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Week of December 15, 2025 | Iran Unfiltered is a digest tracking Iranian politics & society by the National Iranian American Council
The United States has imposed a new round of sanctions targeting Iran’s maritime oil network, intensifying economic pressure on Tehran at a moment of heightened diplomatic strain and regional tension. The U.S. Treasury Department announced sanctions on 29 vessels and their management companies, which Washington says are connected to Iran’s so-called “shadow fleet”—a network allegedly used to export Iranian oil and petroleum products in contradiction of U.S. and, since the disputed snapback of UN resolutions, multilateral sanctions pressure.
According to U.S. officials, the sanctioned vessels and companies employed “deceptive shipping practices” to transport hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of Iranian crude oil and refined products, including fuel oil, bitumen, and gas condensates. The sanctions also target an Egyptian trader based in the United Arab Emirates, with U.S. authorities alleging that companies linked to him are associated with seven of the 29 sanctioned vessels.
The Treasury Department framed the move as part of a broader campaign that has accelerated since Donald Trump’s return to office. U.S. officials highlighted that they had designated more than 180 vessels involved in transporting Iranian oil and petroleum products, actions it claims have raised export costs and reduced Iran’s oil revenues. John Hurley, the Treasury Department’s Deputy Assistant Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, explicitly linked the sanctions to concerns over the country’s nuclear program, stating that the United States will continue efforts to deny Iran oil revenues it says are used to fund military and weapons programs, reiterating Washington’s position that it will not allow Iran to obtain a nuclear weapon.
Separately, Israel’s foreign intelligence chief publicly questioned the viability of diplomatic solutions, arguing that Iran remains committed to reviving sensitive nuclear activities and warning against what he described as the risk of a “bad deal.”
Additionally, in light of continued sanctions pressure and lack of diplomatic progress, Tehran has recently moved to deepen coordination with Russia and other Eastern partners as part of a strategy to blunt sanctions and diplomatic isolation. Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi’s recent two-day trip to Belarus and Russia reflects this shift. The visit began in Minsk and continued in Moscow, signaling Iran’s intent to activate political, security, and economic channels across Eastern Europe and Eurasia at a time of intensified Western pressure.
Iranian analysts note that cooperation with Belarus has expanded in recent years, particularly in military, industrial, and sanctions-evasion pathways. Russia, however, remains a central pillar of Tehran’s eastern strategy. Moscow has played a key role in mitigating political and legal pressure on Iran, including by rejecting Western efforts to revive UN sanctions through the snapback mechanism.
Following his meetings in Moscow, Araghchi announced that Iran and Russia had agreed on a three-year cooperation roadmap, based on their strategic partnership treaty. He said closer coordination would enable more effective action against what Tehran calls “illegal Western sanctions,” help advance infrastructure projects, strengthen regional stability, and counter what Iran views as unlawful actions at the UN Security Council. Emphasizing Tehran’s regional outlook, Araghchi stated that “neighbors are our priority.”
Iranian officials say the visit also focused on coordination over Iran’s nuclear file and relations with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). With sanctions pressure intensifying and scrutiny from the agency increasing, Tehran appears eager to align its approach with Moscow—and indirectly Beijing, both of which have expressed opposition to renewed UN sanctions. While China has been less visible diplomatically, it remains a critical economic partner, serving as a major destination for Iranian energy exports and a supplier of industrial and technological goods. As sanctions tighten, maritime routes linking Iran to Asian markets have become increasingly sensitive—and increasingly contested.
This tension has played out in the Persian Gulf and surrounding waters, where reports indicate the U.S. has stepped up interdiction of vessels that may contain materiel for Iran’s defense and weapons programs. This, in turn, could trigger retaliation from Iran in the form of seizures of tankers connected to hostile powers. Iranian officials have often framed tanker seizures as anti-smuggling or legal enforcement actions, while critics view them as retaliatory moves amid sanctions and interdictions.
Together, these developments signal a more entrenched phase of confrontation in which sanctions enforcement, diplomacy, and maritime power are increasingly intertwined. As Washington tightens restrictions on shipping and logistics networks, Iran is doubling down on Eastern partnerships, alternative trade routes, and political coordination with like-minded states.
