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HOW ZOHRAN MAMDANI SHOULD GOVERN  
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Waleed Shahid
July 21, 2025
The Nation
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_ If Mamdani becomes mayor, he’ll have the chance to prove
something few American socialists have ever gotten close enough to
power to demonstrate: that progressive values aren’t just compatible
with effective governance—they’re strengthened by it. _

Zohran Mamdani at the Resist Fascism Rally in Bryant Park on Oct 27th
2024, photo: Bingjiefu He (CC 4.0)

 

Zohran Mamdani won
[[link removed]] New
York City’s Democratic mayoral primary by defying the rules of local
politics—unseating the establishment, energizing overlooked
neighborhoods, and reimagining what a successful progressive campaign
can achieve. But the primary was just the first test. If Mamdani wins
in November, he’ll face an even tougher task: turning an insurgency
into a governing coalition, and proving that a different kind of
politics can deliver real change in America’s biggest city.

The demands of campaigning, however grueling, are ultimately
straightforward. Governing is messier—but also richer in
possibility. If Mamdani becomes mayor, he’ll have the chance to
prove something few American socialists have ever gotten close enough
to power to demonstrate: that progressive values aren’t just
compatible with effective governance—they’re strengthened by it.

By winning over voters
[[link removed]] in
neighborhoods like Brighton Beach and Bensonhurst that had shifted
toward Donald Trump in 2024, Mamdani showed that a progressive could
appeal to a much wider constituency than conventional wisdom
suggested. His relentless focus on economic anxieties and material
concerns challenged assumptions about what kind of coalition a young
democratic socialist could build in a city as complicated as New York.

That skill will be tested over and over again in office. Governing New
York City requires navigating entrenched interests that rarely agree:
real estate developers, teachers’ unions, immigrant advocacy groups,
police officers, and state legislators in Albany. Each of these
constituencies brings distinct priorities and incentives to the table.
Mamdani’s success as mayor will hinge on his ability not just to
balance competing demands, but to build a governing majority strong
enough to neutralize or overcome the groups determined to block his
agenda. The real test won’t simply be finding common ground; it will
be knowing when to forge alliances, when to compromise, and when to
fight.

Not every stakeholder is going to like him. That’s a given in any
city or coalition this broad. The real challenge is holding the
alliance together while still delivering results. That takes more than
big ideas. It requires strategic clarity, patient outreach, political
infrastructure, and a commitment to bringing people in, even when they
disagree. Without that, ambitious plans can get watered down and
ultimately lose their impact.

And because of Mamdani’s politics and his identity, the pressure on
him is even greater. His success or failure will shape how people
judge the kind of leadership he represents—and what’s possible for
the left going forward.

Mamdani is a sharp student of politics. He will have to take this same
approach to governing if he becomes mayor, by drawing a few key
lessons from his predecessors.

Three former New York City mayors—Michael Bloomberg, Bill de Blasio,
and David Dinkins—offer useful case studies in the challenge of
turning progressive ideals into practical governance. Their legacies
are mixed: Some left lasting reforms; others, deep frustrations. But
across their very different tenures, a few core lessons stand out.
Effective leadership requires a clear governing structure, disciplined
communication, the ability to make tough decisions, and the skill to
manage coalitions in motion. These are not about ideology or specific
policy choices. They’re about execution. The point isn’t for
Mamdani to emulate his predecessors’ agendas. It’s to understand
what it takes to govern well, so he can deliver on his vision with the
urgency and credibility it demands.

Building an Executive Structure That Delivers

One foundational lesson is the importance of executive structure—how
a mayor organizes City Hall and delegates authority. Consider
Bloomberg, whose former deputy mayor, Dan Doctoroff, argues explicitly
in his book, _Greater Than Ever: New York’s Big Comeback
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that administrative success “largely rest on the structure” of
City Hall.

Bloomberg empowered strong deputy mayors, clearly delineating
responsibilities and allowing swift, autonomous decision-making.
Bloomberg famously reorganized City Hall into a “bullpen,” an open
workspace modeled on a Wall Street trading floor, where he and his
senior staff worked side-by-side without walls. This setup allowed for
quick communication, immediate decisions, and clear accountability.
Doctoroff recalls how issues could be resolved by walking across the
bullpen for Bloomberg’s direct input, enabling ambitious
initiatives—from neighborhood rezonings to infrastructure
projects—to move forward efficiently.

