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Week of December 22, 2025 | Iran Unfiltered is a digest tracking Iranian politics & society by the National Iranian American Council
Maritime tensions between Iran and the United States have intensified across multiple theaters, most notably in the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, and beyond the Middle East. These tensions are increasingly shaped by U.S. sanctions enforcement, vessel seizures, and naval deployments, to which Iran has largely responded through reactive maritime enforcement and deterrence measures. The convergence of legal, military, and economic pressure at sea has transformed commercial shipping into a frontline of geopolitical confrontation.
In the latest incident, Iran’s judiciary announced that a legal case has been opened at the Public and Revolutionary Prosecutor’s Office of Qeshm County concerning violations attributed to a seized foreign oil tanker and its detained crew. The vessel was intercepted near Qeshm Island by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy, which stated that the tanker was carrying approximately four million liters of smuggled fuel. Sixteen non-Iranian crew members were arrested and are currently held under judicial detention orders. Iranian authorities have not disclosed the nationality of the detainees, the flag state of the vessel, or its ownership.
According to Mojtaba Ghahremani, Chief Justice of Hormozgan Province, the operation was carried out by the IRGC Navy’s First Naval District, which seized the tanker in waters adjacent to Qeshm Island. The seizure was publicly announced on December 24 by Abbas Gholamshahi, commander of the IRGC Navy’s First District, who stated that the tanker had received its cargo from smaller vessels and was preparing to transfer the fuel to larger ships outside the Persian Gulf, a method Iranian officials describe as part of organized fuel-smuggling networks. Iranian authorities have declared that both the tanker and its cargo will be confiscated.
Judicial officials assessed the combined value of the tanker and its cargo at 700 billion tomans, equivalent to approximately $5.2 million. Iran’s judiciary has stated that in such cases those convicted face prison sentences, fines of up to ten times the value of the seized fuel, and confiscation of vessels in favor of the state. Officials emphasized that the quantity of fuel seized in this case exceeds that of vessels intercepted in previous months, signaling an expansion in the scale of maritime enforcement.
Iranian authorities describe these actions as part of a broader campaign against fuel smuggling, intensified in recent months following directives from President Masoud Pezeshkian to increase enforcement along Iran’s southern and southeastern coasts. Over the past several years, Iran has repeatedly reported the seizure of vessels accused of illegal entry into Iranian waters or transporting contraband fuel, and has also seized foreign oil tankers, often without publicly identifying their ownership.
These Iranian actions have unfolded against a backdrop of recent U.S. maritime seizures and interdictions, which Tehran views as provocative and unilateral extensions of sanctions policy. In recent weeks, the United States seized two oil tankers near Venezuela, actions framed by Washington as sanctions enforcement but criticized by affected states and their allies as violations of maritime norms. In November 2025, U.S. forces boarded and inspected a cargo vessel traveling from China to Iran in the Indian Ocean, several hundred miles off the coast of Sri Lanka. U.S. officials reported that the cargo removed consisted of dual-use items that could be used in Iran’s conventional weapons and missile programs, and the shipment was confiscated and destroyed, while the vessel itself was allowed to continue its voyage. This operation was part of an expanded U.S. maritime interdiction strategy targeting shipments perceived as supporting Iran’s military supply chains, and reflected a broader pattern of U.S. enforcement actions at sea that Tehran views as coercive and destabilizing.
Iran has long maintained that its maritime actions are reactive, arguing that if U.S. sanctions prevent Iran from exporting its own oil, it cannot be expected to tolerate unrestricted exports by others. Iranian officials contend that the seizure of vessels and increased naval activity are defensive measures aimed at countering economic pressure rather than initiating escalation.
At the same time, the presence of U.S. and allied naval forces in the Persian Gulf has expanded, including multinational maritime security coalitions established to protect shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. Iran consistently describes these deployments as sources of instability, arguing that the security of the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz is a legal and historical responsibility of regional states. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has repeatedly stated that “the United States must leave West Asia,” asserting that foreign military presence fuels insecurity rather than preventing it.
Taken together, recent developments suggest that Iran–U.S. tensions at sea are driven by a cycle of action and reaction, rooted primarily in sanctions, economic warfare, and maritime enforcement. As commercial shipping becomes increasingly securitized, the risk of miscalculation in crowded and strategically vital waterways continues to rise, carrying implications not only for regional stability but also for global energy markets and international maritime security.
Amid a sharp new phase of inflation and currency volatility in Iran, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Speaker of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, has issued a direct warning that parliament may initiate impeachment proceedings if the government fails to deliver tangible results in curbing rising prices and stabilizing the economy. Speaking during a public parliamentary session on Sunday, December 21, Ghalibaf turned to what he described as the most urgent national concern: “the unrestrained rise in the prices of basic goods,” with particular emphasis on the sharp increases in the price of foreign currency and gold, which he said now function both as drivers and pretexts for broader inflation.
