[[link removed]]

A HOUSE DIVIDED: WASHINGTON, LANGLEY, SAIGON, AND THE PLOT AGAINST
DIEM  
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Arturo Jimenez-Bacardi and Luca Trenta
May 22, 2025
National Security Archive
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_ Newly available historical evidence shows that the U.S. was deeply
involved with the key players who would ultimately assassinate Diem,
up to and including the day of the coup. CIA leaders opposed the coup
but were overruled by President Kennedy. _

US Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson, RVN President Ngo Dinh Diem and
Frederick Nolting in South Vietnam's Presidential Palace in 1961,
Courtesy Lyndon B. Johnson Library by U.S. Information Agency

 

INTRODUCTION BY NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE

WASHINGTON, D.C., MAY 22, 2025 - Early in the morning of October 7,
1963, the top leadership of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
gathered in the office of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI)
to discuss the brewing crisis in South Vietnam and America’s role in
it. DCI John McCone warned his colleagues: “Under no
circumstances” should “the Agency get into the subject of
assassination or other highly sensitive matters with [U.S. Ambassador
Henry Cabot] Lodge.” The Ambassador had “no concept of
security,” McCone added, and tended to use the press to enhance his
power, presumably at the expense of the CIA, according to a recently
declassified account of the meeting published today by the National
Security Archive (Document 9).
[[link removed]] Twenty-six
days later, South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem and his brother,
Ngo Dinh Nhu, were executed as part of a military coup d’état that
would further destabilize the Southeast Asian country for years to
come.

In the years since, the extent of the U.S. role in the coup and
assassination has been hotly debated and disputed. For over two
decades, the late John Prados shed light on the Kennedy
administration’s position toward the Diem coup in a series of
National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Books.
[[link removed]] This
new EBB supplements those publications with recently declassified
documents obtained through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), the
JFK Assassination Files, the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, and
the personal papers of George McTurnan Kahin, a prominent scholar on
Southeast Asia and early critic of the Vietnam war.
[[link removed]] It
highlights the role of key CIA players—McCone, CIA Far East Division
Chief William Colby, CIA Saigon Chief of Station John H. Richardson,
and contract officer Lucien Conein—and provides new details on how
the coup emerged, almost organically, despite indecision, divisions
between the leading agencies, and bitter rivalries among the
individual officials in charge. With Colby and McCone opposed to the
coup, Conein, who was trusted by Lodge and keen to follow the
Ambassador’s orders, became the key player on the ground.

From the very beginning, government secrecy, obfuscation, lies, and
the incomplete and contradictory statements of key American
participants confused the record.
[[link removed]] Less
than two weeks after the coup against Diem, and on the day that
President John F. Kennedy was assassinated, McCone—joined by
Colby—told the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
(PFIAB) that the CIA “had no part in organizing the coup” and
“did not have information on and does not know about the
assassinations of Diem and Nhu,” according to a document that was
fully declassified for the first time this year as part of the final
JFK assassination documents release (Document 18). Yet a dozen years
later, Colby, then the DCI and speaking to congressional
investigators, expressed a more introspective tone and acknowledged
the Agency role: “I think when you support a coup through violent
overthrow you have to understand that you are taking responsibility
for people getting killed. Soldiers got killed and the head of the
other side got killed.”
[[link removed]] Additional
documents declassified last year under the FOIA, including a detailed
CIA chronology of the entire episode, show that the U.S. encouraged
the coup plotters to take “the earliest possible action” and
provided assurances, money and other support that together
“constituted a clear call for action” (Documents 7 and 19).

By the late summer of 1963, as meetings between the CIA’s Lucien
Conein and the plotting South Vietnamese Generals continued,
Washington had settled, based on Ambassador Lodge’s recommendations,
on a position of “not thwarting” a coup, according to a document
released earlier this year in response to a FOIA request from the
National Security Archive (Document 8). Langley also instructed Conein
to review the Generals’ plans, with the exclusion of any
assassination plots. The U.S. also promised that military aid would
continue once the Generals had removed the Diem regime. Caught off
guard as the coup started, having received a much shorter warning than
anticipated, Conein handed over the rough equivalent of $68,000 in
bribes “to reward opposition military units who joined the coup
group,” according to a now declassified report from the CIA
Inspector General (Document 19), and sent frequent reports to Saigon
and Langley from the Generals’ headquarters (Document 17).

