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US COMPANIES PREPARE TO PROFIT FROM REGIME CHANGE IN CUBA
[[link removed]]
Blake Burdge
January 24, 2026
Jacobin
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_ Eyeing a possible regime change in Cuba, US corporations see an
opportunity to recoup assets lost in revolutionary seizures many
decades ago. The Supreme Court, at the urging of the Trump
administration, might soon clear the way for them. _
Cuban American hard-liners and fossil fuel giants are adopting an
overt strategy of lawfare against Cuba. Encouraged by Donald Trump, a
Republican-dominated Supreme Court could soon give the project crucial
support. (Andrew Caballero-Reynolds, Andrew Caballero-Reynolds / AFP
via Getty Images
s President Donald Trump [[link removed]]
gestures toward regime change in Cuba, the US Supreme Court
[[link removed]], with Trump’s urging,
has agreed to hear lawsuits that could help corporate interests recoup
hundreds of millions of dollars in long-expropriated Cuban assets if
the United States seizes control of the nation.
One of those lawsuits involves an oil giant claiming damages from
Cuban companies for decades-old revolutionary asset seizures. The
other, which one of the plaintiffs calls
[[link removed]] the
most important Supreme Court case on Cuba “in the past sixty
years,” involves the scion of a fascist-friendly corporate empire
who’s taken credit for Trump’s hardline stance on Cuba and is
seeking compensation for a 122-year-old expired pier contract.
Together, they build on long-dormant anti-Cuban foreign policy
weaponized by Trump and push the court to extend US law beyond its
borders to retroactively punish a foreign revolution — and deliver
the spoils to profiteers.
“The Supreme Court is doing about seventy cases a year,” Robert
Muse, a Washington, DC–based attorney who has long focused on Cuban
legal matters, told the _Lever_. “The fact that it would devote two
places on the docket to litigation arising under a statute that’s
only produced about fifty cases in total — and where there’s no
circuit split — is extraordinary.”
Over the past year, the Trump administration has ratcheted
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[[link removed]] tactics
[[link removed]] to
deliver regime change in Cuba, which has weathered a comprehensive
trade embargo for six decades and has been trapped in fuel, energy,
medicine, and foreign exchange crises
[[link removed]] since
the onset of COVID-19 pandemic.
Then, within hours of US troops extracting Venezuelan president
Nicolás Maduro on January 3, Donald Trump asserted
[[link removed]] that
“Cuba is ready to fall” because Cuba gets “all of their income
[[link removed]]”
from Venezuelan oil. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, a prominent Cuban
American politician, soon echoed the warning,
[[link removed]] telling
the Cuban government that it “should be concerned.” The following
week, Trump doubled down on his threats, warning
[[link removed]] the
Cuban government to “make a deal before it’s too late.”
Amid this backdrop, the Supreme Court will hear arguments for _Exxon
Mobil Corp. v. Corporación Cimex, S.A._ and _Havana Docks
Corporation v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd. _on February 23. If the
Supreme Court rules in favor of the corporate plaintiffs, it could
create new avenues for private actors to capitalize on regime change
in the country — and further boost the vulture capitalism that is
already driving US policy in Latin America.
Across the region, corporate interests have been turning political
crises into legal clout. Hedge funds have for years prolonged
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austerity measures in Puerto Rico
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by pressuring the US territory’s government to pay distressed debts
in full. More recently, energy companies
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themselves
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profit from Trump’s Venezuelan regime change.
Codifying Retaliation
After former Cuban president Fidel Castro’s anti-imperialist Cuban
Revolution deposed US-backed dictator Fulgencio Batista in 1959,
US-Cuba relations quickly deteriorated. The following year, Castro
authorized Law 851
[[link removed]],
allowing the Cuban government to expropriate US-owned or controlled
property.
Then, in 1962, the United States imposed a full trade embargo
[[link removed]] on
Cuba, following Deputy Assistant Secretary Lester
Mallory’s recommendation
[[link removed]] three
years earlier to deny “money and supplies to Cuba, to decrease
monetary and real wages, to bring about hunger, desperation, and
overthrow of the government.”
