Iran Unfiltered - NIAC's periodic digest tracking the latest from Iran ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌ ‌<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" width="100%">
<thead>
<tr>
<th>
<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" width="100%">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td style="background-color: #fff; text-align: center; padding: 12px 0 15px;"><a href="#" style="mso-line-height-rule: exactly; line-height: 1%; text-decoration: none;" target="_blank"><img alt="" src="[link removed]" style="line-height: 1%; margin: 0px; border-width: 0px; border-style: solid; width: 130px;" /> </a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="background-color: #222; text-align: center; padding: 0;"><a href="[link removed]" style="display: block; mso-line-height-rule: exactly; line-height: 1%; text-decoration: none; padding: 0 15px;" target="_blank"><img alt="" src="[link removed]" style="line-height: 1%; margin: 0px; border-width: 0px; border-style: solid; height: 82px; width: 505px;" /> </a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Please see our latest Human Rights Tracker [[link removed]] below on labor activist Sharifeh Mohammadi's latest sentencing.

Week of October 27, 2025 [[link removed]] | Iran Unfiltered is a digest tracking Iranian politics & society by the National Iranian American Council

* Cautious Diplomatic Maneuvers Amid Broader Stalemate [[link removed]]
* Ham-Mihan Silenced After Interviewing Pejman Jamshidi’s Accuser [[link removed]]
* Political Reflections from Mehdi Karroubi: Governance, Reform, and Iran’s Foreign Alignment [[link removed]]
* Mohammad Khatami’s Political Warning: A Critique of Government and Media After the War [[link removed]]
* Deepening Divides: Iranian Officials Clash Over Ties With Russia [[link removed]]

Cautious Diplomatic Maneuvers Amid Broader Stalemate [[link removed]]
A series of parallel developments reflect an apparent effort to move cautiously amid a broader diplomatic stalemate with Iran. Qatar’s Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, announced that Doha is actively seeking to mediate between Iran and the United States. He told Reuters that “serious negotiations between Iran and the U.S. could lead to an agreement that would be good for everyone.” This is the first explicit Qatari confirmation of renewed mediation after months of diplomatic stagnation. Previously Oman was the key mediator during initial U.S.-Iran negotiations between March and the outbreak of the June war, and Qatar’s interest signals that Gulf actors continue to see de-escalation through dialogue as preferable to continued confrontation.

At the same time, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) signaled a nuanced tone in its latest assessments . IAEA Director-General Rafael Grossi stated that Iran is not currently engaged in active uranium enrichment, though inspectors have observed movements near stored nuclear materials. Grossi clarified that these activities do not indicate a resumption of high-level enrichment and reaffirmed that “Iran has not pursued nuclear weapons development.” He described Iran’s decision to remain within the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as “a wise and stabilizing step” and emphasized the Agency’s intent to continue respectful cooperation with Tehran. This reflects an active effort to dial down the temperature amid rampant Iranian distrust toward the agency, and following the snapback of UN sanctions on Iran ended a prior nascent understanding between Iran and the IAEA.

In a coordinated diplomatic maneuver, the permanent representatives of Iran, Russia, and China to the IAEA jointly announced that the Director-General’s reporting mandate under UN Security Council Resolution 2231 has ended . They declared that, effective October 18 (26 Mehr), “the issue has been automatically removed from the IAEA Board of Governors’ agenda, and no further action is required.” Resolution 2231 had previously required the IAEA to report quarterly on Iran’s nuclear commitments and semi-annually to the UN Security Council, but the three nations now argue that this mandate expired with the JCPOA’s sunset clause, meaning Grossi is no longer authorized to issue such reports. Procedurally, they may succeed, yet the IAEA would still be obliged to report on Iran’s compliance with its safeguards agreement with the agency.

In a related regional development, India’s Foreign Ministry confirmed that the United States has granted New Delhi a six-month waiver from Iran-related sanctions to continue operations at Chabahar Port , where India manages a terminal under a ten-year agreement. The waiver allows trade routes linking India to Afghanistan and Central Asia to remain open without passing through Pakistan—a critical economic and strategic goal for both Tehran and New Delhi. Indian Foreign Ministry Spokesman Randhir Jaiswal said the waiver was granted recently and will remain in effect until April 2026. This move indicates that Washington, too, is showing selective flexibility, allowing a measured space for engagement with Tehran through regional partners.