Nathan Leventhal, Bloomberg’s transition chair, reorganized City
Hall into five clearly defined domains, each overseen by a deputy
mayor with substantial autonomy, while critical officials like the
police commissioner reported directly to Bloomberg himself. Doctoroff
describes the structure as a “true hub-and-spoke organization,”
with the mayor serving as the central “hub,” providing strategic
oversight and quick decisions, and the deputy mayors acting as the
“spokes,” each responsible for driving their own area forward.

Structure and staffing were also closely linked under Bloomberg’s
management philosophy, which prioritized meritocracy. Doctoroff
distills this approach into simple principles: “Recruit the best
people you can find; support them; provide incentives for good work;
protect them from outside interference; and hold them accountable for
the highest standard of performance.”

Trusting competent appointees, combined with data-driven performance
metrics, created a City Hall culture of both accountability and
creativity, as Doctoroff recounts:

Buried in a longer interview (as a courtesy) were four questions, the
only ones I really cared about: (1) How would your coworkers describe
you? (to understand the applicant’s depth of self-awareness, which I
consider the most valuable attribute someone can have, particularly as
part of a team); (2) Describe in detail your most recent performance
evaluation (I want diligent, hard workers; if someone doesn’t get a
great review, I assume they are not); (3) What is the best idea you
have ever had? (to test creativity; you would be surprised how many
people get stumped on this one, and I ask it because I only want
people who can connect unobvious dots); and, finally, (4) Address a
specific question on our agenda (to determine that the candidate had
given real thought to what we were doing and actually was passionate
about it). On each of the four dimensions—self-awareness, diligence,
creativity, and passion—I rated them on a –1 to +1 scale. If a
candidate didn’t score 3.5 (half points were allowed) or higher, we
didn’t hire him or her.

David Dinkins’s mayoralty (1990–93) illustrates the dangers of
governing without clarity of structure and organization. Dinkins was
elected on an idealistic vision of unity, pledging to weave New
York’s diverse communities into what he poetically termed a
“gorgeous mosaic.” Yet, as Chris McNickle highlights in his
comprehensive study, _The Power of the Mayor: David Dinkins:
1990–1993
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Dinkins’s administration quickly became mired in ambiguity and
indecision.

McNickle observes that Dinkins “never established a clear statement
of the policies he wanted his senior staff to pursue.” Nor did he
implement robust decision-making processes capable of navigating
complex policy choices. Without explicit priorities and firm internal
leadership structures, the administration was often reactive rather
than proactive, severely limiting its ability to deliver on its
promises.

Much of this difficulty arose from Dinkins’s deep ties to the
traditional Democratic political machine, making him inherently
cautious about pushing reforms that might disrupt entrenched
interests. According to McNickle, Dinkins exhibited “a Tammany
leader’s reluctance to commit,” which undermined both his agenda
and his effectiveness. Supporters praised the mayor’s personal
graciousness and thoughtful demeanor, but admitted these same
qualities often resulted in hesitation precisely when bold, immediate
decisions were required. Consequently, the city bureaucracy drifted,
and external entities began setting the policy agenda by default. Late
in his term, Dinkins acknowledged the damaging perception that he was
not fully in control, stating in a televised address that he needed to
demonstrate clearly he was “on top of things” because “sometimes
some have the impression that’s not the case.”

Building an interpersonally cohesive administrative team is also
critical. Juan Gonzalez notes in his book _Reclaiming Gotham
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Blasio assembled his City Hall team, he placed immense value not only
on competence but also on individuals who genuinely shared his
political outlook. “It was very important to him to ensure there was
alignment on perspective and political point of view, and ideology,”
Anthony Shorris, De Blasio’s first deputy mayor, tells Gonzales. To
succeed, he needs a leadership team with both expertise and deep
alignment with his vision.

The lesson here for the new mayor is to avoid an unstructured, passive
approach. The core lesson: Choose strong people who share your vision,
define clear roles, and build a solid structure. Without that
foundation, bold ideas won’t hold. A mayor must shape the
government’s structure and decision processes consciously; if you
don’t, they will shape you.

Building Coalitions, Brokering Power, and Forging Consensus

Effective coalitions move swiftly but strategically, balancing
ambitious goals with inclusive, early outreach. Like co-authors handed
a half-finished manuscript, stakeholders brought into the process too
late often react defensively. They feel little ownership and are more
likely to criticize than contribute, complicating policy
implementation and diluting impact. Successful governance thus depends
on disciplined, proactive consensus-building–clarifying priorities
upfront, engaging key players early, and aligning diverse interests
before tensions harden into opposition.