These external pressures are already reverberating inside Iran’s economy. In recent days, Iran has witnessed a sharp surge in the price of the U.S. dollar and gold, reflecting market anxiety over sanctions, diplomatic deadlock, and geopolitical escalation. The rapid rise in hard-currency and gold prices—often viewed by Iranians as safe havens—signals declining confidence in economic stability and rising expectations of further inflation. As sanctions deepen and prospects for diplomatic relief remain uncertain, economic stress is once again being passed directly onto ordinary Iranians, reinforcing the domestic costs of an increasingly locked-in cycle of pressure, alignment, and confrontation.
Kamran Fani, a prominent writer, translator, manuscript scholar, and permanent member of the Academy of Persian Language and Literature, passed away last week in Tehran at the age of 81. His death marks the loss of one of Iran’s most influential yet quietly enduring cultural figures—an intellectual whose life was devoted to books, scholarship, and the preservation and transmission of knowledge.
Fani was a graduate of Persian Language and Literature from the University of Tehran, where he studied under some of the most distinguished figures of Iran’s modern humanities, including Abdolhossein Zarrinkoub, Zabihollah Safa, Parviz Natel Khanlari, Badi‘ al-Zaman Forouzanfar, and Jalal al-Din Homayi. He later earned a master’s degree in Library and Information Science from the same university, skillfully combining classical literary training with modern scholarly and bibliographic methods.
Throughout his career, Fani played a central role in Iran’s leading cultural and scholarly institutions. He served as a member of the Board of Trustees of the Iranian Parliament Library, which houses one of the country’s richest collections of historical and manuscript sources, and as a member of the Supreme Council of the Great Islamic Encyclopedia Center, contributing to the preservation and organization of Iran’s intellectual heritage.
One of the most significant dimensions of Fani’s professional life was his editorial leadership in major encyclopedic and reference works over several decades. He played a key role in the organization, editing, and authorship of landmark projects including the Encyclopedia of Democracy, the Encyclopedia for Children and Adolescents, the Encyclopedia of Shi‘ism, the Encyclopedia of the Islamic World, and the Daneshnameh-ye Daneshgostar, 18 volumes of which have been published to date. These works remain essential references for scholars and the broader public alike.
Fani was also a highly respected translator, introducing major works of world literature and thought to Persian readers. Among his translations are Anton Chekhov’s Three Sisters and The Seagull, as well as Zarathustra: Statesman or Magician. His translations were widely praised for their clarity, precision, and cultural sensitivity, reflecting his deep respect for both source texts and Persian literary tradition.
Widely regarded as a quiet but foundational force in Iran’s modern literary and scholarly life, Fani made enduring contributions to Persian literature, translation, bibliography, and intellectual discourse. His work helped expand access to world literature while fostering critical engagement with Iran’s own cultural heritage. Colleagues often noted his rare combination of rigor, integrity, humility, and intellectual independence.
Beyond his published work, Fani’s influence extended through mentorship, editorial guidance, and institutional leadership, shaping Iran’s literary ecosystem across generations. His reflections on education, libraries, and intellectual life were captured in “Mr. Librarian,” a book-length interview published eight years ago, in which he examined the evolution of knowledge production and cultural institutions in Iran.
Colleagues and students consistently described Kamran Fani as a principled intellectual, deeply committed to the autonomy of culture and the dignity of scholarship. At a time when Iran’s cultural and academic spaces have faced persistent pressure, his life stood as a testament to the enduring power of ideas, books, and ethical intellectual labor. In recognition of his lasting contributions to Iran’s literary heritage, scholarly standards, and culture of learning, the National Iranian American Council (NIAC) extends its deepest condolences to Kamran Fani’s family, colleagues, students, and the broader Iranian cultural community. His legacy endures in the books he shaped, the knowledge he preserved, and the generations he inspired through a lifetime of principled intellectual work.
