[link removed]
CRANK Call is a monthly review of developments involving cooperation, and at times contention, among China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea (the CRANKs ([link removed]) ).


** August Highlights
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** Power of Siberia 2 pipeline agreement signed at Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit
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Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping signed ([link removed]) a memorandum of understanding for the long-delayed Power of Siberia 2 pipeline project on September 1 at the close of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Tianjin. The MOU leaves undecided the most important commercial details—including pricing and “take-or-pay” obligations—but represents a commitment to continue negotiations toward those terms and not to shift efforts toward a different potential off-taker. The agreement also reflects China’s growing concerns about the risks ([link removed]) of becoming overly dependent on seaborne supplies of liquefied natural gas (LNG).

U.S. LNG supplies were halted ([link removed]) in February due to the trade war with the incoming Trump administration and China’s retaliatory 125% tariff ([link removed]) on U.S. LNG. Supplies from Qatar must transit the Strait of Hormuz, whose vulnerability was underscored by the recent Iran-Israel war. Those two countries are by far the world’s largest LNG suppliers. The arrival of a sanctioned Russian LNG cargo from Arctic LNG 2 during the SCO summit further demonstrated China’s increasing unwillingness to be influenced by U.S. secondary sanctions—a stance also reflected in the Power of Siberia 2 deal. The signing of the MOU is also a signal to Washington that the Russia-China partnership is solid, and that no American machinations will succeed in driving them apart.

Whether the MOU will lead ([link removed]) to a final deal and construction of the pipeline remains uncertain. Russia needs this sale more than China needs the gas, placing Beijing in a very strong negotiating position. China will seek to avoid a “take-or-pay” commitment on the full proposed annual volume of 50 billion cubic meters (Bcm), as such an obligation could push its dependence on Russian gas above 40% per year. At the same time, China will want the flexibility to increase imports up to that level if needed. Beijing is also well-positioned to secure a price per unit well below what it pays for gas through the existing Power of Siberia pipeline, which currently supplies 38 Bcm annually and is set
to expand ([link removed]) to 44 Bcm per year under a separate agreement signed at the SCO summit.


** China vows to continue oil purchases from Russia and Iran despite U.S. pressure
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Chinese officials recently reiterated that they will continue purchasing oil from Russia and Iran despite U.S. secondary sanctions and the threat of punitive tariffs. “China will always ensure its energy supply in ways that serve our national interests,” the Chinese Foreign Ministry posted on X ([link removed]) following trade negotiations in Stockholm with U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent. The statement came after the U.S. and China had made progress toward a broader trade and tariff deal, but Washington threatened Beijing with an additional 100% punitive tariff ([link removed]) on its goods in response to the continued oil purchases. Many outside analysts are skeptical ([link removed]) that the U.S. will follow through, given the potential economic
fallout and President Trump’s political need to secure a trade deal with China. Several bills ([link removed]) are pending in Congress to impose further penalties on China over its trade with Iran and Russia, but it is unclear whether any will advance.


** Iran coordinating with Russia and China to block snapback sanctions
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Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said on August 15 ([link removed]) that Iran was coordinating with Russia and China before responding to moves by the UK, France, and Germany—the “E3”—to impose “snapback” sanctions. The snapback provision, enshrined in UN Security Council Resolution 2231, allows for the automatic resumption of UN-backed sanctions lifted under the JCPOA. Iran argues that the E3’s recent call for “zero enrichment” effectively amounts to an abrogation of the JCPOA, leaving them without legal standing to trigger the snapback mechanism. Tehran’s position mirrors its stance in 2018, when President Trump reimposed unilateral U.S. sanctions and sought unsuccessfully to trigger snapback.