[Document 19 – Fully Declassified CIA Inspector General Report
Provides New Details on U.S. Government Role in Coup Against Diem]
[[link removed]]

_Document 19 – Fully declassified CIA Inspector General report
provides new details on U.S. government role in coup against Diem_

This newly available historical evidence shows that the U.S. was
deeply involved with the key players who would ultimately overthrow
and kill Diem and his brother, up to and including the day of the
coup. While Colby and McCone were clearly opposed to the coup and made
the strongest arguments against it, the senior CIA officials were
overruled by the President and outmaneuvered by Lodge. In the end,
they and their CIA colleagues “faithfully carried out
instructions” to support the coup-plotting generals, according to a
long-awaited and now fully declassified CIA Inspector General report
on the episode (Document 19).
[[link removed]]

Other notable documents published today include:

* An August 30 telegram from a CIA Saigon Station officer (likely
Conein) reporting on an explicit discussion among the coup-plotting
South Vietnamese Generals about the need to assassinate President Diem
for the success of the regime-change operation (Document 3).
* Reports providing additional details on Langley’s initial
reluctance to overthrow Diem—partly due to the Agency’s
long-standing relationship with his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu (Documents 4,
6, and 13).
* Documents showing that the U.S. Embassy in Saigon was mired in
dysfunction and mistrust, with Lodge blaming CIA Chief of Station John
Richardson for the August coup failure and Richardson finding Lodge
too gung-ho and untrustworthy (Documents 6 and 7).
* Records on McCone and Colby’s growing distrust of, and contempt
for, Ambassador Lodge, culminating in their failed opposition to
replacing Richardson as CIA Chief of Station (Document 9).
* The fully declassified CIA personnel file on Lucien Conein—who
would be awarded the CIA’s “intelligence star” for his efforts
during the South Vietnamese crisis of 1963—suggests he played a more
prominent role than previously acknowledged (Document 22).
*
A document found among the personal papers of George McTurnan Kahin
suggesting a new version of—and a new rationale for—the South
Vietnamese Generals’ decision to murder Diem and Nhu: that if they
survived, Washington might change its mind and reinstate them in power
(Document 23).

BRIEFING BOOK BY ARTURO JIMENEZ-BACARDI AND LUCA TRENTA

When the U.S. government desires the overthrow of a foreign
government, the ideal scenario for policymakers is that the U.S. plays
a minimal, deniable role, and that the government speaks with one
voice. Part of the challenge in ascertaining the degree of U.S.
involvement in the overthrow and assassination of Ngo Dinh
Diem—aside from secrecy—is the fact that the Kennedy
administration’s position toward the South Vietnamese president in
the summer and fall of 1963 was marked by division, indecision,
oscillation, distrust, and bureaucratic chicanery.

The failed August coup

In retrospect, the fate of Diem and his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, was
sealed during the “Buddhist Crisis” of May 1963. On June 11, the
images of the self-immolation of Buddhist Monk Thích Quang Duc in the
name of religious freedom shocked the world and focused
attention—including in Washington, D.C.—on the autocratic,
repressive, unstable, and corrupt nature of Diem’s regime.
[[link removed]] Diem
and Nhu—the head of South Vietnam’s secret police—began to be
perceived as incapable of leading a united South Vietnam against the
communist threat. By August 1963, several U.S. officials had become so
disgruntled with Diem, especially in the White House and State
Department, that they began taking formal steps to create the
conditions for a coup.

On August 24, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs
Roger A. Hilsman sent a now-infamous State Department Telegram
(DepTel) No. 243 to Saigon (first published in National Security
Archive EBB 302 [[link removed]] of
2009). DepTel 243 asked the Embassy to make clear to the Vietnamese
military that the U.S. would support a new interim government. The
Ambassador and the Country Team were asked to “urgently examine
alternative leadership” and to make “detailed plans” on how to
“bring about Diem’s replacement if this should become necessary”
(Document 19). Two documents now confirm that the CIA played no role
in drafting DepTel 243 and was not consulted during the
decision-making process. Instead, Deputy Director for Plans Richard
Helms was only notified of the DepTel once it had been cleared with
“Hyannis Port,” that is, with President Kennedy (Documents 16 and
19). In Saigon, CIA Chief of Station John Richardson later reported
that Lodge interpreted the telegram as marching orders to orchestrate
a coup (Document 9).

Two days later, a CIA station telegram that was probably responsive to
instructions from Washington further specified the position that the
Embassy and the station would take in their dealings with the coup
plotters. Ambassador Lodge said the operation should be deniable; the
U.S. hand should not show. The telegram also contained nine points to
guide the Country Team’s approach to the generals. These included an
agreement that Nhu had to go but also that the fate of Diem was up to
the generals themselves. The document confirmed the U.S. posture of
deniability, telling the Generals: “Win or Lose. Don’t expect to
be bailed out.” And yet, it also sets a clear system of incentives
for the Generals to proceed: Unless the Nhus were removed from power
and the Buddhists were freed, the Generals could expect an end to
financial and military support (Document 1).