After months of acute drought, widespread rainfall has affected large parts of Iran since mid-December, driven by a series of unusually intense and closely spaced storm systems. According to Iran’s Water Resources Management Company, average nationwide precipitation has increased by approximately 40 millimeters compared to previous weeks. While this marks a notable improvement, total rainfall remains about 20 percent below Iran’s long-term average, highlighting the depth of the country’s ongoing water crisis.
Over the past 10 days, storm systems have impacted at least 24 provinces, with particularly heavy rainfall concentrated in southern and southwestern regions. Data from the Ministry of Energy indicate that average national rainfall has reached 47 millimeters, representing a 19 percent increase compared to the same period last year—a welcome development, though still insufficient to offset years of accumulated water deficits.
The most intense rainfall was recorded in Hormozgan, Fars, Kerman, and Bushehr provinces, where several stations registered record-breaking 24-hour precipitation totals. In Hormozgan, the Bandar Hosseini station recorded 196 millimeters of rainfall, while stations in Qeshm and near the Esteghlal Dam reported 167 millimeters. Bandar Abbas and Jam followed closely with totals approaching 160 millimeters, levels far exceeding historical norms for this time of year.
Authorities report that the rains have produced short-term but meaningful increases in surface runoff, river levels, snow cover, and dam storage. In Hormozgan alone, reservoir volumes increased by more than 90 million cubic meters, and a small earthen dam in Parsian reached full capacity and overflowed. In Fars province, stored water increased by over 55 million cubic meters. Despite these gains, average dam fill nationwide remains at just 33 percent, a figure approximately 25 percent lower than the same period last year, underscoring how decades of over-extraction and mismanagement have left Iran structurally unable to retain water effectively in a prolonged stretch of declining rainfall patterns.
At the same time, the rainfall has brought significant risks and damage. Meteorological authorities warn that storm activity will continue through at least December 20, with Hormozgan and Kerman facing elevated risks of flash flooding, particularly in areas where soil is already saturated and watersheds are degraded. In multiple provinces, intense downpours have caused localized flooding, infrastructure damage, and disruption to rural livelihoods, with low-income and floodplain communities bearing the greatest burden.
Climate experts inside Iran describe the recent precipitation as rare, highly concentrated, and climatically significant, noting that such events align with broader trends of increasing climate volatility, influenced in part by atmospheric patterns such as the Madden–Julian Oscillation (MJO). Iran is increasingly experiencing long dry periods followed by sudden, extreme rainfall—a pattern that raises flood risks while failing to meaningfully replenish groundwater reserves.
Yet the scale of damage reflects policy failure as much as climatic stress. Deforestation, destruction of watersheds, construction in riverbeds, inadequate drainage infrastructure, weak early-warning systems, and the suppression of independent environmental expertise have left communities dangerously exposed, even during otherwise beneficial rainfall events.
Meteorologists also warn that after a brief lull of roughly ten days, a new cold northern weather system is likely to affect western and northern Iran, bringing heavy rain, snowfall in mountainous areas, sharp temperature drops, and heightened risks of landslides, road closures, and energy disruptions. This rapid shift from warm southern systems to cold northern fronts adds another layer of strain for already overstretched infrastructure and emergency services.
While the recent rains have brought genuine and much-needed relief to parts of Iran, they have not resolved the country’s structural water shortages nor reversed years of environmental degradation. With reservoir levels still critically low and additional extreme weather events likely, the situation underscores that shifting weather patterns don’t remove the need for urgent changes in water governance, land-use policy, disaster preparedness and public accountability.
Iranian and Swedish authorities have confirmed the detention of a dual Iranian-Swedish citizen in Iran on charges of espionage, amid heightened security crackdowns following the recent twelve-day conflict between Iran and Israel. The Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that it is aware of the detention of one of its citizens in Iran and is in contact with the individual’s family through the Swedish embassy in Tehran. According to the ministry, the detainee has legal representation. Swedish officials said they would not provide further details out of respect for consular secrecy and to avoid interfering with ongoing efforts.
