͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌     ͏ ‌    ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­



CFTNI Policy Brief: Another Strike on Iran Would Not Serve U.S. Interests


In the aftermath of the massive protests in Iran earlier this month, President Trump faces a momentous decision on whether to respond to the Iranian regime’s repression with military strikes intended to weaken its hold on power. At the height of the violence, American and Israeli officials warned him that more time was needed to move U.S. military assets into place before taking action, but with those assets now arriving in theater, the moment of decision is fast approaching. President Trump had campaigned on a pledge to avoid “regime change” wars, nation-building, and costly military engagements in a region of secondary importance to U.S. interests, but the current circumstances are pulling him in that direction.


In the latest policy brief from the Center for the National Interest, Greg Priddy examines several key elements that should drive the cost-benefit analysis of such a decision. He concludes that an American attempt to administer a coup de grâce to the Iranian regime would not be advisable. It would carry risks that go well beyond those of Operation Midnight Hammer — the U.S. strikes against Iranian nuclear assets in June — and would have little likelihood of successfully achieving its objective.


The analysis addresses thorny questions, including whether it is realistic to expect Iran to give up all of its missile capabilities as part of a deal, effectively leaving it defenseless, as well as the balance between U.S. use of its scarce missile-defense interceptors (such as the THAAD and SM-3 systems) and Iranian capabilities. Another round of hostilities could leave those systems dangerously depleted, he argues, and undermine the U.S. defense posture in more important theaters, especially the Asia-Pacific region.


Read the report.


For more CFTNI publications, see our website.


Paul J. Saunders

President

Center for the National Interest

About the Author:


Greg Priddy is Senior Fellow for the Middle East at the Center for the National Interest. He also consults for corporate and financial clients on political risk in the region and global energy markets. From 2006 to 2018, Mr. Priddy was Director, Global Oil, at Eurasia Group. Prior to that, from 1999 to 2006, Mr. Priddy worked as a contractor for the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) at the U.S. Department of Energy. Mr. Priddy holds an M.A. In International Relations from George Washington University and has studies at the American University in Cairo.