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SOCIALISTS IN CITY HALL? A NEW LOOK AT SEWER SOCIALISM IN WISCONSIN
 
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Eric Blanc
November 17, 2025
Labor Politics
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*
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*
*
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_ It’s been done before—we can do it again in New York and beyond
_

Cartoon from The Milwaukee Leader (1911) showing Berger’s socialism
car knocking over the profiteers and political opposition., Milwaukee
Leader/Labor Politics

 

In 1910, Milwaukee’s socialists swept into office and they proceeded
to run the city for most of the next fifty years. Though ruling elites
initially predicted chaos and disaster, even _Time _magazine by 1936
felt obliged to run a cover story
[[link removed]] titled
“Marxist Mayor” on the city’s success, noting that under
socialist rule “Milwaukee has become perhaps the best-governed city
in the US.”

This experience is rich in lessons for Zohran Mamdani and contemporary
Left activists looking to lean on City Hall to build a working-class
alternative to Democratic neoliberalism and Donald Trump’s
authoritarianism. But the history of Milwaukee’s so-called sewer
socialists is much more than a story simply about local Left
governance. The rise and effectiveness of the town’s socialist
governments largely depended on a radical political organization
rooted in Milwaukee’s trade unions and working class.

Nowhere in the US were socialists stronger than in Milwaukee. And
Wisconsin was the state with the most elected socialist officials as
well as the highest number of socialist legislators (see Figure 1). It
was also the only state in America where socialists consistently led
the entire union movement — indeed, it was primarily their roots in
organized labor that made their electoral and policy success possible,
including the passage
[[link removed]]
of 295 socialist-authored bills statewide between 1919 and 1931.

Figure 1. Source: James Weinstein, The Decline of Socialism in America
(1967), 118.

Contrary to what much of the literature on sewer socialism has
suggested, the party’s growth did not come at the cost of dropping
radical politics. That they didn’t get closer to overthrowing
capitalism was due to circumstances outside of their control,
including relatively conservative public opinion. And the fact that
they _did_ achieve so much was because they flexibly concretized
socialist politics for America’s uniquely challenging
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context.

THE RISE OF SEWER SOCIALISM

Sewer socialism’s rise was far from automatic or rapid. Though
Milwaukee’s largely German working class was perhaps somewhat more
open to socialist ideas than some other ethnicities, a quantitative
study
[[link removed]]
of pre-war US immigrant voting found that Germans were _negatively
_correlated with socialist votes nationwide.

Figure 2 captures the party’s slow-but-steady rise over many
decades. Here’s how the party’s founder, Victor Berger
[[link removed]],
described this dynamic in a speech following their big 1910 mayoral
election victory:

“It took forty years to get a Socialist Mayor and administration in
Milwaukee since first a band of comrades joined together. … It
didn’t come quickly or easily to us. It meant work. Drop by drop
until the cup ran over. Vote by vote to victory. Work not only during
the few weeks of the campaign, but every month, every week, every day.
Work in the factories and from house to house.”

Figure 2. Data compiled by author.

Milwaukee’s history is a useful natural experiment for testing the
viability of competing socialist strategies in the US. Both moderate
and intransigent variants of Marxism were present and the latter had
nearly a two-decade-long head start. The Socialist Labor Party (SLP)
was the only game in town from 1875 onwards until Berger, a former SLP
member, founded a more moderate rival socialist newspaper, _Vorwärts_
(Forward), in 1893.

By the early nineties, the SLP under the leadership of Daniel De Leon
had crystallized its strategy: run electoral campaigns to propagate
the fundamental tenets of Marxism and build industrial unions to
displace the reformist, craft-based American Federation of Labor
(AFL). Had American workers been more radically inclined, the SLP’s
strategy _could_ have caught on — indeed, something close to this
approach guided
[[link removed]]
the early German Social Democracy as well as revolutionary Marxists
across imperial Russia. But by 1900, Berger’s Social Democratic
Party (SDP) had clearly eclipsed its more-radical rivals.

Victor Berger (right) with Eugene Debs. Berger recruited Debs to
socialism in 1895, while the latter was imprisoned in Woodstock, IL.