Sweden’s confirmation came hours after Iran’s judiciary publicly announced the arrest of a dual national Iranian-Swedish citizen during the twelve-day war. On Tuesday, December 16, Iran’s judiciary spokesperson Asghar Jahangir stated that a verdict in the case would be issued soon, while declining to identify the accused by name. He said the individual is charged with espionage on behalf of Israel’s intelligence services.
According to Jahangir, the accused obtained Swedish citizenship in 2020 and had been residing in Sweden. He claimed that the individual entered Iran approximately one month before the outbreak of the twelve-day war between Iran and Israel and stayed in a villa near the city of Karaj, northwest of Tehran. Iranian authorities say the individual was arrested on the fourth day of the conflict, which began on June 13.
Iranian judicial officials allege that the accused was recruited by Israeli intelligence services in 2023, received training in six European countries, and traveled to Israel roughly two weeks prior to entering Iran. Jahangir further claimed that security forces discovered electronic surveillance equipment in the individual’s possession at the time of arrest. These allegations have been presented by Iranian authorities without the publication of independent evidence.
The case is reportedly being handled by the Revolutionary Court in Karaj. Last week, Hossein Fazeli Harikandi, head of the judiciary in Alborz Province, confirmed that legal proceedings had begun and repeated claims that the accused had met with Israeli intelligence operatives and undergone training in Israeli-controlled territory. Iranian officials say the case is being prosecuted under Article 6 of Iran’s “Law on Countering Hostile Actions of the Zionist Regime Against Peace and Security.”
Article 6 defines any intelligence cooperation or espionage in favor of Israel as equivalent to Moharebeh (enmity against God) and efsad-e fel-arz (corruption on earth), crimes that carry the harshest penalties under Iranian law, including the death sentence. In recent months, Iran has further tightened espionage laws. In October, a bill titled “Intensifying Punishment for Espionage” was approved and became law following ratification by the Guardian Council. Under the revised legislation, intelligence activity or operational cooperation with “hostile states or groups” is punishable by execution and confiscation of property. The law explicitly names the United States and Israel as hostile states, while allowing Iran’s Supreme National Security Council to designate additional entities.
This prosecution is unfolding in a broader climate of intensified repression following the war. Iranian authorities have announced a significant increase in executions of individuals convicted of espionage for Israel. Babak Shahbazi, who had been arrested and tried two years earlier on similar charges, was executed on September 17. Another individual described by authorities as a “trusted and reliable spy” for Israel was executed on September 29.
These executions have raised alarm among human-rights organizations, who have expressed serious concerns about due process, access to independent legal counsel, and the risk of coerced confessions in espionage cases adjudicated by Iran’s Revolutionary Courts. Such courts have long been criticized for lack of transparency and close ties to security agencies. The refusal to disclose the accused individual’s identity, combined with the rapid pace of proceedings and public statements predicting an imminent verdict, has intensified these concerns.
The case also highlights longstanding diplomatic tensions surrounding Iran’s treatment of foreign and dual nationals. Iran does not recognize dual citizenship and treats such detainees solely as Iranian citizens, often limiting foreign consular access. This practice has repeatedly drawn criticism from European governments and international rights organizations, which argue that dual nationals are particularly vulnerable to politically motivated prosecutions. Iran and Sweden have clashed previously over detentions. In June 2024, former Iranian official Hamid Nouri was swapped for Swedish diplomat Johan Floderus and Iranian-Swedish dual national Saeed Azizi. Nouri had been convicted in Swedish courts for his role in overseeing mass executions in Iran in the 1980s.
The arrest of the Iranian-Swedish citizen comes amid statements by Iran’s Prosecutor General Mohammad Movahedi, who has ordered judicial authorities to pursue alleged leaders of domestic and foreign groups accused of collaborating with the United States and Israel during the recent conflict. He has instructed security agencies to gather intelligence on such cooperation and report findings to prosecutors, signaling the likelihood of further arrests.
In recent weeks, many Iranian YouTubers have experienced a sudden and severe collapse in advertising revenue. The cause appears to be improved detection of VPN use and viewer location by YouTube, which now more accurately classifies large portions of Persian-language audiences as being inside Iran. For creators whose work depends on those viewers, income has dropped dramatically—sometimes overnight. What may sound like a technical adjustment is, in reality, a human story with serious political and social consequences.