The next IAEA Board of Governors meeting on November 17 (26 Aban) in Vienna will be a key test of whether underlying tensions can be contained . Western powers could choose to escalate via censure or a referral of Iran’s nuclear file to the UN Security Council. Alternatively, they could choose to proceed cautiously, testing whether Director General Grossi or regional interlocutors can make more progress in a calmer environment. Regardless, Iran appears to have Russia, China and potentially other actors on its side as the diplomatic standoff continues.

Ham-Mihan Silenced After Interviewing Pejman Jamshidi’s Accuser [[link removed]]
The sexual-assault case against Pejman Jamshidi, a well-known footballer-turned-actor, has become a striking example of how power, celebrity, and censorship intersect in Iran . It also highlights how those who seek justice—victims and journalists alike—face intimidation and silencing. After Ham-Mihan, one of Tehran’s most prominent reformist newspapers, published an exclusive interview with the woman accusing Jamshidi of rape and her lawyer, the newspaper’s website was abruptly taken offline by order of security agencies, and its social media accounts were suspended.

The interview was conducted by Elaheh Mohammadi, the same journalist previously imprisoned for her coverage of Mahsa (Jina) Amini’s death and the “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement . Mohammadi’s involvement brought further attention to the case—and likely intensified the pressure on the newspaper.

The woman, who remains anonymous for her safety, told Ham-Mihan that Jamshidi invited her under the pretext of an acting opportunity, then drugged and raped her . She said that after the assault, people close to Jamshidi offered her 50 billion tomans (around US $500,000) to drop the complaint, but she refused to stay silent. According to her lawyer, forensic reports confirmed the sexual assault, and DNA results matched Jamshidi. Despite this evidence, Jamshidi was quickly released on bail and later left Iran.

Ham-Mihan confirmed that its website had been blocked following direct intervention by security agencies. Javad Ruh, the newspaper’s editor-in-chief, told Jamaran News : “ Security agencies called and said they had taken the website offline. They also insisted that no new content be posted on the newspaper’s social-media platforms until further notice . He later told Avaash News Network :

“ The newspaper itself has not been banned, but we’ve been instructed to pause our online activity . The reason hasn’t been officially stated, though I don’t believe it’s directly related to today’s story on Pejman Jamshidi’s case. During the twelve-day war coverage our site was also blocked for a time, and it was later resolved. We’re waiting to see what happens now.”

Although Ham-Mihan’s print edition continues to circulate, its Instagram and X (Twitter) accounts have been inactive since October 28—the same day the shutdown order was issued . Observers see the silencing of Ham-Mihan as part of a broader crackdown on independent journalism in Iran. While Jamshidi, facing serious sexual-assault charges, was able to leave the country freely, the journalists who gave voice to the victim are being censored and threatened. Legal experts note that in Iran, travel bans are normally automatic in rape or “forced adultery” cases, yet this rule was not applied, revealing judicial double standards favoring celebrities and those with political connections.

The Jamshidi case is more than a celebrity scandal . It exposes the structural impunity that protects influential men and punishes truth-tellers. For women who come forward, the price is stigma, disbelief, and danger; for journalists who publish their voices, the price could be forced silence.

The shutdown of Ham-Mihan stands as a reminder that, in today’s Iran, reporting on sexual violence could trigger reprisals from authorities . The scandal is not only what allegedly happened to one woman—but how swiftly the system moved to silence her story.

Political Reflections from Mehdi Karroubi: Governance, Reform, and Iran’s Foreign Alignment [[link removed]]
Green Movement leader Mehdi Karroubi offered detailed reflections on Iran’s political trajectory in some of his first major political remarks since his release from more than fourteen years of house arrest in March 2025 . Karroubi gave the remarks in a recent meeting with the family of Mir Hossein Mousavi, leveling criticism at domestic governance, the handling of the 2009 presidential election, and the country’s increasing alignment with Russia.