In 1996, Congress hardened the embargo by passing the Helms-Burton
Act [[link removed]],
which extended the ban beyond US borders. By threatening legal action
against both US and non-US firms for conducting business in Cuba, the
Helms-Burton Act explicitly sought
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expedite the collapse of the Cuban government by discouraging foreign
business investment in Cuba.
These lawsuits build on long-dormant anti-Cuban foreign policy
weaponized by Trump and push the court to extend US law beyond its
borders to retroactively punish a foreign revolution.
One section of the Helms-Burton Act, Title III, created a private
right
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of action that allowed “US nationals” to file suit against any US
or foreign entity that “traffics” in property expropriated by the
Cuban government. Both the drafters of the Helms-Burton Act and
Cuban-American hard-liners have argued
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Title III is necessary because it provides a means for Cuban-Americans
to receive compensation for property that the Cuban government has
seized and profits from.
However, the Cuban government has already settled many revolution-era
debts without the threat of legal action. It has negotiated
settlements
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nationalized properties with Canada, Great Britain, France, Spain, and
Switzerland. The Cuban government originally agreed
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to compensate US property owners via proceeds from its long-standing
US sugar export deal, but the matter was left at an impasse after the
United States ended the trade arrangement in 1961.
Shortly after former president Bill Clinton signed the Helms-Burton
Act, the European Union threatened
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challenge the law before the World Trade Organization because it would
allow the United States to regulate non-US companies operating
elsewhere. Clinton agreed to suspend Title III of the law for six
months, and the EU dropped its case. For more than twenty years, every
president since
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has suspended Title III in six-month terms, recognizing that its
activation would strain
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diplomatic relations with allies.
That restraint ended during Donald Trump’s first term when the
administration activated Title III in April 2019. The move opened the
floodgates for longstanding grievances to become lawsuits. Roughly
forty suits were filed
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the first two years of Title III’s activation against Cuban,
American, and European companies — but so far, most have had little
effect.
“Title III has been operative for six years” Muse explained,
“and nobody has received a judgment.” Many of the lawsuits have
been dismissed on procedural issues
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and most early judgments
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the only jury verdict award
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favor of plaintiffs have been overturned.
But now, two of those lawsuits have reached the Supreme Court.
Exxon and the Assault on Sovereign Immunity
One of those cases was filed
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ExxonMobil against two Cuban state corporations: Union CubaPetroleo
(CUPET) and Corporación CIMEX. Exxon Mobil argues that the companies
are liable for the losses incurred by Cuba’s 1960 revolutionary
expropriation of its service stations and oil refineries, which were
at the time owned by the oil giant’s Panamanian subsidiary, Esso
Standard Oil.
The 1976 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
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as well as international law — agrees that one nation cannot be sued
in the courts of another. So, for a plaintiff to proceed with a civil
suit against a foreign state under the Helms-Burton Act, it would need
to qualify for an exception
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year, the US Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit determined
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Exxon did not satisfy the criteria to qualify for any such exception.
Exxon then petitioned
[[link removed]] the
Supreme Court to do something far more radical: strip Cuban government
entities of their sovereignty altogether by arguing that Title III of
the Helms-Burton Act does away with foreign sovereign immunity.
Last August, the Trump administration filed an amicus brief in the
case agreeing
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the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act imposes undue burdens on
plaintiffs and that Title III of the Helms-Burton Act alone should
suffice. Sovereign immunity, in the eyes of Trump’s Solicitor
General, appears to be an inconvenience standing in the way of
retribution.
In its brief, the government insisted that it has “compelling” and
“paramount
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foreign policy interests in ensuring that US nationals receive
compensation, citing a January 2025 Trump memo titled _“_Restoring a
Tough U.S.-Cuba Policy
[[link removed]]_._” What
it does not explain, though, is how the courts would enforce any
resulting judgments against the Cuban companies involved — unless
there is a regime change.