Most Iranian YouTubers are not celebrities or political actors. They are teachers, engineers, journalists, artists, translators, and technologists—members of Iran’s educated middle class who turned to global digital platforms because traditional economic pathways were closed to them. For many, YouTube was not a luxury; it was one of the few remaining ways to earn a modest living, share knowledge, and stay connected to the outside world. As physical trade, travel, and financial access were restricted, digital platforms became a fragile but vital bridge to the global economy. That bridge is now weakening.
As we explained in an earlier report for Iran Unfiltered, the rise of Persian-language YouTube channels and online talk shows over the past decade created a new Iranian public sphere—one that bypassed both state television and foreign broadcasters and allowed Iranians themselves to shape debate, share expertise, and engage in civic discussion. That transformation helped weaken the state’s narrative monopoly and gave millions of Iranians significantly more access to independent information and participatory media.
Over the past decade, these Persian-language channels have played an essential role in Iranian society. They provided educational content, technical skills, cultural programming, and independent analysis that state-controlled media could not or would not offer. These programs helped millions of Iranians learn new skills, stay informed, and engage with global conversations. Monetization made this ecosystem sustainable. Even limited advertising revenue allowed creators to justify the time, effort, and personal risk involved in producing content under censorship. Crucially, this income was tied to merit and audience trust rather than political loyalty.
That model is now breaking down. As YouTube reclassifies VPN-masked traffic as originating from Iran, advertising revenue tied to those views has collapsed. In some cases, ads are no longer served at all. The result is a sudden economic shock for creators who did nothing wrong and relied on VPNs only because censorship leaves them no other option. This change effectively excludes many Iranian creators from the global digital marketplace.
The role that U.S. sanctions may be playing in this development is unclear. The web of sanctions on Iran is nearly all-encompassing, impacting the entire Iranian economy. On one level, an embargo on Iran prevents U.S. entities from engaging in commercial transactions with individuals based in Iran. However, there are limited exceptions in the form of “general licenses.” General License D-2 authorizes U.S. companies to offer certain services, hardware and software necessary for various forms of internet-based communication, and also authorizes some limited fund transfers in service of permissible transactions. However, many private companies have typically interpreted the guidance conservatively, with concerns about the remaining myriad sanctions and hefty fines for violation taking precedent over an apparent green light from the U.S. government to more fully offer their products and services in Iran.
While policymakers defend sanctions as a measure against the Iranian government, their effect has largely been felt by those outside of power. One result has been the steady narrowing of spaces for ordinary Iranians to participate in the world economy. Iranian citizens are largely shut out of international banking, payment platforms, and digital marketplaces. They cannot easily sell products abroad, freelance globally, or monetize online work. For Iran’s middle class—especially younger, educated, and globally-minded Iranians—digital platforms have been among the last remaining economic outlets.
Now those outlets are once again being restricted. The people most affected are not elites or insiders but the very segments of society most associated with civic engagement, pluralism, and democratic values. Women creators, independent educators, journalists, and young professionals are losing one of the few spaces where talent and effort could still translate into opportunity. Punishing these groups does not weaken authoritarian control. It weakens civil society.
The consequences extend beyond economics. When creators can no longer sustain their work, content production slows or stops. Educational channels disappear. Independent perspectives fade. Audiences lose access to practical skills, scientific knowledge, and alternative viewpoints. Over time, this erodes the information environment and leaves more space for state media and disinformation. Younger generations lose opportunities to learn and connect with the world. The long-term damage to social openness and democratic capacity is significant.
If U.S. policy aims to support the Iranian people and encourage access to information, outcomes like this represent a serious contradiction. Policies that effectively penalize VPN use—when VPNs are a necessity under censorship—end up punishing the wrong people. When sanctions and platform enforcement intersect in ways that exclude ordinary Iranians from lawful economic activity, the result is deeper isolation, not accountability.