PRAGMATIC MARXISM

What were the politics of Berger’s new current? Berger and his
comrades are usually depicted
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whom “change would come through evolution and democracy, and not
through revolution.” In reality, the sewer socialists were — and
remained
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— committed Marxists
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who saw the fight for reforms as a necessary means not only to improve
the lives of working people, but also to strengthen working-class
consciousness, organization, and power in the direction of socialist
revolution in the US and across the globe.

Here’s how Berger articulated this vision in the founding 1911 issue
of _The_ _Milwaukee Leader_, his new English-language socialist daily
newspaper: “The distinguishing trait of Socialists is that they
understand the class struggle” and that “they boldly aim at the
revolution because they want a radical change from the present
system.”

Issue One of The Milwaukee Leader, with a cartoon of the newspaper’s
ship sinking capitalism (1911).

Reacting against De Leon’s doctrinaire rigidity and marginality,
Berger consciously sought to Americanize scientific socialism. Berger
argued that socialists in the US “must give up forever the slavish
imitation of the ‘German’ form of organization and the
‘German’ methods of electioneering and agitation.” Since the
specifics of what to do in the US were not self-evident, this
strategic starting point facilitated a useful degree of political
humility and empirical curiosity.

One of the things Berger learned was that socialist propaganda would
not widely resonate as long as most American workers remained resigned
to their fate. This, he explained, was the core flaw in the SLP’s
assumption that patiently preaching socialism would eventually
convince the whole working class:

The most formidable obstacle in the way of further progress—and
especially in the propaganda of Socialism—is not that men are
insufficiently versed in political economy or lacking in intelligence.
It is that people are without hope. … Despair is the chief opponent
of progress. Our greatest need is hope.

It was precisely to overcome widespread feelings of popular
resignation that the sewer socialists came to focus so much on fights
for immediate demands, both at work and within government. Since
“labor learns in the school of experience,” successful struggles
even around relatively minor issues would tend to raise workers’
confidence, expectations, and openness to socialist ideas.

It was easy to play with “revolutionary phrases,” but Berger noted
that this did not do much to move workers closer to socialism. While
it was important to continue propagating the big ideas of socialism,
what America’s leftists needed above all was “concrete political
achievements, not theoretical treatises ... less mouth-work, more
footwork.” Armed with this orientation, Berger and his comrades set
out to win over a popular majority — starting with Milwaukee’s
trade union activists.

Cartoon from _The Milwaukee Leader_ (1911) showing Berger’s
socialism car knocking over the profiteers and political opposition.

ROOTING SOCIALISM IN THE UNIONS

By the time Berger arrived on the scene, Milwaukee already had a rich
tradition of workplace militancy
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and unionism. Crucially, Berger’s current sought to transform
established unions rather than enter into competition with them by
setting up new socialist-led unions, as was the practice of the SLP
and, later on, the Wobblies.

Years of hard work within the unions paid off. In December 1899,
Milwaukee’s Federated Trades Council elected an executive committee
made up entirely of socialists, including Berger. For the next quarter
century, the leadership of the party and the unions statewide formed
an “interlocking directorate” of working-class socialists involved
in both formations. Nowhere else in the US did socialists become so
hegemonic in the labor movement as they did in Milwaukee and
Wisconsin.

A historian of Milwaukee unions notes
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the “inheritance Socialists bequeathed to the labor movement”:
democratic norms; support for industrial (rather than craft) unionism;
the absence of corruption; support for workers’ education; and
strong political advocacy. Wisconsin’s socialists could not have
achieved much without their union base. And precisely because they had
succeeded in transforming established AFL unions by “boring from
within,” they fought a relentless two-front war
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nationally against the self-isolating dual unionist efforts of
left-wing Socialists and the Wobblies, on the one hand, and the
narrow-minded AFL leadership of Samuel Gompers, on the other.

BUILDING THE PARTY

The anti-Socialist _Milwaukee Free Press_ ruefully noted in 1910 that
“there would not today be such sweeping Social-Democratic victories
in Milwaukee if that party did not possess a solidarity of
organization and purpose which is unequaled by that of any other party
in the county, or, for that matter, in the state.”