“You’ve got your Helms-Burton judgment — where are you going to
execute it?” said Muse. “There are no Cuban assets in the United
States to execute on.”
Havana Docks and the Fiction of Stolen Property
The same day that the Supreme Court agreed to hear the Exxon case, it
also agreed
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to hear Havana Docks Corporation’s lawsuit against four US-based
cruise lines.
The Kentucky-based company seeks $439 million from cruise ship
operators Carnival, Royal Caribbean, MSC Cruises, and Norwegian for
alleged damages incurred between 2016 and 2019, when President Barack
Obama removed
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Cuba from a list of countries deemed to have inadequate port security
to allow for US-based cruises to stop there. Havana Docks argues that
it holds a long-standing claim to a concession for a long-nationalized
terminal and piers used by cruise operators during that time for
passenger loading and unloading.
In 1904, Cuban president Tomás Estrada Palma granted Compañia del
Puerto, a predecessor to Havana Docks Corporation, a public works
concession to build a pier on the state-owned San Francisco Wharf in
Havana. According to Decree 467, the concession was explicitly for
public purposes and only for cargo loading and unloading; despite
Havana Dock’s current claims, Compañia del Puerto was never
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authorized to offer passenger services on the pier. The initial term
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of the lease was for fifty years beginning in 1905; the lease was
later extended to ninety-nine years, with an expiration date of 2004.
The Cuban Law of Ports made clear
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ports are public property and that the public has a “fundamental
right to the use of the littoral sea,” which includes the specific
right to embark and disembark passengers. According to legal expert
Ambar Diaz
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in a report created for the Supreme Court at the request of the cruise
lines, Havana Docks’ rights were always contingent on state
ownership, public rights, and a nonexclusive concession — meaning
that the company’s lease could at any time have been terminated,
including through expropriation, if the state determined that public
needs required it.
Havana Docks is adamant, though, that its expired lease still
qualifies as property that was expropriated by the Cuban government.
Behind Havana Docks Corporation’s litigation stands an extensive
lobbying campaign by Mickael Behn, a London-based heir to
International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation. The company became
a global telecommunications empire
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the 1930s under Sosthenes Behn, who leveraged connections and cozied
up to officials from the Franco and Hitler regimes
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and paid Cuban officials under Batista. In 1917, Sosthenes formed
[[link removed]] Havana
Docks Corporation and acquired the concession from Compañia del
Puerto to operate cargo loading and unloading on the Havana piers.
Now Mickael, Sosthenes’ grandson, along with his two cousins in
France, holds a majority of Havana Docks’ shares. A small group of
shareholders
[[link removed]],
including Warren Buffett, owns the rest. Behn joined forces with
Javier Garcia-Bengochea, a Cuban American who claims
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to own more than 82 percent of commercial waterfront property that
was used by cruise operators following Obama’s legalization of Cuban
travel. Only 32.5 percent of Garcia-Bengochea’s interest was
certified by the International Claims Settlement Act — the remaining
50 percent stake was never certified
[[link removed]].
In 2018, Behn and fellow Title III claimant Javier Garcia-Bengochea
began to run a public smear campaign
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to discourage American tourists from taking cruises to Cuba, placing
billboards across Miami and running radio ads to link the Cuban
military with US-based cruise operators. Behn and his associates
effectively ran the ad campaign with the help
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the Miami-based Cuban Democratic Directorate, a nongovernmental
organization that received more than $3 million
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in US federal grants to “promote freedom of information” in Cuba.
Behn and Garcia-Bengochea indirectly lobbied
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the first Trump administration in 2018 to activate Title III of the
Helms-Burton Act with the help of former US diplomat Otto Reich
(famous for his role in the Iran-Contra scandal
[[link removed]]), former National
Security Advisor John Bolton, and DC-based lobbying firm Cormac Group.
The lobbying firm scheduled “$10k coffees
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for Behn and Garcia-Bengochea with then-Senator Rubio and
then-Governor Rick Scott to request that Trump enforces Titles III and
IV of the Helms-Burton Act.