Iranian YouTubers are more than content creators. They are educators, connectors, and bridges between Iran and the world. When those bridges are dismantled, Iranian society becomes more isolated, less informed, and more vulnerable to authoritarian control. Policies that silence independent voices and shrink economic opportunity do not advance justice. They entrench isolation and punish the very people most aligned with democratic values. If the goal is to stand with the Iranian people, the world must ensure they are not locked out of the global digital economy—especially when they are simply trying to participate in it.
As of Saturday, December 13, 2025, Iran officially began implementing a three-tier gasoline pricing system, marking one of the most sensitive fuel policy changes since the nationwide protests triggered by a sudden price hike in November 2019. Under the new system, gasoline is now sold at 1,500, 3,000, and 5,000 tomans per liter, with the highest rate applying immediately to fuel purchased through emergency cards at gas stations, which rose from 3,000 to 5,000 tomans per liter.
The rollout was confirmed by Fereydoon Yasemi, head of Tehran’s National Iranian Oil Products Distribution Company, and by government spokesperson Fatemeh Mohajerani, who said the policy aims to manage fuel consumption and reduce Iran’s growing dependence on gasoline imports. Mohajerani announced that subsidized quotas have been eliminated for government vehicles (except ambulances), imported cars, and vehicles registered in free-trade zones, while ordinary private car owners retain access to subsidized fuel within a monthly limit.
Under the new framework, every eligible driver continues to receive 60 liters of gasoline at 1,500 tomans per month. An additional 100 liters can be purchased at 3,000 tomans per liter, bringing the total subsidized and semi-subsidized quota to 160 liters per month. Any consumption beyond that threshold, as well as all fuel purchased using station emergency cards, is priced at 5,000 tomans per liter. According to the government, around 80 percent of motorists meet their monthly needs within this 160-liter ceiling.
President Masoud Pezeshkian has framed the policy as a matter of economic necessity rather than choice. He has repeatedly pointed out that Iran currently imports gasoline at an estimated cost of around 60,000 tomans per liter, while selling it domestically at heavily subsidized prices. “The foreign currency used to import gasoline belongs to everyone who lives in this country, not only to those who benefit from burning cheap fuel,” Pezeshkian said recently, adding that the state lacks sufficient financial resources to simultaneously subsidize fuel and address the livelihoods of the majority who do not own cars.
According to official figures published by the Iranian government, approximately $6 billion per year is currently spent on gasoline imports, a sum equivalent to one and a half times Iran’s annual cash subsidy program. Mohajerani noted that while Iran exported fuel products worth more than $6 billion in 2019 and 2020, it now imports over $4 billion in gasoline annually, a figure that continues to rise. Members of parliament have warned that domestic refineries are expected to produce no more than 107 million liters per day this year, while average daily consumption has exceeded 127 million liters, forcing Iran to import at least 20 million liters per day at a cost of roughly $4 billion.
The policy is being introduced amid broader fiscal stress. Government officials estimate that Iran’s budget deficit exceeds 50 percent of total public spending, and the economy is already under pressure from inflation, currency depreciation, and the lingering effects of the 12-day war earlier this year, which heightened concerns about energy security. Pezeshkian has emphasized that the current measures generate no immediate windfall for the government, noting that applying the 5,000-toman rate to select categories of vehicles is only a first step in managing consumption rather than a direct revenue-raising move.
At the same time, authorities have left the door open to future adjustments. The government has stated that the 5,000-toman rate is not fixed and may increase in coming months depending on economic conditions. Imported super gasoline, already offered on Iran’s Energy Exchange earlier this fall at a base price of around 65,800 tomans per liter, is expected to reach consumers at prices approaching 75,000 tomans, effectively creating a fourth price tier in practice.
The new system also introduces complex rules that have drawn criticism. Each household is eligible for subsidized fuel for only one vehicle, with owners required to designate which car receives the quota. Newly manufactured vehicles, high-value domestic cars, foreign vehicles, and free-zone plates are largely excluded from subsidies. Internet-based ride-hailing drivers, estimated at around two million nationwide, receive no special quota beyond the standard 160 liters, though the government has promised to reimburse part of the price difference for higher-tier fuel used for work purposes through a separate system.