Building this machine took years of experimentation and refinement
under the guidance of Edmund Melms, an affable factory worker. Such a
focus on organizing, with its focus on developing new working-class
leaders, was crucial for helping Milwaukee’s socialists avoid the
constant turnover and churn that undermined so many other SPA
chapters.

SDP comrades preparing a “bundle brigade.” Source: _History of the
Milwaukee Social-Democratic Victories _(1911).

One of Melms’s organizational innovations was the party’s
soon-to-be famous “bundle brigade.” During electoral campaigns,
between 500 and 1,000 party members on Sunday mornings would pick up
the SDP’s four-page electoral newspaper at 6 a.m. and deliver it to
every home in town by 9 a.m. No other parties attempted anything this
ambitious because they lacked sufficient volunteer capacity, not just
for delivery but also for determining the language spoken in each
house; party members would have to canvass their neighborhoods ahead
of time to determine whether the house should receive literature in
German, English, or Polish.

Melms’s second innovation was to hold a Socialist carnival every
winter. These were massive events with over 10,000 participants,
attracting (and raising funds from) community members well beyond the
SDP’s ranks. In addition to these yearly carnivals, the party held
all sorts of social activities which helped grow and cohere the
movement. These included picnics, parades, card tournaments, dress
balls, parties, concerts, baseball and basketball games, plays, and
vaudeville shows. And some party branches were particularly proud of
their singers. As one participant recalled, “Did you love song?
Attend an affair of Branch 22.”

Students of the South Side Socialist Sunday School (1917). Source:
Milwaukee Public Library

Whereas patronage and graft greased the wheels of other party
machines, the socialists had to depend on selflessness derived from
political commitment. While most people who voted for the SDP were
interested primarily in winning immediate changes, there were also
additional, loftier motivations undergirding the decision of so many
working-class men, women, and teenagers to do thankless tasks like
getting up early on cold Sunday mornings to distribute socialist
literature. Historian-participant Elmer Beck is right
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that “the dreams, visions, and prophecies of the socialists … were
an extremely vital factor in the rise of the socialist tide.”

MESSAGE AND DEMANDS

With its eyes planted on the goal of winning a majority of
Milwaukeeans and Wisconsinites to socialism, the SDP was obsessed with
spreading its message. Between 1893 and 1939, the party published
twelve weekly newspapers, two dailies, one monthly magazine, as well
as countless pamphlets and fliers.

Class consciousness was the central political point stressed in all
the party’s agitation and publications — virtually everything was
framed as a fight of workers against capitalists. Linked to this class
analysis was a relentless focus on workers’ material needs: for
instance, one of the SDP’s most impactful early leaflets was
directed at working-class women: “Madam—how will you pay your
bills?” This relentless focus on workers’ material needs was one
of the key reasons the SDP was able to build such a deep base. Indeed,
the party’s ability to recruit — and retain — so many workers
depended on delivering tangible improvements to their lives (unlike so
many other SPA chapters, who had to rely on ideological recruitment
alone).

After 1904, immediate demands took on an increasingly central place in
the SDP’s election campaigns. Had Milwaukee’s socialists lost
sight of their socialist goals? Hardly. Up through its demise in the
late 1930s, the party never ceased propagandizing for socialism and
proposing ambitious but not-yet-winnable reforms. But Milwaukee’s
sewer socialists believed that running to win in electoral contests
— and seriously fighting to pass policy changes once in power —
made it possible to recruit a larger, not smaller, number of workers
to socialist politics.

Cartoon from _The Milwaukee Leader_ (1911)

The comparative data on party membership bears out this hypothesis. By
1912, roughly one out of every hundred people in Milwaukee was
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a member of the Social Democratic Party. No other city in America had
anything close to this level of strength; in contrast, New York City,
another socialist bastion, had one member for every thousand
inhabitants. Had the Socialist Party of America been as strong as
Milwaukee’s SDP, it would have had about one million members —
roughly the same size as German Social Democracy, the world’s
largest socialist party.

In a challenging American political context, Wisconsin’s socialists
pushed as far as possible without losing their base. Rigorous
comparative histories
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have shown that _all_ of the most successful instances of mass
working-class politics in America have adopted some form of this kind
of pragmatic radicalism, including Minnesota’s Farmer-Labor Party
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immigrant socialism, and the Popular Front Communists
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of the late 1930s.