Karroubi was a cleric, former Speaker of Parliament and ran for President in both 2005 and 2009 on a reformist platform. Following the announced victory of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2009 that many Iranians viewed as fraudulent, he emerged as one of the leading voices of the Green Movement protests, alleging that the results were rigged and demanding answers on allegations of torture of protesters. His continued activism led to an arbitrary fourteen years of house arrest, along with Mir Hossein Mousavi and Zahra Rahnavard.

During his meeting with Mousavi’s children, Karroubi appeared to raise concerns about the growing pro-Russia orientation of the government. He stated, “the deviation from the ideals of the revolution has reached a point where some military figures in Parliament defend President Putin so intensely that even if the Tudeh Party were in power, it would not have shown more enthusiasm for the Russians.”

A few days before Karroubi’s remarks, Parliament Speaker Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf publicly criticized Mohammad Javad Zarif and Hassan Rouhani for “damaging Iran’s strategic cooperation with Russia,” underscoring the continuing divide among Iran’s political elites over the country’s foreign orientation. . Since 2021, Iranian foreign policy has increasingly emphasized ties with Moscow in trade, defense, and energy sectors. This policy has been strongly supported by conservative political factions, while some former officials—including Zarif and Rouhani—have expressed concern that excessive dependence on Russia could undermine Iran’s long-term autonomy and strategic flexibility.

Karroubi also revisited the events of the 2009 presidential election, stating that “instead of accepting the people’s vote, the system chose to support fraud and repression .” He observed that critics of the government were subsequently labeled as seditionists and disloyal, and described the outcome of that approach as persistent disorder in economic management, culture, security, and social ethics. Reflecting on that period, he added that “the signs of deviation from the path of the revolution were already visible, and we acted to prevent further deterioration.”

Karroubi attributed many of Iran’s continuing challenges to the expanded role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the Basij, and intelligence agencies in political, economic, and governance affairs . According to him, this consolidation of power has weakened oversight mechanisms and contributed to corruption and inefficiency. He also referred to the sharp economic decline as evidence of structural shortcomings. “The day we were placed under house arrest, one U.S. dollar was 900 tomans; today it is 108,000 tomans,” he said, warning that “if this path is not corrected, God knows how much higher it will go.”

Despite the critical tone of his remarks, Karroubi expressed hope for an end to what he described as an atmosphere of hostility and obstinacy, and called for the release of Mir Hossein Mousavi and Zahra Rahnavard, who remain under house arrest . He emphasized the importance of national dialogue and reconciliation, suggesting that political stagnation has deepened divisions and hindered reform.

Karroubi’s comments reflect the enduring divisions between reformist and conservative factions over political accountability and electoral legitimacy, as well as the concentration of authority within Iran’s security and military institutions . They also illustrate how the country’s deepening relationship with Russia has become a central issue in debates over national sovereignty and independence.

While Karroubi’s statements were made in a personal setting, they carry significant political weight . As a senior revolutionary figure and former establishment insider, his remarks highlight the continuing tension between centralization of power and calls for reform, transparency, and accountability. They also demonstrate that issues surrounding the 2009 election, the balance of power within the state, and Iran’s foreign alignment remain defining elements of the country’s political discourse.

Mohammad Khatami’s Political Warning: A Critique of Government and Media After the War [[link removed]]
Former Iranian president Mohammad Khatami has once again drawn national attention with his shar p political remarks regarding Iran in the aftermath of the 12 Day War . On October 24, speaking to a group of political activists in Yazd, Khatami focused on the performance of the government and the state broadcaster, warning that the gap between the people and the ruling establishment has never been wider. His remarks, widely reported in Tehran’s reformist newspapers such as Ham-Mihan, Arman-e Melli, and Shargh, carried a tone of frustration mixed with patriotic concern, highlighting the dangers of political isolation, propaganda, and the mistake of perceiving national unity as support for the government.