As the CIA team was getting ready to meet the Generals based on these
guidelines, the situation changed on the August 29. In the morning,
CIA Chief of Station Richardson, CIA contract agent Lucien Conein, and
CIA station officer Alphonse Spera were shown a telegram from General
Maxwell Taylor to Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV)
Commander Paul Harkins. The telegram hinted that Washington had
“second thoughts” regarding the coup (Document 7). With a meeting
with the Generals already scheduled, Richardson ordered Conein and
Spera to proceed but to provide no iron-clad assurances regarding U.S.
support. Having met with the Generals, the CIA reported to Washington
that they had a “plan for a coup d’etat and will implement it when
they are assured that the US government is fully behind them.” As
proof of support, the Generals asked the U.S. to cut aid to the South
Vietnamese government. The suspension of aid would signal U.S. support
and alter the balance of forces in Saigon against Diem.
[[link removed]]

On the 30th, an exchange between the President and Lodge made clear
that—while Washington had not completely changed its mind on a
coup—Kennedy wanted to keep his options open until the last minute
and support a coup only if it would be successful. As he told Lodge,
“When we go, we must go to win, but it will be better to change our
minds than to fail.”
[[link removed]] Lodge
agreed with the President but also warned that—since this was
primarily a Vietnamese affair—the U.S. government might not have the
option to stop the coup once one was in motion.
[[link removed]]

[South Vietnamese Generals openly discuss assassinating Diem]
[[link removed]]

_Document 3 – South Vietnamese Generals openly discuss assassinating
Diem._

In the early afternoon of the 30th, the Embassy in Saigon sent a
telegram to the State Department. The telegram reported a conversation
between a CIA CAS [Controlled American Source] officer (likely Conein)
and Colonel Pham Ngoc Thao, who had recently attended a dinner with
the plotting Generals. Thao explained that Generals Tran Thien Khiem
and Nguyen Khanh agreed to support General Duong Van Minh’s coup,
provided that Diem and Nhu were killed during the coup attempt.
“Generals,” the document continued, “said that if first step of
attempted coup is successful, i.e. the assassination of President
Diem, they would then support the coup openly” (Document 3). Half an
hour later, the Embassy reported with some apprehension that General
Khiem, one of the main coup plotters, had been called to the
Presidential Palace and had spent several hours there, while at the
same time refusing to take U.S. calls.
[[link removed]] The
coup seemed to be in peril.

By the following day, the coup had indeed petered out. The U.S.
government had refused to cut U.S. aid as the Generals had requested.
[[link removed]] General
Khiem also claimed that the Generals did not have a favorable balance
of forces, an assessment Harkins agreed with.
[[link removed]] On
September 10, during a PFIAB meeting, CIA director McCone expressed
relief that the plan had been aborted (Document 4). He denied
Vietnamese press allegations that the Agency was behind efforts to
remove Diem from power and said the plan to “unload the Nhus”
(contained in DepTel 243) was misguided. The decision to send such a
telegram was the result of “miscalculation of the Generals’ true
capabilities and intentions.” McCone reassured the Agency’s
overseers that such a policy was now on the backburner (Document 4).

In Saigon, though, the failure of the August coup became a main
element of contention between the CIA, especially Richardson, and
Lodge. The former believed that the coup had failed because the
Generals did not have the capabilities to carry it out, regardless of
the extent of U.S. assurances. In Richardson’s assessment, “there
was a clear distinction between our full encouragement and actually
being in a position to put together the ingredients for a successful
coup” (Document 7). Lodge, though, came to see Richardson and his
unwillingness to explicitly support the Generals as the main reason
for the August coup failure (Document 7).

The Lodge-Richardson rift intensifies

In mid-September, Lodge started calling for Richardson to be replaced
as Chief of Station by General Edward Lansdale. On September 18, the
prospect was raised during a meeting between McCone, Secretary of
State Dean Rusk, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, National
Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy, and Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs W. Averell Harriman (Document 5). While no clear
policy on how to deal with Diem emerged during the meeting, several
concerns were raised regarding the U.S. and especially the CIA’s
relationship with Nhu. The CIA had been having weekly meetings with
Nhu, and one was upcoming. Since Lodge was opposed, it was agreed to
cancel the meeting. U.S. officials continued to disagree on the future
of Nhu. On the matter of replacing Richardson, McCone expressed his
“unalterable opposition” to sending Lansdale as new Chief of
Station (Document 5). McCone repeated his opposition one day later in
a strongly worded and personal letter to Lodge. “General
Lansdale,” McCone wrote, “would not be acceptable to the
organization nor to me personally” (Document 6).
[[link removed]] The
CIA’s director was also very critical of Lodge’s treatment of
Richardson. Despite Lodge’s claims that he had no problems with
Richardson, intelligence collected by the Agency pointed to Lodge’s
efforts to ostracize Richardson. McCone did recognize, though, that
Richardson was close to Nhu and—were a coup to go ahead—believed
he should probably be replaced (Document 6).
[[link removed]]