Nevertheless, far left socialists elsewhere in the country — whose
tactical rigidity was both a cause and consequence of their weaker
roots in the class — frequently criticized their Wisconsin
comrades’ supposed “opportunism.” In 1905, for example, the
national leadership of the SPA expelled Berger from the body for
suggesting in an article that Milwaukeeans vote against a right-wing
judge in a non-partisan race that the party did not have the capacity
to contest. Berger lambasted
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this “heresy hunt without a heresy” and he succeeded in winning
back his post through an SPA membership referendum, the national (and
local) party’s highest decision-making structure. Episodes such as
these led the SDP to jealously guard its autonomy from national
Socialist Party of America structures that periodically succumbed to
leftist dogmatism.

SUCCESSFULLY GOVERNING MILWAUKEE

It was a challenging task, requiring constant wagers and adjustments,
to pull the mass of working people toward socialism without
undermining this process by jumping too far ahead. “Never swing to
the right or too far to the left,” advised Daniel Hoan, the
party’s mayor from 1916 through 1940. But concretizing this axiom
into practical politics was easier said than done — especially once
the party had to govern.

Given the powerful forces arrayed against them, and the unique
obstacles
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facing radical politics in the US, the remarkable thing about the
sewer socialist administrations is how much they achieved. Under SDP
rule, Milwaukee dramatically improved health and safety conditions for
its citizens in their neighborhoods as well as on the job. Milwaukee
built up the country’s first public housing cooperative and it
pioneered city planning through comprehensive zoning codes. And though
the SDP did not advance as far as it wanted in ending private
contracts for all utilities, it succeeded in building a city-owned
power plant and municipalizing the stone quarry, street lighting,
sewage disposal, and water purification.

Another crown jewel of sewer socialism was its dramatic expansion of
parks and playgrounds, as well as its creation of over 40 social
centers across Milwaukee. The city leaned on school infrastructure to
set up these centers, which provided billiards for teens, education
classes and public events for adults, plus sports, games and
entertainment for all. “During working hours, we make a living and
during leisure hours, we make a life,” was the motto coined by
Dorothy Enderis
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who headed the parks and recreation department after 1919.

The city’s excellent provision of recreation, services, and material
relief was, according to Mayor Hoan, responsible for it having one of
the lowest crime rates of any big city in the nation. In his
fascinating 1936 book _City Government: The Record of the Milwaukee
Experiment, _Hoan writes that in “Milwaukee we have held that crime
prevention [via attacking its social roots] is as important, if not
more so, if a comparison is possible, than crime detection and
punishment.” Comparing the cost of policing to the cost of social
services, Hoan estimated that the city saved over $1,200,000 yearly
via its robust parks and recreation department. This did not mean
Milwaukee ever considered defunding its police. Sewer socialists in
fact pushed for better wages and working conditions for cops, in a
relatively successful attempt to win away rank-and-file police from
their reactionary chief John Janssen.

After the first significant migration of Black workers arrived in
World War I, Mayor Hoan led a hard fight
[[link removed]]
against the Ku Klux Klan in the city, while Victor Berger (breaking
from his earlier racial chauvinism) led
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parallel, high-profile fight in Congress against lynching as well as
against immigration restrictions. As historian Joe Trotter notes
[[link removed]], Milwaukee’s
Black workers responded by consistently voting Socialist and leaders
of the town’s Garveyite Universal Negro Improvement Association
joined the SDP and agitated for its candidates.

“Socialist Outing,” from the Milwaukee Public Library’s
Socialist Party Collection

Ending graft and promoting governmental efficiency was another major
focus. One of the first steps taken by Emil Seidel, the party’s
mayor from 1910 through 1912, was to set up a Bureau of Economy and
Efficiency — the nation’s first, tasked with streamlining
governance. Despite the protestations of some party members, Socialist
administrations did not prioritize giving posts to SDP members. Mayor
Hoan defended the merit system on anti-capitalist grounds: “You must
show the working people and the citizens of the city that the city is
as good as and better an employer than private industry if you are to
gain headway in convincing them that the municipality is a better
owner of the public utilities and industries than private
corporations.”