In his address, Khatami praised the solidarity of Iranians during the recent conflict but warned against misinterpreting that unity as political approval for the ruling authorities . He said the Iranian people rallied not around a government or a faction, but around the idea of Iran itself. “Let us not be mistaken and say the people endorsed us,” he said. “They endorsed Iran, and it is we who must move toward Iran.” This distinction, subtle but powerful, challenged the government’s narrative that national cohesion during wartime reflected renewed public support for the Islamic Republic. For Khatami, the people’s behavior was an expression of national identity, not political allegiance.

His most direct criticism was aimed at the state broadcaster, the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), which he accused of failing to sustain the inclusive and unifying tone it briefly adopted during the war . IRIB headquarters was the target of an Israeli bombing on June 16, which occurred mid-broadcast, killing two and wounding others.

“Even the songs sung for Iran were good,” Khatami remarked, “but soon after the war, state television reverted to its previous course .” The comment, simple yet cutting, encapsulated his long-standing frustration with IRIB’s partisan behavior — its tendency to act as an instrument of propaganda for hardline factions rather than as a national media serving all citizens. Khatami’s critique implied that the network’s return to divisive programming reflected a deeper institutional problem: an unwillingness to recognize the diversity of Iranian society and the need for shared narratives that transcend ideology.

Khatami’s critique of IRIB reflects a broader public frustration with the suppression of dissent and the manipulation of information . For many Iranians, state television symbolizes centralized control — a daily reminder of the distance between rulers and society. By publicly calling out IRIB, Khatami challenged one of the most sensitive foundations of the system: the idea that information should serve power rather than the people.

By linking the performance of the media to broader political dysfunction, Khatami painted a picture of a state disconnected from its people . His argument was that a government which cannot tolerate different viewpoints or give space to public questioning risks losing its legitimacy. He contrasted the spirit of unity seen during the war with the fragmentation that dominates everyday governance. While missiles and military strength had contributed to the country’s defense, he said, the real power of Iran lay in its people.

“Missiles without people are only tools,” he warned, “and people without trust in their government are vulnerable .” In this sense, his message was as much about domestic legitimacy as it was about national security: power that does not rest on popular confidence cannot endure.

Khatami’s political message extended beyond the media and post-war environment. His broader critique targeted the government’s failure to manage the country effectively and to meet its own long-term goals. He lamented that Iran had fallen behind on every major indicator of development and accused the leadership of sacrificing growth, transparency, and civic participation in the name of security. For Khatami, the same mentality that dominates the state broadcaster — the insistence on control and the exclusion of dissent — also pervades governance as a whole. It has, he implied, produced a system unable to respond to public needs, incapable of reform, and increasingly detached from the aspirations of its citizens.

The timing of Khatami’s remarks added symbolic weight . His comments came just as the government sought to portray the postwar atmosphere as a moment of national victory. Instead, Khatami shifted the narrative from triumphalism to reflection, reminding Iran’s elites and the public that military success cannot compensate for political and social stagnation. He stressed that true legitimacy does not come from televised displays of patriotism but from public trust and inclusion. His statement that “we must move toward Iran” served as a call to reorient the nation’s political compass — away from ideological supremacy and toward national interest, pluralism, and civic responsibility.

In Tehran’s reformist press, his remarks were described as a warning — an implicit challenge to the state’s monopoly over information and its habit of claiming national unity as proof of popular consent . Ham-Mihan called his speech “Khatami’s explicit warning,” arguing that the deeper crisis in Iran is intellectual rather than structural: a rift between those who view religion and governance as open to reason and those who use them as tools of authority. Arman-e Melli wrote that the war had revealed the irreplaceable role of the people, forcing the political elite to acknowledge that society cannot be ignored or excluded. Shargh interpreted his Yazd speech as a coded message to both government and public — that the survival of the nation depends on balancing the state’s power with the people’s participation.

He warned that unless the government listens to its citizens and the media becomes a platform for all voices, the fragile unity witnessed during wartime will dissolve into deeper disillusionment . His words carried both urgency and restraint — a message of reform delivered through the language of patriotism. After the war, as the government seeks validation and the media claims victory, Khatami reminded everyone that genuine victory belongs only to a nation that allows its people to speak freely and think critically.