Ghalibaf stated that parliament considers it its duty to address the public’s livelihood concerns and stressed that lawmakers have been actively and seriously pursuing the issue. He noted that during the previous week—when MPs were present in their constituencies—he, together with the heads of the Economic Commission and the Planning and Budget Commission, held multiple meetings with cabinet ministers and senior government officials to examine price hikes and exchange-rate instability.
He announced that a formal oversight session would be held on Tuesday focused on preventing further erosion of household purchasing power, implementing the electronic ration-card (kalabarg) law, and managing the foreign-exchange market. The closed-door session Tuesday included five ministers, the Central Bank governor, and other senior figures, and concluded with a decision to form a five-member joint committee between parliament and the government to address structural economic imbalances. Some reports described verbal tensions during the meeting, including remarks attributed to the Central Bank governor that foreign-currency supply is not solely under his authority, a claim later downplayed by the Central Bank.
The standoff coincides with the government’s submission of the 1405 (2026–27) budget bill, which—according to the head of the Planning and Budget Organization—has been prepared under a new framework that removes four zeros from the national currency, marking the first annual budget drafted under the proposed new rial system.
Ghalibaf concluded with an explicit ultimatum: if these measures fail to produce results, parliament’s priority—“to minimize time and tension”—will be for the government to undertake cabinet reshuffles. Should the executive fail to implement what he described as necessary reforms, he said, lawmakers will be compelled to initiate the impeachment process.
The government responded by emphasizing cooperation while warning against politicization. Government spokesperson Fatemeh Mohajerani said the administration has placed controlling inflation and preserving purchasing power at the top of its executive priorities. She stated that the government has taken specific measures in recent weeks to manage the currency market, strengthen oversight of essential goods, expand electronic subsidy mechanisms, and prevent further economic instability.
At the same time, Mohajerani cautioned against shifting responsibility solely onto the executive, stressing that while the government must answer for policy implementation, parliament also bears responsibility for legislation, economic structures, and the consequences of its own decisions. She argued that economic reform cannot be achieved merely by changing individuals, but requires adjustments to procedures and policies in both branches of power. While welcoming parliamentary oversight, she warned that such tools are most effective when used to restore public trust, not intensify economic and social uncertainty.
These political exchanges are unfolding against the backdrop of rapidly worsening economic indicators. On Tuesday, December 23, the U.S. dollar surpassed 133,000 tomans, while the Imami gold coin rose above 146 million tomans. The euro reached 157,000 tomans, the British pound 180,000 tomans, and the price of one gram of gold exceeded 14 million tomans. Economic analysis indicates that between November 20 and December 21, the dollar gained roughly 18,000 tomans, representing an increase of nearly 16 percent in one month. Analysts cite domestic inflation, budget deficits, foreign-currency constraints, and speculation surrounding the future of the Central Bank leadership as key drivers of the surge.
Food prices have also risen sharply. Iran’s State Organization for Government Sanctions reported that the most frequent violations of price controls imposed by the government in recent weeks involved price increases for bread and rice, underscoring the growing pressure on low- and middle-income households.
Taken together, Ghalibaf’s warning represents one of the strongest parliamentary signals to date that Iran’s inflation crisis may soon translate into formal political consequences. While both parliament and the government publicly emphasize shared goals of economic stability and protecting livelihoods, the sharpened rhetoric reflects deepening institutional strain at a time of accelerating inflation, currency volatility, and public anxiety. Whether oversight sessions and joint mechanisms can deliver rapid relief—or whether impeachment proceedings move from threat to reality—remains a pivotal question for Iran’s political and economic trajectory.
Tensions between Israel and Iran have escalated in recent days amid conflicting reports of Iranian missile activity, intensified military rhetoric, and renewed warnings from Israeli officials about Iran’s growing military capabilities. While neither side has announced an imminent military operation, the convergence of military signaling, intelligence alerts, and political coordination have heightened the risk of miscalculation.
On December 22, 2025, Iranian media circulated videos and photographs showing an unidentified object moving across the sky and leaving a white trail, triggering widespread speculation about a missile test. Fars News Agency initially reported that “field observations and public reports” pointed to missile testing in several locations, including Khorramabad, Mahabad, Isfahan, Tehran, and Mashhad. Hours later, Iran’s state broadcaster (IRIB) quoted “informed sources” denying that any missile test had taken place, asserting that no missile exercise occurred that day and that the white trail was caused by a high-altitude aircraft contrail. Despite the contradictory narratives, no official statement from Iran’s military or judiciary was issued to definitively clarify the incident.