Boosting the public’s confidence in governmental initiatives
eventually made it possible for Mayor Hoan to push the limits of
acceptability regarding city incursions into the free market. Before
and following World War I, Hoan — without city council approval —
purchased [[link removed]] train carloads of
surplus foods and clothing from the US Army and sold them to the
public far below market prices at city offices. The project’s scope
was ambitious: in January 1920 alone, Hoan purchased 72,000 cans of
peas, 33,600 cans of baked beans, 100,000 pounds of salt, 20,000 pairs
of knit gloves and wool socks, among other items. Basking in the
project’s success, the mayor noted that “the public sale of food
by me has offered an opportunity of demonstrating the Socialist theory
of operating a business. It should demonstrate once and for all that
the Socialist theory in conducting many of our enterprises without
profits can be worked out in a grand and beneficial manner if handled
by those who believe in its success.”

In contrast with progressive city administrations nationwide,
Milwaukee socialists believed that effective governmental change
depended to a large degree on bottom-up organizing. A sense of this
can be gleaned from the _Milwaukee Free Press_’s story about the
SDP’s rally the night it won the mayoral race in 1910:

A full ten minutes the crowd stood up on its feet and cheered for
Victor Berger; waved flags and tossed hats high in the air; cried and
shouted and even wept, for very overflowing of joy. Then Mr. Berger
stepped forward, and a hush fell upon the audience as he began to
speak. “I want to ask every man and woman in this audience to stand
up here and now enter a solemn pledge to do everything in our power to
help the men whom the people have chosen to fulfill their duty,”
said Mr. Berger. Like a mighty wave of humanity, the crowd surged to
its feet, and in a shout that shook the building and echoed down the
street to the thousands who waited there, gave the required pledge.

Grassroots pressure became increasingly urgent once the party lost its
short-lived control over the city council. Given Mayor Hoan’s lack
of a majority, historian John Gurda notes
[[link removed]] that he chose
to “take a populist approach to governing, appealing directly to the
citizens of Milwaukee to support his reforms and pressure the
non-partisan aldermen to support them as well.” The same strategy
informed the party’s approach
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on a statewide level, leading the SDP to power-map the legislature to
figure out pressure points to flip movable office-holders.

Socialist administrations also did everything possible to boost union
power. Union labor was used on all city construction and printing
projects. With city backing, a unionization wave swept the city’s
firemen, garbage collectors, coal passers, and elevator operators,
among others. Mayor Seidel even threatened to swear in striking
workers as police deputies if the police chief attempted to intimidate
strikers.

And in 1935 the SDP succeeded in passing America’s strongest labor
law: the “Boncel Ordinance,” which empowered the city
administration to close the plants of any company that refused to
collectively bargain and whose refusal resulted in crowds of over 200
people two days in a row. Employers who refused to comply would be
fined or imprisoned. With support from governmental policy above and
workplace organizing below, Milwaukee County’s union density grew
tenfold from 1929 through 1939. By the end of the 1930s roughly 60
percent
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of its workers were in unions. In contrast, New York City at its peak
only reached a union density of at most 33 percent.

Mayor Daniel Hoan speaking in front of the Seaman auto plant during a
strike. Wisconsin Historical Society.

DEMISE

Despite labor’s upsurge and the SDP’s continued efforts to educate
the public about socialism, the movement’s forward advance was
significantly constrained by employer opposition and public opinion
[[link removed]],
which as ever was shaped by America’s uniquely challenging terrain,
as well as media scaremongering and the normal, expectations-lowering
pull [[link removed]] of
capitalist social relations.

By the late 1930s, backlash
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against union militancy and governmental radicalism had begun to take
an electoral toll in Wisconsin and nationwide. Incensed by Mayor
Hoan’s refusal to impose an austerity budget, employers had waged a
“war” to recall him in 1933. Though they lost that battle,
Milwaukee’s bourgeois establishment succeeded in convincing a
majority of voters to defeat the SDP’s subsequent referendum to
municipalize the electric utility. In 1940, Hoan decisively lost the
mayoral race to a handsome but politically vacuous centrist named Carl
Zeidler. Sewer socialism’s reign was over. (Another Socialist, Frank
Zeidler, became mayor of Milwaukee from 1948 through 1960, but by this
time the party was a shell of its former self.)