Deepening Divides: Iranian Officials Clash Over Ties With Russia [[link removed]]
Iran’s relationship with Russia, long described as “strategic,” has become the center of fierce new political infighting in Tehran . On October 26, 2025, the dispute reached an unprecedented level when Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Speaker of the Iranian Parliament, publicly accused former president Hassan Rouhani and ex–foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif of damaging the path of strategic cooperation with Moscow. The clash exposed deep divisions over the Islamic Republic’s “Look to the East” policy and the extent to which Iran should rely on Russia as a counterweight to the West.

Iran, Russia, and China jointly sent a letter to the United Nations rejecting Western efforts to reactivate sanctions under the so-called “snapback mechanism .” Ghalibaf hailed this coordination as proof of a new global alignment in which Tehran, Moscow, and Beijing stand together against Western dominance. Addressing the parliament on 26 October 2025 (4 Aban 1404), he declared that national unity required protecting this “strategic achievement,” and then sharply attacked Rouhani and Zarif for allegedly undermining it.

“I find it necessary to express my explicit criticism toward the former president and our former foreign minister ,” he said, “who, precisely when the course of our strategic cooperation with Russia is advancing, have with their statements harmed this path.” Coming from the head of the legislature, this was more than a partisan remark; it amounted to an official warning that criticism of Russia or dissent from pro-Russia policy could be construed as a threat to national interests.

Zarif, in a series of leaked and public remarks, responded to criticism from Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov by arguing that Moscow had deliberately obstructed Iran’s rapprochement [[link removed]] with the West during the 2015 nuclear negotiations, preferring to keep Tehran trapped in the geopolitical rivalry between Russia and the United States . He said Iranian diplomacy had repeatedly been sacrificed to the “field” and to Russian interests. Zarif also criticized Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov for proposing what he called a “very bad formula” on the snapback clause during the nuclear talks, which Iran had to reject after “a lot of effort.”

Rouhani, for his part, reiterated that Iran’s foundational principle of foreign policy must remain “neither East nor West .” Replacing Western dependence with Eastern dependence, he warned, would leave Iran both subordinate and uncreative. He reminded his audience that Russia and China had voted for all six UN Security Council resolutions imposing sanctions on Iran between 2006 and 2010 — evidence, he said, that neither power had acted as Iran’s unconditional ally.

Ghalibaf’s accusations opened the floodgates for hardline attacks in the parliament. Amirhossein Sabeti, a young Tehran MP and former Ofogh TV host, denounced Rouhani as “the most hated politician in Iran,” accused him of opposing anti-corruption measures, and invoked the 2019 gas-price protests to portray him as responsible for a national tragedy. He called on the judiciary to prosecute Rouhani for “acts and omissions,” insisting that he should “end up behind bars, not think of higher office.” Other hardline deputies joined in, chanting “Death to Fereydoun” (Rouhani’s family name) and “Trial!” across the chamber.

Veteran conservative Hamid Rasayi accused Rouhani of “eight years of submission to America” that had brought only more sanctions and humiliation, and demanded that judiciary chief Gholamhossein Ejei investigate alleged misconduct in Rouhani’s presidency and even in his academic record . What had begun as a policy debate quickly turned into threatening a political purge, fusing foreign-policy loyalty tests with personal vendettas.

Reformist figures reacted with alarm. Political analyst Ahmad Zeydabadi asked whether “the Russians have demanded that Iranian citizens remain silent toward Kremlin policies as a condition for cooperation,” calling such a demand “the ugliest and most disgraceful form of colonial subordination.” He questioned why the remarks of two now-private citizens could be considered harmful to national interests. Hesameddin Ashena, Rouhani’s former adviser, admonished Ghalibaf that “it is unwise for the Speaker to read aloud everything that reaches his hands.”