These developments unfolded amid heightened international scrutiny of Iran’s missile program. Iranian officials have consistently framed their military posture as defensive. Foreign Ministry spokesperson Esmaeil Baghaei reiterated that Iran’s missile program is defensive in nature and not subject to negotiation, arguing that its purpose is to deter aggression rather than provoke conflict. Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi stated that while Iran does not seek war, it does not rule out the possibility of another attack and is “fully prepared — even more than before.” He emphasized that, in Tehran’s view, deterrence and preparedness are the most effective means of preventing war.
Senior Iranian military officials have echoed this position. Ahmad Vahidi, deputy chief of Iran’s armed forces general staff, claimed that during the 12-day war earlier this year, less than three percent of Iran’s missile launch sites were destroyed, portraying Iran’s strategic capabilities as largely intact. Army Commander Amir Hatami said Iranian forces are closely monitoring hostile movements and would respond decisively to any aggression, pointing to upgraded readiness, air-defense systems, and battlefield lessons drawn from the recent conflict.
Israeli officials, however, have taken a markedly different view. In recent days, Israeli authorities have warned that Iran’s missile development constitutes an immediate and growing threat. According to reporting by Axios, Israeli officials cautioned the U.S. government that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps could use missile drills as cover for preparations for a surprise attack on Israel. Israeli military rhetoric has also intensified, with IDF Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir warning that Israel would strike its enemies “wherever necessary, near or far,” describing Iran as central to Israel’s most complex and prolonged conflict through its regional network of allied forces.
Reports by NBC News indicate that Israeli officials believe Iran is accelerating ballistic missile production and rebuilding air-defense systems damaged during the earlier conflict. While Israel continues to express concern over Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, these reports suggest that missile capabilities and air defenses are now seen as the more immediate threat. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is expected to raise these concerns in discussions with U.S. President Donald Trump, with some reports suggesting he will pitch a new round of joint U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran and its missile program.
At the same time, broader geopolitical considerations may limit the likelihood of near-term U.S. military involvement in a new conflict with Iran. The Trump administration is currently escalating with Venezuela, which has absorbed diplomatic and military attention. In parallel, President Trump has repeatedly stated that U.S. strikes have eliminated Iran’s nuclear threat, framing the issue as largely resolved rather than a still-looming threat.
Taken together, the current situation reflects a volatile balance. Iran emphasizes deterrence and defensive readiness, Israel signals low tolerance for strategic surprise, and the United States appears focused on containing multiple global challenges while avoiding another Middle Eastern war. Although no party has declared an intention to initiate hostilities, the mix of ambiguous military activity, conflicting public narratives, and heightened alert levels increases the risk of escalation either through misinterpretation or preemptive action.
Norwegian authorities have confirmed that a Norwegian citizen has been detained in Iran, stating that due to privacy and data-protection obligations, they are unable to release further details regarding the case. The Norwegian government has simultaneously strongly reiterated its travel warning, urging its citizens not to travel to Iran under any circumstances.
Iranian judicial authorities have not publicly announced or acknowledged the arrest. However, on Monday, HRANA, the news agency of the Human Rights Activists in Iran network, reported that Shahin Mahmoudi, a 46-year-old Iranian–Norwegian dual national, was arrested in the city of Saqqez, located in Kurdistan province.
According to HRANA, Ms. Mahmoudi is currently being held in a state of legal limbo at the Intelligence Ministry detention facility in Sanandaj. The report states that she was summoned by telephone on Sunday, December 14, to the Intelligence Office in Saqqez, where she was detained upon presenting herself later that same day and subsequently transferred to Sanandaj.
HRANA further reports that no formal charges have been disclosed, and that the specific accusations remain unclear. The agency also noted that Ms. Mahmoudi had traveled from Norway to Iran on Friday, November 28, shortly before her arrest.
Information published on the website of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs underscores the structural vulnerability of dual nationals in Iran, noting that Iran does not recognize dual citizenship. As a result, the Norwegian embassy in Tehran has described it as “almost impossible” to provide consular assistance to Iranian–Norwegian citizens in cases of detention.
The arrest of Ms. Mahmoudi takes place amid a broader pattern of detentions of dual nationals in Iran over the past decade, frequently on charges such as “espionage” or “acting against national security.” European governments, the European Union, and international human rights organizations have repeatedly characterized the detention of dual nationals by Iranian authorities as a form of “hostage-taking” or political leverage, arguing that such detainees are often used as bargaining tools in diplomatic negotiations. In previous cases, several foreign or dual-national prisoners have been released following negotiations, including through financial payments or prisoner exchanges involving Iranian nationals held abroad.