In early October, the CIA’s meetings with the Generals restarted. By
now, Conein had become the Agency’s main point of contact with the
Generals, and contrary to Richardson, Lodge trusted him to execute his
directives.
[[link removed]] In
a meeting on the 2nd between General Minh and Conein, the former asked
for a confirmation of U.S. posture towards a coup and assurances that
the U.S. would not “thwart” a coup if one were to get underway.
Minh stated that the Generals did not require U.S. support and
outlined three main options: i) the assassination of Ngo Dinh Nhu and
Ngo Dinh Can, keeping Diem in office, ii) the encirclement of Saigon
by various military units, or iii) a direct confrontation between the
coup plotters and the remaining troops (Document 19). On the 5th,
Lodge asked State for confirmation of what Conein should tell the
General the next time they met. Lodge agreed that the U.S. should
state that they would not thwart a coup, Conein should also offer to
review the Generals’ plans, except for the assassination plans
(Document 8). On the same day, a telegram to Lodge confirmed U.S.
government policy. “No initiative should now be taken” the
telegram read, “to give any active covert encouragement to a
coup.” U.S. officials should work to identify possible alternative
leadership, but this effort had to be “secure and fully deniable,”
as well as separated from the normal reporting work.
[[link removed]]

Two days later, on October 7, the crippling dysfunction and mistrust
between Richardson and Lodge became evident during a meeting between
McCone, Colby, and Richardson, who had been temporarily recalled to
the U.S. (Document 9). Participants criticized the extensive
compartmentalization of information and dysfunction in Saigon, with
Lodge cutting the CIA country team out of the decision-making process.
CIA leadership speculated that Lodge had used press leaks to further
his position and undermine Richardson. The distrust between Lodge and
the Agency had reached a boiling point. The State Department was also
on the case. It wrote Lodge that David Halberstam had a quote from him
stating that he would have been happier with a new CIA Station Chief.
State asked for the leaks to stop and to work together to “ensure a
more accurate reflection of our common commitment to a single
governmental policy.”
[[link removed]]

The controversy surrounding assassination

As detailed above, the assassination of Diem and Nhu had been openly
discussed by the Generals with CIA operatives as an essential element
to the planned August coup (Document 3). In October, when the
assassination (of Nhu and Can) was listed as one of the Generals’
preferred options, a controversy ensued as to what the U.S. government
posture should be. With Richardson out, Acting CIA Saigon Chief of
Station Dave Smith told Langley that he had discussed the latest
Conein-Minh meeting with Lodge and his deputy William C. Trueheart.
Smith recommended: “we do not set ourselves irrevocably against
assassination plot since the other two alternatives mean either a
bloodbath in Saigon or a protracted struggle.” Having received
Smith’s cable and perhaps already unwilling to discuss assassination
with Lodge, McCone sent a stern reply (written by Colby) to withdraw
Smith’s recommendation since the U.S. could “not be in a position
of actively condoning such course of action and thereby engaging our
responsibility therefore.” A CIA cable from Saigon confirmed that
McCone’s directive had been acted upon, and that Lodge shared the
DCI’s view (Document 19).

This exchange played a prominent role in the 1970s Congressional
Investigations. Members of the Church Committee pointed out that
McCone’s directive—written by Colby—conformed with other
last-minute telegrams that had been sent to distance the U.S.
government from any involvement in assassination.
[[link removed]] A
“CYA” effort in the words of one of the Senators. During Colby’s
testimony, a key element of contention became whether Conein, the main
contact with the Generals, had been made aware of McCone’s directive
regarding assassination.
[[link removed]] At
the hearing, Colby had no specific answer. In a later correspondence
between the CIA’s William Elder and William Miller of the Senate
Select Committee, the former had to admit that the cable traffic on
the matter remained unclear (Document 21).

Towards the November coup

As General Minh’s conspiracy against Diem picked up steam, the
Executive Committee of the National Security Council (ExComm) held an
off-the-record meeting on October 8 to discuss the South Vietnamese
general’s coup proposal.
[[link removed]] Although
McCone and McNamara cautioned against Minh’s plans, President
Kennedy liked the proposal, given that it allowed the U.S. to deny its
involvement. “I don’t know whether Big Minh’s going to do it or
not,” the President explained, “The only thing is, as I understand
our position is, well, if he does it, all right, and if you don’t do
it, all right. We’re not now—all this—the only difference is,
we’re not now going to him and asking him to do it.”
[[link removed]] The
coup was back on.