Behind this uproar lie two conflicting strategic visions . The first, championed by Ghalibaf and the existing security establishment, sees Russia and China as indispensable partners for circumventing Western sanctions, ensuring energy and arms cooperation, and asserting ideological defiance of the United States. The second, represented by Rouhani, Zarif, and the reformist camp, views such alignment as risky and one-sided, warning that Moscow exploits Iran’s isolation to treat it as a junior partner. To them, balanced, multi-directional diplomacy is essential for preserving Iran’s independence.

It also reflected the unease of Iranian officials aware of Moscow’s irritation over Zarif’s criticisms, suggesting that the Iranian parliament’s posture partly aimed to placate the Kremlin. This backlash to remarks from former officials has cast a light on Iran’s internal debate over its orientation toward Russia. What began as a discussion over the snapback mechanism has evolved into a broader ideological confrontation between those who view alignment with Moscow as salvation and those who fear it as subjugation.

# [#]

[link removed] [[link removed]]
Sharifeh Mohammadi’s Death Sentence Commuted to 30 Years: Human Rights Concerns Remain [[link removed]]
برای خواندن این مطلب به فارسی اینجا را کلیک کنید [[link removed]]

Iranian labor activist Sharifeh Mohammadi, who had been under a death sentence [[link removed]] for “baghi” (armed rebellion against the Islamic Republic), has had her punishment reduced to 30 years’ imprisonment following a decision by the head of Iran’s judiciary. Her lawyer, Amir Raeesian, announced the ruling on his Instagram page, explaining that “the danger of execution has now been lifted,” but that efforts for judicial review and full acquittal remain underway.

Raeesian stated that he will continue to pursue Article 477 of Iran’s Code of Criminal Procedure, which allows the Supreme Leader or the head of the judiciary to order a retrial if a verdict contradicts Islamic law or justice. He emphasized that the defense team seeks to overturn the conviction entirely, arguing that Mohammadi should be cleared of the charge of baghi — one of the harshest and most politicized accusations in Iranian law.

Sharifeh Mohammadi was arrested on December 5, 2023 (Azar 14 1402) by security agents while returning home from work. She was held incommunicado for several weeks, first in Rasht and then in Sanandaj Prison in Kurdistan Province. For roughly three months she was kept in solitary confinement, subjected to prolonged interrogations, and denied access to her family and legal counsel. She is now held in Lakan Prison, Rasht, where she remains incarcerated.

Mohammadi was first sentenced to death on July 8, 2024 (Tir 18 1403) by Branch 1 of the Revolutionary Court in Rasht on charges of baghi . The Supreme Court overturned that verdict on October 12, 2024 (Mehr 21), citing serious ambiguities and lack of evidence. Nevertheless, a parallel court re-issued the death sentence, and in August 2025, Branch 39 of the Supreme Court again upheld the execution order despite unresolved contradictions and procedural flaws.

The confirmation of the death sentence sparked backlash from civil-society groups, human-rights defenders, and labor organizations. The Campaign to Defend Sharifeh Mohammadi condemned the verdict as “unjust and politically motivated,” stating that “from the very beginning, this case was constructed by the Ministry of Intelligence as a security scenario rather than a legal process.” The campaign added that the arrest, interrogation, and trial lacked any sign of independence or impartiality.

According to a source close to Mohammadi’s family, the baghi charge was based not on armed activity but on personal friendships with individuals the Ministry of Intelligence alleged were linked to the Kurdish Komala Party. Such alleged associations were used to portray her as part of an armed group, despite no evidence of violent conduct or organizational involvement.

Human-rights advocates have welcomed the commutation of her death sentence, viewing it as a crucial step that spares her life, yet falling far short of true justice. They have warned that the entire case against Mohammadi remains gravely flawed — tainted by coerced confessions, denial of fair-trial guarantees, politically motivated charges, and lack of due process.

Under international human-rights law, Iran is bound by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which guarantees the right to life, freedom from arbitrary detention, and freedom of expression and association. The application of baghi to a non-violent labor activist stands in direct violation of these obligations.

Human-rights organizations worldwide have urged Iran to release Sharifeh Mohammadi immediately and unconditionally, declaring her imprisonment arbitrary and politically motivated. While her life has been saved, thirty years behind bars for peaceful activism would be profoundly harsh and disproportionate.