Stakeholders excluded from initial conversations often react
defensively, opposing or complicating policies, causing initiatives to
become overly complex and diluted. Effective governance, therefore,
requires the strategic patience and discipline to build early
consensus around clear priorities. Doctoroff describes how the
Bloomberg administration built a broad, unconventional coalition for
the PlaNYC
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initiative, notably by including “strange bedfellows such as labor
unions and environmentalists, who provided political air cover.” By
engaging key City Council members and potential critics well before
publicly announcing initiatives—including a controversial
congestion-pricing plan—the administration created a buffer of
support around its ambitious policy goals.

By contrast, when coalition management falters, it can derail an
entire mayoralty. The cautionary tale often cited is again Dinkins,
whose historic 1989 victory
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the city’s first Black mayor was powered by a multiethnic liberal
coalition of African Americans, Latino voters, and progressive whites.

In effect, Dinkins governed as if his initial coalition would sustain
itself, but politics is never static. A mayor must continually tend
and adjust their coalitions—assuaging one group’s concerns,
embracing new allies, and sometimes confronting former friends.
Failing to do so will alienate even natural supporters.

Crime and racial tensions in the early 1990s stressed the bonds of the
Dinkins coalition. His handling of flashpoints like the Crown Heights
riots of 1991 left many in his base dissatisfied and others
questioning his leadership. Over time, white liberal voters and even
some Latino communities drifted from him, and support from his core
Black voting base dropped. McNickles writes that, by 1993, even before
Dinkins narrowly lost re-election, “Dinkins’s coalition never
collapsed, but it sagged and weakened as a result of his poor
leadership.”

Bill de Blasio’s mayoralty offers other important lessons here.
Elected in 2013 on a populist wave anchored by his compelling promise
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end New York’s “tale of two cities,” de Blasio swiftly assembled
a diverse coalition that included labor unions, grassroots activists,
community organizations, and communities of color. The greatest test
of this coalition was his ambitious push for universal
pre-kindergarten, an initiative requiring the rapid mobilization of
broad civic support. Despite substantial political resistance and
logistical obstacles, his administration’s intensive outreach
efforts and careful coordination with both civic and labor groups
proved decisive.

Detailed accounts by David Freedlander in _New York_
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Joseph Viteritti in _The Pragmatist: Bill de Blasio’s Quest to Save
the Soul of New York
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the complexity of de Blasio’s strategy. Immediately after the
election, de Blasio formed a high-level working group of experts,
including Sherry Cleary of CUNY’s Early Childhood Professional
Development Institute, convening as frequently as 10 times per week.
Although the specialists initially proposed a three-year
timeline—already considered aggressive—the mayor insisted on
launching within his first year, and, crucially, made that goal
public.

“By saying that publicly,” de Blasio told Freedlander, “we put
everyone on the hook. If you want your bureaucracy to move, make
everyone responsible with a public goal they can’t squirm out of.”

But managing city-level coalitions inevitably requires navigating
state politics–a lesson Mayor Bill de Blasio learned through
his toxic relationship
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Governor Andrew Cuomo. Cuomo initially opposed de Blasio’s proposed
tax on the wealthy, eventually granting
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funding but denying the mayor a political win on the tax itself. De
Blasio invested substantial political capital in this battle,
later reflecting
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“I was told a thousand times it was not viable…but we won,”
thanks largely to sustained grassroots advocacy and public pressure.

To overcome resistance from Albany, de Blasio strategically mobilized
public opinion through the Campaign for One New York, a contentious
501(c)(4) backed by unions, philanthrophy, and civic groups. This
inside-outside approach amplified public support, demonstrating that
entrenched political obstacles could be overcome by mobilizing a broad
coalition of residents, labor, and influential stakeholders to
pressure the governor.

De Blasio’s experience provides a clear roadmap for Mamdani:
effective governance demands skillfully balancing internal negotiation
with external pressure. If elected, Mamdani will face an even more
challenging political landscape, making this strategic interplay
between grassroots mobilization and institutional maneuvering critical
to his success.

But de Blasio also discovered that even a strong public mandate does
not shield a mayor from well-funded and organized resistance. As
Gonzales recounts, Bradley Tusk, a former Bloomberg aide, led
a multimillion-dollar campaign
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erode public trust in the mayor. Charter advocates like Eva Moskowitz
and Families for Excellent Schools launched legal challenges and ad
blitzes, painting
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Blasio’s education agenda as a threat. Police unions staged public
acts of defiance
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including turning their backs
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him at funerals, to portray him as anti–law enforcement.