The CIA’s Conein became the key liaison between the U.S. government
and the coup-plotting South Vietnamese Generals. While CIA
headquarters expressed some concerns regarding a possible set-up and
an effort by General Tran Van Don to—at a minimum—entrap Conein,
the meetings continued.
[[link removed]] In
late October, Conein met Don at a dentist's office in Saigon to gauge
Washington’s appetite for a coup. Don told Conein that the Generals
were not ready to share the coup plan, but that he would receive it
two days before the start of the coup. An agreement was reached that,
when the coup began, Conein would be invited to the Joint General
Staff (JGS) headquarters to secure a direct line of communication
between the coup plotters and Ambassador Lodge. Before a redacted
section, the last available paragraph reads: “Without being
questioned on this point, Gen Don stated that Generals’ Committee
had come to the conclusion that the entire Ngo family had to be
eliminated from the political scene in Vietnam”
[[link removed]] A
few days after the meeting, Lodge informed the Generals that Conein
was authorized to speak for Lodge.
[[link removed]]

On October 26, less than a week before the coup, several American
officials began to get jittery over the conspiracy against Diem. In a
message to National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy, Lodge stated that
he was unconvinced that a coup would take place, as he was not sure
General Don had “the iron in his soul” (Document 10). Lodge agreed
with Bundy that a failed coup might have had negative repercussions
for the U.S. from “persons who wish to damage us.” Yet, if the
U.S. government played its cards correctly, Lodge still believed that
the U.S. would be able to maintain a “very vigorous denial” that
it played any role in the coup.

Three days before the coup, top U.S. officials met at the White House
again to discuss the prospects and consequences of overthrowing Diem,
but they remained divided (Document 11). The Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Maxwell Taylor, stated that regardless of the
outcome, a coup would be “disastrous.” Building on Taylor, DCI
McCone considered it unwise not to reconsider the U.S. posture since
the military adviser to the President (Taylor) was counselling against
the overthrow of Diem and Nhu. The President worried about the risk of
protracted fighting. RFK doubted whether the U.S. should proceed with
a plan that might either fail or create instability even in case of
success, especially since a coup might undermine the war effort. Bundy
argued that the U.S. could not reverse course and abandon the coup
plotters. The record of the meeting makes clear that Washington had
widespread knowledge of a growing conspiracy against Diem. The meeting
concluded with an agreement to send a cable for a new assessment of
the coup’s prospects (Document 11). Four hours later, at another
meeting in the White House, Kennedy’s doubts receded as he explained
that “the burden of proof should be on the coup promoters to show
that they can overthrow the Diem government and not create a situation
in which there would be a draw.”
[[link removed]] The
President was clear: he wanted a successful coup.

That same day, from Saigon, Lodge dismissed Washington’s concerns
that a coup climate might remove the element of surprise since such a
climate had existed for months (Document 12). Lodge also reminded U.S.
officials that the Generals had not shown any reliance on U.S.
support, nor had they made any specific request for support. If
anything, they had demanded “the least possible American
involvement.” Lodge—aiming to strengthen confidence in
Washington—was also firm in summarizing the U.S. role. “A point
which must be completely understood is that we are not engineering
this coup.” Under orders not to thwart the coup, the U.S. role had
been limited to observing and reporting developments and would rely on
Conein’s long-standing relationship with the Generals. Lodge warned
that requests for financial and military support had not yet been made
but may be forthcoming in the future. Lodge concluded by restating
that there was no way of stopping the coup except by betraying it to
Diem. He also noted that—since the Generals have moved from a 48 to
a 4-hour warning—he would not have time to check with Washington
when the coup started. Consequently, Washington would not have the
option to influence events on the ground.

Even at this late stage, Colby provided a strong defense of Nhu—who
had become the symbol of South Vietnamese instability for those in
Washington who favored a coup (Document 13).
[[link removed]] Nhu,
Colby wrote, had been undermined by his reputation as “intriguing,
sinister and ruthless” and by his wife’s “harsh and sometimes
hysterical utterances.” But Nhu had also been very supportive of
U.S.-backed initiatives, such as the Strategic Hamlet program. He had
been successful in establishing the Republican Youth, though Colby did
acknowledge the movement’s “fascistic” tendencies and the
“Potemkin village” character of this (and many other) ventures.
Ultimately, Colby wrote, Nhu “represents a strong, reasonably
well-oriented, and efficient potential successor to Diem, and the
image problems could be addressed through propaganda efforts. “Nhu
is a desirable rather than a catastrophic candidate.”

On the same day, on October 30, debates regarding Washington’s
options to stop the coup continued, with Lodge stressing that the only
option was to betray the coup to Diem (Document 14). While Conein was
set to meet the Generals, Lodge also warned against sharing the
Generals’ coup plans with the U.S. military since the Generals
believed that it was U.S. military personnel in Saigon who had leaked
information to Diem. Lodge also made clear that he was prepared to
wash his hands of Diem’s fate and would stress to Vietnamese
authorities that if President Diem, who is the commander in chief of
the armed forces, is unable to stop the coup, then there is nothing
that he can do. Finally, Lodge also explained his views on making U.S.
funds available for the plotters. They should be made available only
if they can be passed discreetly and the U.S. government assesses that
the coup will likely succeed.