The central obstacle to moving further toward social democracy and
socialism in America was simple: the organized Left and its allied
unions were not
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powerful enough to convince a majority of people to actively support
such an advance. This is a sobering fact to acknowledge, since it runs
contrary to radicals’ longtime assumption that misleadership and
cooptation are our primary obstacles to success.

But given the many structural challenges facing US leftism, the most
remarkable thing about sewer socialism — and the broader New Deal
that it helped pioneer — was not its limitations but rather its
remarkable advances, which provided an unprecedented degree of
economic security and workplace
[[link removed]] freedom
[[link removed]]
to countless Americans.

RELEVANCE FOR TODAY

The history of sewer socialism provides a roadmap for radicals today
aiming to build a viable alternative to Trumpism and Democratic
centrism. Milwaukee’s experience shows that the Left not only can
govern, but that it can do so considerably more effectively than
either establishment politicians or progressive solo operators.
That’s the real reason why defenders of the status quo are so
worried about a democratic socialist like Zohran Mamdani.

We have much to learn from Wisconsin’s successful efforts to root
socialism in the American working class. Unlike uncompromising
socialists to their left, the SDP consistently oriented its agitation
to the broad mass of working people, rather than a small radicalized
periphery; it combined union organizing and disruptive strikes with a
hard-nosed focus on winning electoral contests and policy changes; it
centered workers’ material needs; it made compromises when
necessary; it based its tactics on concrete analyses of public opinion
and the relationship of class forces rather than imported formulas or
wishful thinking; it saw that fights for widely and deeply felt
demands would do more than party propaganda to radicalize millions;
and, eventually, it came to understand
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the need to balance political independence with broader alliances.

Today’s radicals would do well to adopt the basic political
orientation of Berger’s current. But it would be contrary to the
non-dogmatic spirit of the sewer socialists to try to simply copy and
paste all of their tactics. Building a nationwide third party, for
example, is not feasible in our contemporary context because of
exceptionally high ideological polarization
[[link removed]] combined with the
entrenchment of America’s unique party system
[[link removed]]
over the past century.

As we search for the most effective ways to overcome an increasingly
authoritarian and oligarchic status quo, on a terrain of widespread
working-class atomization
[[link removed]],
it would serve us well to heed Berger’s reminder
[[link removed]]
to his comrades: “We must learn a great deal.”

 

_[This is a working paper, the final version of which will be a much
longer essay for __Catalyst_ [[link removed]]_,
America’s best socialist journal. __Subscribe_
[[link removed]]_ today to Catalyst and
you’ll get my upcoming piece as well as the magazine’s other
excellent content. My final paper will take a deeper dive into all the
topics touched on above, as well as other questions I didn’t have
space here to address, such as the evolution of SDP electoral tactics,
how it supported and disciplined its elected officials, its somewhat
dogmatic approach initially to labor party and farmer movements, and
tensions between grassroots mass organizing and Socialist
administrations in Milwaukee.]_

_ERIC BLANC is author of the books __We Are the Union: How
Worker-to-Worker Organizing is Revitalizing Labor and Winning Big_
[[link removed]]_ (UC Press
2025) and __Red State Revolt: The Teachers’ Strike Wave and
Working-Class Politics_
[[link removed]]_
(Verso 2019), Eric Blanc is an assistant professor of labor studies at
Rutgers University, researching new workplace organizing, strikes,
digital labor activism, and working-class politics._

_You can receive a newsletter of his research here:
__laborpolitics.com_
[[link removed]]

_His writings have appeared in journals such as Politics & Society,
New Labor Forum, and Labor Studies Journal as well as publications
such as The Nation, The Guardian, and Jacobin._

_A longtime labor activist, Blanc is an organizer trainer in the
__Emergency Workplace Organizing Committee_
[[link removed]]_, which he helped co-found in March
2020. He directs __The Worker to Worker Collaborative_
[[link removed]]_,
a center to help unions and rank-and-file groups scale up their
efforts by expanding their members’ involvement and leadership._

_He can be reached at eric.blanc rutgers.edu  My substack is
__LABORPOLITICS.com._ [[link removed]]

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