Supporters of the policy argue that gradual, tiered pricing is preferable to a sudden price shock, helping to curb excessive consumption, reduce pollution, and make fuel smuggling less profitable without provoking immediate social unrest. The government has estimated that the impact on inflation will be limited—around 0.2 percentage points—and that additional revenue, estimated at 3–5 trillion tomans annually, will be directed toward support for lower-income households.
Critics, however, warn that even modest fuel price increases can have outsized effects on transportation costs, informal employment, and the price of goods and services, particularly at a time when household purchasing power has already been eroded. Since November 2019, the exchange rate has increased nearly tenfold and average consumer prices have risen by almost 700 percent, fueling skepticism about official inflation estimates. Some lawmakers note that nearly 30 percent of vehicle owners rely on their cars as a primary source of income, making fuel costs a direct livelihood issue.
Gasoline remains a uniquely sensitive issue in Iran—one that sits at the intersection of economics, politics, and social stability. Past attempts at reform in 2007 and especially November 2019 demonstrated how quickly fuel pricing can become a trigger for unrest. For this reason, successive governments avoided meaningful reform despite acknowledging that gasoline prices were economically unsustainable.
The Pezeshkian administration argues that the timing reflects economic compulsion rather than political convenience. With rising consumption, mounting import bills, and an expanding budget deficit, officials insist that continuing to sell gasoline far below cost is no longer viable. Whether the three-tier system succeeds in reducing consumption, imports, smuggling, or fiscal pressure remains uncertain. What is clear is that Iran’s gasoline problem—like its broader energy crisis—is no longer a question of resources, but of governance, trust, and the social cost of reform.
In an interview published on December 16, 2025, Iranian political prisoner and former deputy interior minister Mostafa Tajzadeh told the French weekly Le Point that neither war, sanctions, nor foreign intervention can bring democracy to Iran, arguing instead that only a peaceful, people-driven democratic transition can end clerical rule. The interview was conducted in writing from Evin Prison, where Tajzadeh is currently held.
Addressing the 12-day war between Iran and Israel in June 2025, Tajzadeh rejected claims by Iranian and Israeli authorities that the conflict ended in victory. He argued that neither side achieved its objectives. Despite Israel’s initial surprise attacks on Iran’s air defenses and senior military commanders, he said, Israel failed to fully paralyze Iran’s military capabilities or prevent retaliatory missile strikes.
At the same time, Tajzadeh emphasized that Iranian society did not interpret the bombings as liberation and did not rise up in response. Even political prisoners, he noted, did not view the bombing of Evin Prison as an opportunity to escape. He expressed hope that the war had at least shattered the illusions of both sides and demonstrated the futility of military escalation as a path to change.
Tajzadeh warned that external military intervention would only lead to catastrophe, saying it would either plunge Iran into deeper chaos or result in the establishment of an even more brutal military regime. “Neither outcome is a solution,” he said, firmly rejecting the idea that democracy can be imposed through force from abroad.
He was equally critical of economic sanctions, stating that sanctions—and certainly war—harm Iranian society far more than they weaken those in power. According to Tajzadeh, sanctions erode civil society, deepen poverty, and place the heaviest burden on the most vulnerable segments of the population. He argued that the only defensible form of sanctions are targeted measures against human rights violators, not broad economic restrictions that punish ordinary citizens.
Tajzadeh, now 69 years old, is among Iran’s most well-known political prisoners, having spent much of the past 16 years behind bars. A former senior reformist official, he supported the 2009 Green Movement and opposed the disputed re-election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, for which he served seven years in prison between 2009 and 2016. He was arrested again in July 2022, two months before the emergence of the “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement, and sentenced to five years in prison on charges of conspiring against national security.
Reflecting on imprisonment, Tajzadeh said he does not feel defeated. He described prison as a period of intense reflection that allowed him to reassess power, society, and human nature, and said he harbors no personal resentment toward interrogators, judges, or security officials. He emphasized that he refuses to live with hatred and believes that prison has amplified, rather than silenced, his voice.
