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WHAT CAN THE JOINT LIST TEACH US ABOUT BUILDING PALESTINIAN POLITICAL
POWER?  
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Rida Abu Rass
May 23, 2025
+972 Magazine
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_ The Joint List was a historic electoral alliance of
Palestinian-majority parties. Ten years after its formation, this
experiment in Palestinian unity inside Israel — and its ultimate
collapse — shows the need for carefully cultivated alliances. _

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Ten years ago, Israel’s four Palestinian-majority parties achieved
an unprecedented breakthrough by forming the Joint List — a historic
electoral alliance that aimed to bridge the ideological gaps and
interpersonal rivalries dividing the community’s fragmented
leadership. 

While short-lived, this experiment ignited rare political enthusiasm
among Israel’s Palestinian citizens who had long yearned for unity
and influence. Within five years, the Joint List became Israel’s
third-largest party and the most substantial challenge to mainstream
Zionist politics.

The List’s influence peaked during Israel’s 2019-2022 political
crisis, when multiple inconclusive elections left the country in
deadlock
[[link removed]].
Suddenly, Palestinian lawmakers found themselves in the unlikely
position of potential kingmakers  — their support crucial for
forming any government that could replace Netanyahu’s rule.

A decade after the Joint List’s promising start, Palestinian
politics in Israel has fractured beyond recognition. The List’s
unified leadership has splintered back into competing factions,
paralyzed by ideological divides, strategic disagreements, and
personal rivalries — some long-standing and others new. This
disintegration fueled Palestinian citizens’ disillusionment
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both the Israeli political system and their ineffectual leadership,
with voter participation and parliamentary representation plummeting
as a result. 

And in the streets, a climate of fear prevails. Amid the horrors
unfolding in Gaza
[[link removed]],
Palestinian citizens of Israel watch with demoralized silence. While
some have vocally resisted the war, most are afraid to speak out
against it, and equally terrified of its potential spread across the
Green Line.

[Demonstrators call to end the war in Gaza, at the Hebrew University
in Jerusalem, May 12, 2025. (Flash90)]
[[link removed]]
Demonstrators call to end the war in Gaza, at the Hebrew University in
Jerusalem, May 12, 2025. (Flash90)
Demonstrators call to end the war in Gaza, at the Hebrew University in
Jerusalem, May 12, 2025. (Flash90)

The long road to unity

For Palestinian citizens of Israel, the Joint List’s formation was
long overdue. For the first time since Israel’s establishment in
1948, the community could claim a unified leadership with legitimate
authority to speak for all. 

During Israel’s early years, as Palestinians struggled to recover
from the Nakba’s trauma, military rule (1948-1966) deliberately
suppressed political organization. The Israeli Communist Party (Maki)
eventually emerged as the dominant political force in the 1960s-70s,
mobilizing Palestinian voters through its binational framework. Yet
while popular, it failed to represent the community’s full
ideological diversity.

In the late 1980s, nascent ideological streams were expressed for the
first time, when liberal reforms within Israel allowed the foundation
of new Palestinian parties like the National Democratic Assembly
(Balad)
[[link removed]].
Though fragmented, Palestinian leadership enjoyed unprecedented
influence in this era, supporting Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin’s
1992-95 government — the most liberal in Israel’s history —
without being formally included in his ruling coalition.

In the aftermath of the Second Intifada
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fragmented Palestinian leadership was pushed to the margins of Israeli
politics, while its natural allies on the Jewish left gradually shrank
to electoral irrelevance. Meanwhile, a hardening right-wing bloc
tightened its grip on the Knesset, making calls for Palestinian
political unity increasingly urgent.

At first, the Palestinian leadership resisted these calls, even as
voter apathy grew and turnout declined. The decisive turning point
came in 2014, when far-right politician Avigdor Lieberman, then
serving as foreign minister, engineered a crucial electoral reform.
His proposal to raise the Knesset threshold from 2 percent to 3.25
percent — transparently designed to eliminate smaller Palestinian
parties — finally compelled the fractured leadership to set aside
its differences in the face of this new existential threat, and form
[[link removed]] the
Joint List.