While the E3 and other UN Security Council members have rejected Iran’s argument, Russian and Chinese officials have publicly voiced support ([link removed]) for Tehran’s position. The E3 acted early enough to ensure sanctions would take effect before the end of September, rather than waiting until the October 18 expiration date—when Russia will hold the rotating presidency of the Council. The E3 have also floated the possibility of a six-month delay ([link removed]) to the snapback deadline, but this would require Iran to restore full access for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to its nuclear sites and materials, as well as to account for its existing stockpile of 60% highly enriched uranium. A preliminary agreement ([link removed])
announced in Cairo on September 9, following talks between Araghchi and IAEA Secretary General Rafael Grossi, marks a step in that direction—but falls short of resolving the issue.


** Iran seeks access to China’s BeiDou satellite navigation system
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Iranian officials have reportedly sought access to China’s BeiDou satellite navigation ([link removed]) service as an alternative ([link removed]) to the U.S. GPS system. According to local Iranian media, Deputy Communications Minister Ehsan Chitsaz said Iran is pursuing alternatives to GPS partly because of its and others’ use of GPS jamming ([link removed]) during the June clashes with Israel and the United States. The conflict highlighted the acute vulnerability ([link removed]) of Iran’s reliance on Western information and communications technologies. During the fighting, Iranian authorities instructed citizens to stop
using the WhatsApp messaging platform after allegations that it had disclosed users’ locations in a way that could be retrieved by Israel for targeting purposes.


** Links
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Russian and Chinese anti-submarine patrol aircraft conducted drills in the North Pacific after President Trump ordered two U.S. ballistic missile submarines to move closer to Russia. (Fox News ([link removed]) , Al Jazeera ([link removed]) , Reuters ([link removed]) )

Russian President Vladimir Putin briefed the leaders of China and India on his recent discussions with President Trump about the war in Ukraine. (New York Times ([link removed]) )

Chinese President Xi Jinping responded positively to U.S.-Russia talks, according to a readout of his call with Putin. (Reuters ([link removed]) )

President Trump reiterated his call for Russia and China to join nuclear arms control talks with the United States. (Reuters ([link removed]) )

Russian and Chinese naval vessels carried out a joint patrol near Japanese coastal waters. (Newsweek ([link removed]) )

Iranian nuclear scientists sought sensitive technologies and supplies during a previously undisclosed visit to Russia in August 2024. (Financial Times ([link removed]) , Moscow Times ([link removed]) )

While Russia is now mass-producing Iranian-designed drones, Iran is seeing little benefit. (CNN ([link removed]) )

North Korea is accelerating construction of a satellite launch facility, along with an associated port that may facilitate the delivery of Russian components. (Wall Street Journal ([link removed]) )

Russian citizens visiting North Korea recently reached a 15-year high, as Russia also ceased publishing data on North Koreans’ visits to Russia. (NK News ([link removed]) )

The growing number of North Korean workers in Russia are being forced to endure abysmal conditions. (BBC ([link removed]) )

Russia warned the United States, South Korea, and Japan against forming a security alliance against North Korea. (NBC News ([link removed]) )

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un praised as heroes North Korean troops who died fighting against Ukraine. (NBC News ([link removed]) )

China is assisting Iran in restoring its missile manufacturing capabilities by selling equipment and supplies. (Newsweek ([link removed]) )

The United States sanctioned a Greek shipping company for facilitating Iranian oil exports to China. (Bloomberg ([link removed]) )

China is restricting the activities of North Korean commercial entities. (Daily NK ([link removed]) )

North Korea is tightening state control over trade relations with companies in China. (Daily NK ([link removed]) )

A Chinese citizen received a U.S. prison sentence for shipping firearms to North Korea. (BBC ([link removed]) , South China Morning Post ([link removed]) )


** Recent Analysis
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Exploiting Fault Lines in Iran’s Relations with Russia and China After the Israel War ([link removed]) (Anna Borshchevskaya and Grant Rumley, Washington Institute for Near East Policy)


** CRANK Call
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Editor-in-Chief, Paul Saunders
Editor, Greg Priddy ([email protected])

Image: Office of the President of the Russian Federation (via Wikimedia Commons)

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