk cargo vessels Golden ES and Rasha both made deliveries of urea, which the Myanmar military uses to produce bombs and other explosives. |
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| January 23, 2026: Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) head Mohammad Eslami said that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) must "clarify its position" on the June 2025 U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities before Iran will allow the IAEA to inspect the bombed sites. IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi earlier said that the Agency had inspected all of the 13 declared nuclear facilities that were not damaged in the strikes, but that it has had no access to the facilities in Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan that were the main targets of the attack. |
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| January 14, 2025: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Aerospace Force commander Majid Mousavi told Iranian state media that Iran has increased its missile stockpile since its war with Israel in June 2025. Mousavi claimed that damage to production facilities from the war had been repaired and that the Aerospace Force's production output "in various areas" was now higher than it was before June 2025. |
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| The United States sanctioned networks of entities involved in Iranian arms proliferation. - The Treasury Department froze the assets of entities involved in procurement for Iran’s missile and drone programs, as well as a company engaged in joint drone production with Venezuela – December 30
- The Treasury Department also targeted Houthi weapons smuggling networks, along with entities and vessels facilitating Iranian oil sales to the Houthis – January 16
- The United States convened a symposium of 40 countries to discuss the implementation of restored U.N. “snapback” sanctions on Iran – January 27
The United States and its allies responded to the Iranian government’s violent repression of protests with new sanctions. - The G7 condemned the crackdown and threatened to impose restrictive measures – January 14
- The U.S. Treasury and State Departments designated officials involved in repression and targeted two money laundering networks used by Iran to facilitate oil exports – January 15
- The United States subsequently sanctioned nine shadow fleet vessels and their owners to deny revenue to the Iranian state – January 23
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| Iran Watch is a website published by the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control. The Wisconsin Project is a non-profit, non-partisan organization that conducts research, advocacy, and public education aimed at inhibiting strategic trade from contributing to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
Copyright © 2026 - Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control |
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