The coup and Conein

The coup started on November 1 at 1315 Saigon time. Conein was told
only two hours in advance. He was asked to join the Generals at the
JGS headquarters and to take as much money with him as he could.
Conein took 5 million piastres that had been stored in a safe in his
house (Document 19). Various versions exist as to what use was made of
the money. Having previously warned that the Generals were likely to
request money, Lodge was seemingly left out of the decision to pass
the money on the day of the coup (Document 19).

During his testimony to the Senate Select Committee, Conein said the
money had come from the CIA and for non-controversial purchases like
“rice and bread” for troops—“the most important thing”—and
to set up medical facilities.
[[link removed]] Then-DCI
Colby told a different version in his testimony, stating that the
money had been used to “reward certain opposition units who joined
the coup” and that there had been a second transfer of money the
following day to provide insurance for the families of those who had
died in the coup.
[[link removed]] He
later downplayed the role of the money transfer but admitted that it
was likely used to buy the loyalty of additional troops.
[[link removed]] The
issue was so controversial that the part of the CIA Inspector
General’s report pertaining to the payoffs was only unredacted only
in 2024. Furthermore, Walter Elder, during an investigation in the
aftermath of the “Family Jewels” directive, told Colby that the
“accounting” for Conein’s money “and its use has never been
very frank or complete.”
[[link removed]]

[CIA’s Lucien Conein is awarded the Intelligence Star for his role
in the coup against Diem.]
[[link removed]]

_Document 22 – CIA’s Lucien Conein is awarded the Intelligence
Star for his role in the coup against Diem._

In any case, as the coup was underway, Conein and other CIA assets
sent regular reports about developments, providing a detailed analysis
of the Generals’ thinking and their evolving views on Diem (Document
17). At one point, Conein reported that the Generals were attempting
to contact the presidential palace but without success. Their
ultimatum was that, if the president were to resign immediately, they
would guarantee his safety. If he refused, the palace would be
attacked within an hour by air force and armored cars. As Conein
wrote, the “ultimatum appears final.” Later in the day, Conein
reported that the Generals had “firmly decided there to be no rpt no
discussion with the president. He will either say yes or no and that
is the end of the conversation.” A later report said they were
“preparing heavy air bombardment on palace immediately.”

Diem and his brother Nhu were eventually captured and assassinated in
the back of an armored vehicle. Two controversies still surround their
final hours. First, at one point, the Generals asked for a plane to
take Diem out of the country. Having reported the request to Acting
Chief of Station Smith, Conein was told that 24 hours were needed to
find a plane that could take Diem to the first country that would
offer him asylum. Church Committee investigators identified this as a
crucial decision in the Diem coup. Rhett Dawson, Minority Counsel in
the Church Committee, wrote to Fritz Schwartz, the Committee’s Chief
Counsel, that it was recommended that “the committee examine
McGeorge Bundy and others, if necessary, on the delays in air
evacuation to asylum.” During congressional testimonies, several
U.S. officials, including Conein, Colby, and Bundy, were indeed asked
about the delay, but nobody could explain who had made the decision
and why. As Dawson wrote, the decision “casts a pall over American
involvement in the assassinations of Diem and Nhu.”
[[link removed]]

A second element remains unclear when trying to ascertain the U.S.
role in the coup. The uncertainty is largely due to the different
versions of events that have emerged over the years, primarily through
one of its main protagonists: Lucien Conein. The problem with Conein,
as journalist Stanley Karnow explained, “is that he told you these
marvelous stories, but they didn’t always pan out.”
[[link removed]] When
asked by the Church Committee how the assassination happened, Conein
testified that he had been caught by surprise. In fact, with the
Generals, he had worked on preparing the JGS for the arrival of the
media and for a peaceful transfer of power.
[[link removed]] The
Generals, as he told the Committee, decided to kill Diem only at the
last minute, angered by Diem’s decision to secretly abandon the
palace and defy the delegation sent for his surrender. In later years,
Conein repeated the same version of events, with an emphasis on the
peaceful transfer of power in various TV interviews.
[[link removed]]

Even before the Church Committee investigations, though, Conein had
provided a different version. During a 1971 NBC News
program, _Vietnam Hindsight, Part II: The Death of Diem_, Conein
explained how—when the Generals wavered—he had offered incitement
and support. As he recalled, he told the Generals, “Once you are
into the attack, you must continue. If you hesitate, you are going to
be lost.” More importantly, Conein claimed that he could not
explicitly discuss the Generals’ decision on Diem, as he knew they
were part of a “blood oath” and he did not want to divulge
“privileged information.” However, Conein did agree that the
Generals’ decision was not a last-minute one. There had been a vote
among the Generals, and they had decided to assassinate Diem (Document
20). In 1981, the Generals’ decision to kill Diem was confirmed by
General Tran Van Don.
[[link removed]] Don
admitted that the Generals’ feared a change of heart by the United
States. If Diem had been kept prisoner, “perhaps after three months
the Americans would have replaced him and the Generals by bringing
back the Nhus” (Document 23).