In a recent and related development, Asghar Jahangir, spokesperson for Iran’s judiciary, announced last week that the verdict in the case of an Iranian–Swedish dual national accused of spying for Israel’s intelligence services would be issued imminently. Sweden’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs subsequently confirmed that it had summoned Iran’s ambassador in protest.
This cases stands in apparent contrast to Iran’s newly enacted “Law for the Support of Iranians Abroad”—legislation explicitly framed by Iranian officials as an effort to ease travel, strengthen legal protections, and rebuild trust with the diaspora, including dual nationals. While the law promises pre-travel clearance mechanisms, guarantees against arbitrary detention, and disciplinary penalties for officials who violate such assurances, the detention of Shahin Mahmoudi underscores a persistent paradox within Iran’s governance structure: public commitments to legal reform and diaspora engagement coexist with opaque security practices and discretionary arrests by intelligence bodies. This divergence between legislative signaling and on-the-ground enforcement continues to erode confidence among Iranians abroad and raises serious questions about inter-agency accountability, rule-of-law consistency, and the credibility of stated reforms.
Iranian authorities announced the execution of Aghil Keshavarz, a 27-year-old architecture student, on Saturday morning, 20 December, on charges of “espionage for Israel” and “imaging military and security sites.” The case is politically significant, reflecting Iran’s broader post-war security strategy following its recent confrontation with Israel and an intensified focus on alleged internal threats.
According to the Judiciary of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Mr. Keshavarz was arrested in May 2025 in the city of Urmia, after an army protection patrol allegedly caught him photographing the headquarters of an infantry division. Authorities further claimed that he had conducted “missions” in Tehran, Isfahan, Urmia, and Shahroud, framing the case not as an isolated incident but as part of a coordinated intelligence network operating across multiple strategic locations. No publicly verifiable evidence or court documentation has been released to substantiate these allegations.
Mr. Keshavarz was sentenced to death in late summer by Branch One of the Revolutionary Court of Urmia, presided over by Judge Sajad Dousti. The handling of the case follows a familiar pattern in Iran’s national security prosecutions, where espionage cases are processed swiftly, largely out of public view, and presented as matters of existential threat to the state. The absence of detailed judicial disclosures appears structural rather than incidental, reinforcing the judiciary’s function as a component of Iran’s security architecture, particularly during periods of heightened regional tension.
State-affiliated media coverage further underscores the political framing of the case. According to Mizan, the judiciary’s official news agency, Mr. Keshavarz initially studied mining engineering before continuing his education in architecture. Notably, Mizan emphasized his family’s political background, stating that some relatives held monarchist sympathies and that his uncle had a history of membership or support for the Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK). The inclusion of these details—despite their indirect relevance to the specific charges—aligns with a longstanding state narrative that conflates espionage, opposition movements, and exile-based groups into a single externalized threat.
This framing serves multiple objectives. Domestically, it reinforces the perception that foreign intelligence operations are deeply embedded within Iranian society, providing justification for heightened surveillance and internal security measures. Externally, it signals resolve to adversaries by demonstrating that alleged collaboration with Israel carries the maximum possible penalty, particularly in the aftermath of direct military confrontation.
According to the Kurdistan Human Rights Network, Mr. Keshavarz was initially detained by the Intelligence Organization of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, before being transferred to Evin Prison in Tehran and later to Urmia Central Prison, where his sentence was ultimately carried out. The prominent role of the IRGC’s intelligence arm highlights how espionage cases are primarily managed by security institutions rather than civilian judicial mechanisms.
The execution comes in the aftermath of the 12-day war between Iran and Israel, a conflict Iranian officials have repeatedly described as revealing the depth of Israeli intelligence penetration inside Iran. Since the end of the conflict, authorities have announced the arrest, prosecution, and execution of multiple individuals accused of espionage, suggesting a deliberate effort to reassert deterrence, project internal stability, and suppress dissent or perceived collaboration during a volatile regional moment.
In this context, executions function not only as judicial outcomes but also as political signals—directed at domestic audiences, regional rivals, and opposition groups abroad. The emphasis on espionage charges, family political history, and national security narratives reflects a broader state strategy aimed at consolidating power and shaping the post-war narrative around vigilance, resistance, and control.
Iran is a signatory to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which restricts the use of the death penalty to the “most serious crimes” and requires adherence to basic fair-trial guarantees. Critics argue that Iran’s handling of espionage cases—particularly in Revolutionary Courts characterized by closed proceedings and limited transparency—raises persistent questions about the politicization of justice in national security cases.
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