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Iran’s protest movement has now entered a distinctly new phase. Large-scale street mobilization has largely receded, and major urban centers remain visibly quiet, with no credible reports of sustained demonstrations comparable to earlier stages of unrest. Heavy security deployment continues, particularly in politically sensitive cities, suggesting that the state has succeeded—at least for now—in reasserting physical control over public space. This relative calm, however, does not reflect political resolution. Instead, it marks a transition from open confrontation to enforced silence, in which the social, psychological, and human consequences of the crackdown continue to unfold beneath the surface.
The human cost continues to mount despite the information blackout. According to the latest verified data from Human Rights Activists News Agency (HRANA), at least 2,677 people have been confirmed killed, with 1,693 additional death cases still under review. HRANA further reports 2,677 individuals with serious injuries and 19,097 arrests, including minors and students, alongside an increasing number of forced confessions broadcast on state media. These figures have been compiled amid a prolonged, near-total internet shutdown—now longer than the 2019 blackout—raising sustained concern that the true scale of casualties may only become apparent once communications are restored.
With street protests suppressed, the crisis has shifted decisively toward diplomacy, deterrence, and international signaling. The central variable at this stage is the posture of the United States, and in particular the choices facing President Donald Trump. Over the past 48 hours, U.S. rhetoric has shown signs of modulation. While Washington continues to warn that executions or renewed mass killings would trigger serious consequences, there has been a parallel effort to reduce immediate escalation and test diplomatic channels.
In this context, statements by Steve Witkoff, President Trump’s special envoy, are especially revealing. Witkoff has confirmed that, at Trump’s direct instruction, he contacted Iranian officials and conveyed a direct U.S. message to Tehran. Importantly, Witkoff made clear that these contacts focused on four long-standing strategic issues: Iran’s nuclear program, uranium enrichment, missile capabilities, and regional proxy forces. Notably absent from these four tracks was any substantive negotiation framework regarding Iran’s internal protest crackdown, despite public U.S. concern over killings and executions. This distinction suggests that while human rights abuses remain part of Washington’s pressure rhetoric, the operational diplomatic agenda remains anchored in traditional security and regional files.
In parallel, Iran’s internal crisis has moved formally onto the agenda of the United Nations Security Council, which convened an emergency session at the request of the United States. During the meeting, senior UN officials warned about the scale of repression, mass arrests, and the prolonged internet shutdown, while several Western delegations condemned the violent response to protests and signaled readiness for further punitive measures. Russia and China, by contrast, criticized U.S. rhetoric and cautioned against external intervention, arguing that military escalation would deepen regional instability. Iranian representatives rejected allegations of mass repression, framing the unrest as violent and externally instigated. The session underscored deep divisions among major powers and highlighted the absence of consensus on concrete international action, reinforcing a pattern in which diplomatic condemnation is intensifying even as enforcement mechanisms remain limited.
At the same time, deterrence signaling continues. Reports of U.S. naval assets—including a carrier strike group—moving toward the broader Middle East indicate that Washington is maintaining military leverage alongside diplomatic outreach. This combination points toward a familiar but volatile pattern: the possible emergence of negotiations conducted under the shadow of military threat, rather than a clear pivot either to de-escalation or confrontation.
International actors are actively shaping this environment. Russia has positioned itself as a potential mediator, with President Vladimir Putin holding calls with both Israeli and Iranian leaders and reiterating Moscow’s readiness to reduce tensions. Meanwhile, U.S. pressure on third countries engaging Iran has intensified, most visibly in South Africa, where Washington criticized Pretoria for hosting naval exercises that included Iranian participation during the crackdown—prompting an internal South African review of Iran’s role in the drills. These developments underscore that Iran’s external relationships are increasingly being scrutinized and politicized amid the crisis.
Inside Iran, political signaling has moved in the opposite direction of fragmentation. A recent statement by former president Mohammad Khatami is notable not only for acknowledging deep social grievances, economic hardship, and governance failures, but for the boundaries it draws. While sharply critical of violence and warning against polarization, Khatami ultimately frames the path forward as reform within the existing constitutional and ideological framework, calling for a return to republicanism compatible with Islamic governance rather than a rupture with the system. This statement reinforces the reality that even prominent reformist figures continue to define themselves inside the political order, signaling that elite cohesion—at least at the declarative level—remains intact.
This internal alignment intersects with a broader societal constraint often underestimated in escalation scenarios. Many analysts argue that a large portion of Iranian society—despite deep opposition to the Islamic Republic—remains opposed to foreign military intervention. Among those articulating this view is Mehrzad Boroujerdi, who has warned that external military action could have devastating long-term consequences for Iran and would be unacceptable to broad segments of the population. This sentiment helps explain the widening divide within the opposition landscape: between those awaiting an external shock to force change and those who fear such intervention would strengthen repression and deepen national trauma.
Taken together, Iran appears to be entering a phase defined by quiet streets but unresolved conflict. The state has regained control of public space, but at the cost of thousands of lives, mass arrests, and an information blackout that has severed society from transparency and accountability. Internationally, pressure on Tehran is intensifying, yet it is being channeled—at least for now—through sanctions, backchannel diplomacy, and calibrated military signaling rather than immediate force.
The critical question is no longer whether protests will return in the short term, but whether the crisis will be redirected outward—into negotiations shaped by coercion—before its underlying political and social drivers are addressed. What exists today is not stability, but enforced quiet: a pause produced by repression at home and brinkmanship abroad, with Iran’s political future still unresolved and its society absorbing the shock of extraordinary violence.
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