Commenting on the re-arrest of Nobel Peace Prize laureate Narges Mohammadi following her speech at a memorial for human rights lawyer Khosro Alikordi, Tajzadeh said the detention reflects the authorities’ fear of any gathering, even peaceful commemorations. He stressed that many of those detained are women aligned with the “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement and argued that their arrests underscore women’s decisive role in shaping Iran’s future. He warned that continued detention carries greater political cost than their release.
Tajzadeh said the post-war escalation of repression reflects the ruling establishment’s belief that another conflict is not imminent, allowing it to revert to intimidation and judicial harassment. However, he argued that this strategy is unsustainable in a society burdened by drought, water shortages, air pollution, runaway inflation, inequality, and systemic corruption. According to Tajzadeh, fear is no longer concentrated among citizens but increasingly among those in power.
He described the growing rejection of compulsory hijab as an irreversible social transformation, noting that even many religious Iranians now oppose enforced veiling and recognize its damage to faith itself. He argued that the ruling establishment has already retreated in practice and can no longer restore control through force.
Explaining why he moved beyond advocating reform from within the system, Tajzadeh said efforts since 1997 ultimately collapsed due to the concentration of power in the office of the Supreme Leader, particularly after 2017. While stressing that the failure of reform does not justify violence, he argued that civil resistance and non-violent disobedience—as demonstrated in the struggle over compulsory hijab—can compel the ruling clergy to retreat.
Tajzadeh called for the election of a constituent assembly, a national referendum, and a revision of the constitution, including the removal of velayat-e faqih, describing this route as the safest and most peaceful path out of Iran’s deepening crisis. While acknowledging that such proposals may seem unrealistic today, he argued they may soon become the only viable option.
On foreign policy, Tajzadeh reiterated his opposition to Iran acquiring nuclear weapons and called for a comprehensive new agreement with the West. He said Iran’s development depends on balanced relations with the United States and Europe, adding that the destruction of Israel or the expulsion of the United States from the region is neither Iran’s mission nor within its capacity.
He concluded by rejecting the notion that Iranians must wait for the death of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei for change, noting that major social and political shifts—such as the weakening of compulsory hijab and the breaking of taboos around negotiations with Washington—have already occurred during his lifetime and could continue with less turmoil if pursued now.
At least three Iranian police officers and one civilian were killed in terrorist attacks carried out by armed assailants late on Monday night, December 15, at a police checkpoint in Fahraj County, Kerman Province, near the border with Sistan-Baluchestan. According to a statement issued by the Quds Base of the IRGC Ground Forces, which operates in southeastern Iran, police personnel stationed at the checkpoint were carrying out routine duties to ensure security along a major transportation route when they were attacked by armed assailants.
In a separate statement, Kerman provincial police described the incident as a “terrorist act,” stating that one police officer and two other members of the security forces were killed, along with one civilian. Authorities did not identify the attackers or provide further details about their affiliation.
Police officials emphasized that “intelligence and operational measures” are underway to identify and confront those responsible. The police added that the checkpoint had been established to enhance public security and protect public order in southern and eastern areas of Kerman Province. Fahraj County is located in eastern Kerman Province, close to the border with Sistan-Baluchestan, a region that has experienced repeated security incidents in recent years.
In a separate incident, police in Sistan-Baluchestan Province reported an attack by armed individuals on law enforcement officers in the city of Iranshahr. In their statement, police referred to the attackers as “ashrar,” a term commonly used by Iranian authorities to describe organized criminal networks, particularly those involved in drug trafficking.
According to the police, the assailants arrived in two passenger vehicles and engaged with law enforcement officers with the intent to attack. Authorities said no police officers were injured in this incident. As of the time of reporting, no group has claimed responsibility for either of these recent attacks.
Sistan-Baluchestan Province, which has a significant population of Sunni Baluch residents, has long been one of Iran’s most economically marginalized regions and has frequently witnessed armed confrontations between security forces and militant or criminal groups.
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