A certain degree of mystery and obfuscation, then, remains regarding
Diem’s final hours and Conein’s role in the coup. The 2025 release
of Conein’s personnel file seems to confirm that Conein was no mere
passive spectator of the coup, as he was awarded the “intelligence
star” for his services during those critical months in Vietnam
(Document 22). An intelligence star is awarded “for a voluntary act
or acts of courage performed under hazardous conditions or for
services rendered with distinction under conditions of great risk.”
[[link removed]] This
suggests that the CIA saw Conein as much more than a simple bystander
to the evolving coup.

READ THE DOCUMENTS
[[link removed]]

[[link removed]] This
shows McCone’s views on assassination. During the Congressional
investigations of the 1970s, McCone testified that for moral and - as
in the case of Diem - strategic reasons he was opposed to and could
not discuss assassination. In later years, his assistant William Elder
had stated that McCone would ask CIA officials not to inform him of
assassination plots. Here, he seems more open to talk about it. Luca
Trenta, _The President’s Kill List_ (Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University Press, 2024), p. 99.

[[link removed]] The
episode has also been covered extensively. Scholarship on Vietnam is,
of course, rich and diverse. Works that deal at length with the Diem
coup include Howard Jones, _Death of a Generation_ (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2004); Fredrik Logevall, _Choosing War_ (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1999); John Prados, _Vietnam: the
History of an Unwinnable War, 1945-1975_ (University Press of Kansas,
2013); Nichter, _The Last Brahmin;_ Lindsey O’Rourke, _Covert
Regime Change_ (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2018); William
J. Rust, _Kennedy in Vietnam_ (New York: Da Capo Press,1985); Ken
Hugues “Silence: JFK’s Role in the Overthrow and Assassination of
South Vietnamese President Ngô Đình Diệm
[[link removed]],” Miller
Center’s Presidential Recordings Digital Edition, and Trenta, _The
President’s Kill List_. The episode is also covered in Rust’s
biography of Conein in Studies in Intelligence, the CIA in-house
journal. See William Rust, “CIA Operations Officer Lucien Conein: A
Study in Contrasts and Controversy,” _Studies in
Intelligence_ Vol. 63, No. 4 (2019), 43-58.

[[link removed]] For
his classic book on the Vietnam War, see George McTurman
Kahin, _Intervention: How America Became Involved in
Vietnam_ (Alfred A. Knopf, 1986).

[[link removed]] For
instance, Robert F. Kennedy (RFK) was adamant that his brother did not
approve a coup against Diem. RFK was not present during most of the
key meetings where the President argued in favor of a coup. See Luke
Nichter, _The Last Brahmin: Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. and the Making of
the Cold War_ (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2020), pg. 209.

[[link removed]] William
Colby testimony, U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, June 20, 1975. JFK
Assassination Records, 2017 release, 157-10014-10019, pg. 30.

[[link removed]] Nichter’s
excellent biography of Lodge presents a different interpretation of
the ambassador’s position towards the coup as not fully supportive.
We see Lodge as very much in favor of a coup, with Colby and McCone as
the key actors opposed to the coup. See Nichter, _The Last Brahmin_,
pg. 217.

[[link removed]] Hugues,
“Silence.”

[[link removed]] Telegram,
CIA to White House situation room, 29 August 1963, John F. Kennedy
Presidential Library (JFKL), National Security File (NSF), Vietnam
General, Folder “August 1963 24-31, CIA cables, JFKNSF-198-009.”

[[link removed]] Message
From the President to the Ambassador in Vietnam (Lodge)
[[link removed]], _Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume IV, Vietnam,
August-December 1963_, Document 18.

[[link removed]] Lodge
telegram to Kennedy, August 30, 1963, GRFL Saigon Embassy Files, Box
8, Folder "Henry Cabot Lodge, Including Diem Coup, 1963-65 (2).”

[[link removed]] Telegram,
Saigon to Secretary of State, 30 August 1963, JFKL, NSF, Vietnam
General, Folder, “August 1963 24-31, CIA cables JFKNSF-198-009.”

[[link removed]] Trenta, _The
President’s Kill List_, 139.

[[link removed]] Telegram,
CIA to State, 31st August, JFKL, NSF, Vietnam General, Folder,
“August 1963 24-31, CIA cables JFKNSF-198-009.”