On April 17, 2019, the Trump administration announced the activation
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of Title III. Less than two months later, the administration halted
cruises
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and ended
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category that allowed American citizens to visit Cuba as tourists.
Behn and Garcia-Bengochea have openly credited
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their lobbying efforts to the successful implementation of Title III
and the following restrictive US travel policy to Cuba.
“We were able to muster our resources and bring them together and
ultimately connect with the Trump administration to get Title III
enacted,” Garcia-Bengochea told
[[link removed]] the _Miami
New Times_ in 2023. “Everybody who has sued [under Title III] owes
us. We did this for them, and they know it.”
It is with good reason that the Cuban hard-liner community can expect
the US Supreme Court to rule in favor of these lawsuits.
Since 2000, Garcia-Bengochea has donated $25,400 to Marco Rubio’s
political coffers and $18,600 to Florida congressman Mario
Díaz-Balart. Díaz-Balart, a Republican, filed an amicus curiae brief
[[link removed]]
in support of Havana Docks in March 2025, arguing that US foreign
policy is to “bring democratic institutions to Cuba” by cutting
off “hard currency, oil, and productive investment and expertise.”
In their own Supreme Court brief on the issue, the cruise lines and
related industry groups warned
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that accepting Havana Docks’ theory that expired, nonexclusive,
public-purpose concessions can be converted to indefinite property
claims. They argue
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that this would expose companies to potentially massive retroactive
liability and would chill any future normalization policy between the
United States and Cuba.
“The sum-total of the Eleventh Circuit’s holding is that [Havana
Docks Corporation]’s time-limited interest expired before 2016,”
the cruise lines noted. “That narrow, factbound conclusion is not
the stuff of certiorari, let alone of diplomatic crises.”
An Imperial Court in Waiting
The Trump administration’s foreign policy goals, which align with
Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s lifelong vendettas
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leftist governments in Latin America, particularly Venezuela and Cuba,
have worked in tandem to drive the Title III lawsuits to the Supreme
Court’s docket.
In both the Exxon and Havana Docks cases, US Solicitor General D. John
Sauer contends
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that an immediate review of the Helms-Burton Act’s meaning and scope
as a “priority for US foreign policy.”
While this is the first time a Helms-Burton Act Title III lawsuit has
ever reached the Supreme Court, the Trump administration has
interpreted the 1996 law squarely as it was intended — to curtail
foreign investment in Cuba because it “undermines the foreign policy
of the United States
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policy is to bring about regime change in Cuba.
It is with good reason that the Cuban hard-liner community can expect
the US Supreme Court to rule in favor of these lawsuits. In the first
year of its second administration, Trump’s solicitor general has
been masterful at identifying lower court decisions that the Supreme
Court would likely reverse or stay in Trump’s favor; last year, the
Trump administration lost only five of twenty-six cases
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the Supreme Court’s emergency docket.
“History teaches us that the courts are exceptionally deferential to
the executive branch in the area of foreign relations,” said Muse.
“If the US government tells the court there’s a national security
interest, the court is not going to examine the basis for that
claim.”
Since 1996, the primary goal of the Helms-Burton Act has been to scare
US investors away from Cuba in order to choke any supply of US dollars
to the island.
“Helms-Burton is a truly bizarre statute,” says Robert Muse. “It
doesn’t advance national security, it doesn’t compensate anyone,
and it produces judgments with nowhere to enforce them.”
Today, however, there is a very real possibility that legal action
could be taken against US companies — in this case, cruise lines —
to satisfy Trump’s regime-change ambitions and the avarice of
corporate vultures.
This article was first published by the _Lever_
[[link removed]], an award-winning independent
investigative newsroom.
_BLAKE BURDGE is a graduate student in international relations at
Northeastern University specializing in diplomacy. He is the founder
of __Cuba Monitor__, an independent platform focused on US–Cuba
policy._
_JACOBIN is a leading voice of the American left, offering socialist
perspectives on politics, economics, and culture. The print magazine
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web audience of over 3,000,000 a month._
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