Mamdani, whose politics and identity represent an even sharper break
from the status quo, should expect similar attacks. He’ll need a
disciplined strategy and strong support from civil society to counter
well-funded campaigns aimed at derailing his agenda and making him a
one-term mayor. And he’ll need to know when to negotiate within
existing power structures and when to harness grassroots, grasstops,
and elite support outside of them to achieve transformative policy
victories. Building a resilient inside/outside infrastructure—one
that can mobilize public support and apply pressure when special
interests push back—will be essential.

Framing Attention

Effective city governance isn’t just about delivering
policy—it’s about shaping attention and clearly framing the
narrative around those policies. Mayors must tell a compelling story
about what they’re doing and why it matters, making their vision
understandable and meaningful to voters and stakeholders.

As de Blasio told
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shortly after taking office, “the public would like to
see…forceful leadership with clear values, and less horse trading,
and less domination by special interests.” Regardless of one’s
view of de Blasio’s record, this statement captures a key insight: A
mayor’s narrative should project clear values and a sense of
direction. Universal pre-K wasn’t just an education policy; in his
narrative, it was a battle against inequality. It told the public not
just _what_ de Blasio was doing, but _why_.

Bloomberg, by contrast, presented himself as a pragmatic
problem-solver, a data-driven manager who would make the city
“great” in measurable ways. This, too, was a narrative, albeit a
technocratic one: that city government can be run like a
high-performing business. Bloomberg’s story was summarized in one
word: “Comeback.” It lacked emotional warmth, but it reassured
many New Yorkers in the uncertain post-9/11 era that someone serious
was at the helm.

Dinkins’s mayoralty highlights the delicate but crucial challenge
leaders face in defining their own narratives, particularly in a city
as divided and complex as New York. Dinkins entered office framing his
tenure around themes of racial healing and unity. But as crises
mounted, this uplifting narrative unraveled quickly. McNickle notes
that despite Dinkins’s sincere intentions, his administration was
increasingly depicted—fairly or not—as chaotic and overwhelmed.

The media played a central role in reinforcing this perception;
Dinkins frequently expressed frustration that reporters exaggerated
his missteps while minimizing his accomplishments. McNickle’s book
cites Wilbur C. Rich, who argued in _David Dinkins and New York City
Politics: Race, Images and the Media
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stereotypes made it “permissible for the public to hold
reservations” about Dinkins’s competence—reservations a white
mayor might not have faced. Mamdani, having already dealt with a
torrent of Islamophobic bigotry during his campaign, is no doubt
preparing for similar challenges in office.

Yet Dinkins’s troubles were also amplified by internal divisions
within his base. Prominent Black leaders and activists, most notably
Al Sharpton, harshly criticized Dinkins. Sharpton once denounced
Dinkins as an “Uncle Tom,” accusing
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of abandoning Black constituents. Sharpton’s tone shifted
dramatically after a 1991 stabbing incident in Bensonhurst forced him
into deeper reflection, leading him to declare
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intent to “bring down the volume and bring up the program.” But by
that point, the damage had been done.

Ultimately, Dinkins’s cautious and dignified personal style
compounded these narrative problems. McNickle describes his demeanor
as a “fetish-like commitment to projecting a courtly demeanor,” a
trait that inadvertently conveyed aloofness at moments demanding
decisive action. During crises like the Crown Heights riots,
Dinkins’s careful deliberation was portrayed as weakness. One
damning editorial from a Black newspaper in Brooklyn captured this
succinctly, warning
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“Frankly, you are beginning to look like a wimp.”

Attempting to reclaim his narrative, Dinkins sought alternative
channels of communication, directly engaging local radio stations to
moderate inflammatory rhetoric and releasing an optimistic, detailed
27-page report titled _New York City ROARING BACK: Changing the City
for Good_. Yet these efforts arrived too late to overcome entrenched
skepticism. Despite his genuine efforts and personal dignity, Dinkins
struggled profoundly to communicate a compelling and authoritative
vision to the city he sought to unify.

Mamdani has shown an extraordinary skill for exciting, disciplined
narrative-building during his campaign. He must bring those skills to
City Hall.