[[link removed]] It
is not clear why McCone was so opposed to Lansdale as Saigon Chief of
Station. Lansdale's poor performance leading Operation Mongoose
against Cuba burned many bridges at Langley where he gained a a
reputation as a “wild man” within the CIA. See Max Boot, _The
Road Not Taken: Edward Lansdale and the American Tragedy in
Vietnam _(Liveright, 2018), pg. 114.

[[link removed]] Richardson
would be replaced by his deputy David Smith who would become Acting
Saigon Chief of Station.

[[link removed]] Nichter, _The
Last Brahmin, _pg. 220.

[[link removed]] Telegram
to Lodge, via CAS Channel, 5 October 1963, JFKL, NSF Vietnam Top
Secret cables, Folder, “Tab C, October 1963 JFKNSF-204-012.”

[[link removed]] Telegram,
State to American Embassy Saigon, 4 October, 1963, JFKL, NSF, Vietnam
Top Secret Cables, Folder “Tabs A-B, October 1963 JFKNSF-204-011.”

[[link removed]] The
same dynamic also emerges in other episodes of US government’s
involvement in assassination, such as the case of Rafael Trujillo of
the Dominican Republic. It is also discussed explicitly in the 1970s
Congressional inquiries. Trenta, The _President’s Kill List_, pp.
124-125.

[[link removed]] William
Colby testimony, pg. 53-54.

[[link removed]] Hughes,
“Silence.”

[[link removed]] Hughes,
“Silence.”

[[link removed]] Telegram,
McCone to Saigon, 24 October 1963, JFKL, NSF, Vietnam Top Secret
cables, Folder “Tab C, October 1963 JFKNSF-204-012.”

[[link removed]] CIA
Saigon to Washington, 25 October 1963, GRFL Saigon Embassy Files, Box
8, Folder “Henry Cabot Lodge, Including Diem Coup, 1963-65 (3).”

[[link removed]] Telegram,
Lodge to Secretary of State et al., October 28, 1963, GRFL Saigon
Embassy Files, Box 8, Folder “Henry Cabot Lodge, Including Diem
Coup, 1963-65 (3).”

[[link removed]] Memorandum
of a Conference with President Kennedy, October 29, 1963. FRUS, Volume
IV, Vietnam, August-December 1963, Document 235. See also Hugues,
“Silence.”

[[link removed]] This
document is undated and it is possible that it was written prior to
late October. However, according to the CIA’s FOIA webpage, the date
of the document is October 30, 1963.

[[link removed]] Lucien
Conein testimony, U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, June 20, 1975. JFK
Assassination Records, 2017 release, 157-10014-10094.

[[link removed]] William
Colby Testimony, U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, June 4, 1975. JFK
Assassination Records, 2017 release, 157-10002-10172, pgs. 124-125.

[[link removed]] Colby
Testimony, June 20, 1975, pg. 46.

[[link removed]] William
Elder, Memorandum for William Colby, “Special Activities,” 
[[link removed]]June
1, 1973.

[[link removed]] Rhett
Dawson to Fritz Schwarz, “Diem Assasination,” 7 July 1975. JFKAR
2025 Release, No. 157-10014-10152.

[[link removed]] Rust,
“CIA Operations Officer Lucien Conein,” pg. 44.

[[link removed]] Conein
testimony June 20, 1975, pg. 55.

[[link removed]] Lucien
Conein, Interview
[[link removed]],
Vietnam: A Television History, 7 May1981.

[[link removed]] In
his memoirs, though, Don had provided a different narrative, he had
denied that there had been a vote, stating instead that no vote was
taken, and the lack of a clear decision was responsible for Diem’s
and Nhu’s deaths. Tran Van Don, _Our Endless War_ (San Rafael:
Presidio Press, 1978), pp. 110-111.

[[link removed]] CIA
Medals: Intelligence Star
[[link removed]].

_Founded in 1985 by journalists and scholars to check rising
government secrecy, the National Security Archive
[[link removed]] combines a unique range of functions:
investigative journalism center, research institute on international
affairs, library and archive of declassified U.S. documents ("the
world's largest nongovernmental collection" according to the Los
Angeles Times), leading non-profit user of the U.S. Freedom of
Information Act, public interest law firm defending and expanding
public access to government information, global advocate of open
government, and indexer and publisher of former secrets._

Related link: New Light in a Dark Corner: Evidence on the Diem Coup
in South Vietnam,
[[link removed]]

* South Vietnam
[[link removed]]
* CIA
[[link removed]]
* political assassinations
[[link removed]]
* Nho Dinh Diem
[[link removed]]
* Henry Cabot Lodge
[[link removed]]
* John McCone
[[link removed]]

*
[[link removed]]
*
[[link removed]]
*
*
[[link removed]]

 

 

 

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