The commutation of Sharifeh Mohammadi’s death sentence should be welcomed as a humanitarian reprieve — but it should also serve as a call to end the criminalization of civic activism in Iran. NIAC reiterates its call on Iranian authorities to release all unjustly detained prisoners, including Mohammadi, and to move into compliance with its international rights obligations.
Support NIAC's important work by making a contribution today.
Donate → [[link removed]]
<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" width="100%">
<tfoot>
<tr>
<td style="background-color: #fff; text-align: center; padding: 60px 30px 45px;">
<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" width="100%">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td width="35%">&nbsp;</td>
<td style="text-align: center; padding: 0 8px;"><a href="[link removed]" style="mso-line-height-rule: exactly; line-height: 1%; text-decoration: none;" target="_blank"><img alt="" src="[link removed]" style="line-height: 1%; margin: 0px; vertical-align: middle; border-width: 0px; border-style: solid; width: 36px; height: 36px;" /> </a></td>
<td style="text-align: center; padding: 0 8px;"><a href="[link removed]" style="mso-line-height-rule: exactly; line-height: 1%; text-decoration: none;" target="_blank"><img alt="" src="[link removed]" style="line-height: 1%; margin: 0px; vertical-align: middle; border-width: 0px; border-style: solid; width: 36px; height: 36px;" /> </a></td>
<td style="text-align: center; padding: 0 8px;"><a href="[link removed]" style="mso-line-height-rule: exactly; line-height: 1%; text-decoration: none;" target="_blank"><img alt="" src="[link removed]" style="line-height: 1%; margin: 0px; vertical-align: middle; border-width: 0px; border-style: solid; width: 36px; height: 36px;" /> </a></td>
<td style="text-align: center; padding: 0 8px;"><a href="[link removed]" style="mso-line-height-rule: exactly; line-height: 1%; text-decoration: none;" target="_blank"><img alt="" src="[link removed]" style="line-height: 1%; margin: 0px; vertical-align: middle; border-width: 0px; border-style: solid; width: 36px; height: 36px;" /> </a></td>
<td style="text-align: center; padding: 0 8px;"><a href="[link removed]" style="mso-line-height-rule: exactly; line-height: 1%; text-decoration: none;" target="_blank"><img alt="" src="[link removed]" style="line-height: 1%; margin: 0px; vertical-align: middle; border-width: 0px; border-style: solid; width: 36px; height: 36px;" /> </a></td>
<td width="35%">&nbsp;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="background-color: #fff; border-top: 1px solid #000; color: #000; padding: 30px 30px 10px; text-align: center;">&nbsp;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="background-color: #fff; color: #000; padding: 0 30px;">
<p><span style="display: block; font-family: Arial, sans-serif !important; font-size: 18px; font-weight: 700; mso-line-height-rule: exactly; line-height: 1.2;">Receive this email from a friend? <a href="[link removed]" style="color: #002b49;">See previous issues and/or sign up here</a>.</span></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="background-color: #fff; color: #000; padding: 0 30px 20px;"><span style="display: block; font-family: Arial, sans-serif !important; font-size: 14px; mso-line-height-rule: exactly; line-height: 1.7;">This email was sent to&nbsp;[email protected] because you signed up to receive the latest Iran Unfiltered newsletter in your inbox. If you don't want to receive this newsletter in the future, we'd hate to see you go but you can <a href="[link removed]" style="color: #002b49;">manage your subscription and unsubscribe here</a>. Iran Unfiltered is a weekly digest tracking Iranian politics &amp; society from the National Iranian American Council, a 501(c)3 grassroots organization.&nbsp;</span></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="background-color: #fff; padding: 0 30px 30px;"><span style="font-size:14px"><span style="display:block"><span style="font-family:Arial, sans-serif !important"><span style="line-height:1.2">© 2020 National Iranian American Council | PO Box 65439 | Washington, DC 20035</span></span></span></span></td>
</tr>
</tfoot>
</table>