Governing Competently

Finally, all the structural planning, coalition-building, and
messaging in the world will amount to little if a mayor cannot deliver
competent governance. This is perhaps the most pragmatic lesson of
all: _Show results_.

The people of New York can forgive a lot—ideology or style or even
the occasional scandal—but they do not easily forgive incompetence.
New Yorkers have famously little patience for excuses. They expect the
trains to run, the snow to get plowed, crime to stay down, and the
trash to be picked up. Competence also means the ability to handle
crises calmly and effectively. Here again, historical examples are
instructive.

Bloomberg’s administration, for all its faults, was widely viewed as
managerially competent. A telling anecdote: Bloomberg installed
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countdown clock in the City Hall bullpen, ticking down the days of his
term to instill urgency in his team. By his last year, they could
publish a comprehensive progress report boasting of hundreds of
targets met, from hundreds of new playgrounds opened to a million
trees planted. The details of those initiatives mattered less than the
overall impression: This mayor got things done.

Doctoroff reflects on why they got things done, and again, it circles
back to management fundamentals. “Plans don’t usually fail because
of bad faith or even disagreements…Most often, different parts of
the bureaucracy simply have different priorities… There has to be a
mechanism to quickly identify the gaps and resolve them,” he writes.

In Bloomberg’s City Hall, that mechanism was the structured system
of deputy mayors and the bullpen’s culture of constant
communication. When an interagency dispute arose, Doctoroff could
literally pull all the relevant commissioners into a room and hash it
out, since nearly all of them ultimately reported to him. This meant
problems got solved fast—an efficiency that New Yorkers noticed in
the smooth rollout of many services.

De Blasio’s tenure highlighted the tension between progressive
ambition and managerial competence. While he pursued widely popular
initiatives—such as universal pre-K, affordable housing, and
expanded ferry service—his administration often faltered
operationally. Samar Khurshid and Ben Max describe
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Blasio as “an incrementalist addressing crises in dire need of bold
action,” often correctly diagnosing problems but failing to
effectively address them. They write, “Whatever the crisis or
opponent, de Blasio often—though certainly not always—proved his
own worst enemy, struggling to build alliances, getting mired in
ethical scandals and misguided political pursuits, being unnecessarily
combative with the press corps… and attacking problems either too
late, too timidly, or (nearly) not at all.”

No incident illustrated these weaknesses more clearly than the
Rivington House scandal. In 2015, city officials quietly removed a
deed restriction protecting a Lower East Side nursing home, allowing
developers to convert it into luxury condominiums. The controversy
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major administrative breakdowns, particularly in the overloaded office
of First Deputy Mayor Anthony Shorris, who acknowledged struggles
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oversight and delegation. Ultimately, Rivington House became symbolic
of how a mayor could understand the city’s challenges yet falter in
addressing them.

Ultimately, mayoral competence in New York boils down to two
essentials: operational effectiveness and political skill. To succeed,
a mayor must excel at both. One former Dinkins aide lamented that
Dinkins “doesn’t see his own power and his own choices.” That
critique hits at the heart of executive leadership: owning your
decisions and their outcomes. Mamdani should take note.

The four years of a mayor’s term go by quickly, and most political
arcs follow a familiar rhythm: year one is spent staffing up and
learning how government actually runs; year two focuses on pushing
signature policies through the legislature; year three demands the
gritty, unglamorous work of implementation; and year four is dedicated
to defending the record while seeking re-election. 

Mamdani’s campaign success provides strong evidence that he
understands the essential principles of governance: strategic
structure, attentional and narrative discipline, clear
decision-making, and expansive coalition-building. To deliver
transformative leadership, Mamdani must channel that understanding
into navigating and holding together this broader, more intricate
political ecosystem. If he succeeds—maintaining clarity of purpose,
making smart compromises when necessary, building effective
organization and infrastructure, and articulating a compelling vision
that neutralizes his adversaries—he will prove not only that
progressive ideals can win elections, but also that they can yield
effective, enduring governance even in a city as complicated,
demanding, and extraordinary as New York.

_Waleed Shahid [[link removed]] is
the director of The Bloc [[link removed]] and the former
spokesperson for Justice Democrats. He has served as a senior adviser
for the Uncommitted Campaign, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, and Jamaal
Bowman. He is a member of The Nation’s editorial board_

_Copyright c 2024 The Nation. Reprinted with permission. May not be
reprinted without permission
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Distributed by PARS International Corp
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_Please support  progressive journalism. Get a digital subscription
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