[Members of the Joint List address supporters at the party
headquarters in the Northern israeli town of Nazareth, as the exit
polls in the Israeli general elections for the 20th parliament are
announced on March 17, 2015. (Basel Awidat/Flash90)]
[[link removed]]
Members of the Joint List address supporters at the party headquarters
in the Northern israeli town of Nazareth, as the exit polls in the
Israeli general elections for the 20th parliament are announced on
March 17, 2015. (Basel Awidat/Flash90)
Members of the Joint List address supporters at the party headquarters
in the Northern israeli town of Nazareth, as the exit polls in the
Israeli general elections for the 20th parliament are announced on
March 17, 2015. (Basel Awidat/Flash90)

While Joint List leaders saw their alliance as a tactical response to
Israel’s new electoral restrictions, its creation sparked an
unprecedented wave of grassroots enthusiasm. Most recognized the List
wasn’t a cure-all — the growing divide between Palestinian
citizens and the Zionist mainstream remained vast. Yet the 2015
campaign kindled genuine hope among Palestinians, particularly as some
Jewish-Israeli leftists also envisioned the List as potential
kingmakers in a post-Netanyahu center-left government.

The List’s election campaign channeled this energy. Leaders appeared
united in joint press conferences, and on billboards in Israel’s
Palestinian towns and cities. The results shattered expectations:
previously disengaged members of the electorate displayed List
merchandise on social media, while volunteer-led get-out-the-vote
efforts boosted Palestinian turnout from 56 percent (2013) to 63
percent. Most dramatically, the unified list gained 13 seats
[[link removed]] —
two more than the individual parties had won separately in 2013.

THE 2019-2022 CRISIS

The Joint List’s initial success soon gave way to internal
dysfunction
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with the Palestinian representatives failing to capitalize on the
momentum from their 2015 breakthrough. Ideological clashes and
personal rivalries fostered an atmosphere of mutual suspicion that
alienated their base culminating in a temporary split in 2019. The
consequences became starkly evident in that year’s elections, when
voter turnout among Palestinian citizens plummeted below 50 percent
— a historic low — and the fractured parties won just 10 seats
combined.

Yet Israel’s political chaos between 2019 and 2022, marked by five
consecutive elections and an electorate divided almost evenly between
pro- and anti-Netanyahu camps, gave the Joint List an unexpected
second life. Reconstituted ahead of the September 2019 vote, it
immediately regained its 13 seats. Then, in March 2020, it achieved a
historic milestone, becoming Israel’s third-largest party with 15
seats — the highest ever for Palestinian representation. Turnout
rebounded, while support for Zionist parties among Palestinian voters
collapsed from 28 percent to just 12 percent.

[Members of the Joint List arrive for a meeting with Israeli
president Reuven Rivlin following the results of the general election,
at the President's Residence in Jerusalem, September 22, 2019.
(Yonatan Sindel/Flash90)]
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Members of the Joint List arrive for a meeting with Israeli president
Reuven Rivlin following the results of the general election, at the
President's Residence in Jerusalem, September 22, 2019. (Yonatan
Sindel/Flash90)
Members of the Joint List arrive for a meeting with Israeli president
Reuven Rivlin following the results of the general election, at the
President’s Residence in Jerusalem, September 22, 2019. (Yonatan
Sindel/Flash90)

Crucially, the List expanded its reach beyond its Palestinian base,
campaigning in Jewish-majority cities and framing its message around
Arab-Jewish solidarity. This outreach, though modest, doubled its
Jewish support to roughly 20,000 votes — a narrow but decisive
margin that secured an extra seat. For a brief moment, the List proved
that a unified Palestinian voice could reshape Israeli politics. But
without deeper institutional unity, these gains would prove fleeting.

The Joint List attempted to parlay its newfound influence into forcing
the Jewish center-left’s hand. Their calculus was clear: with
Netanyahu’s removal requiring their seats, they hoped to extract
concessions on Palestinian inclusion. But this strategy misread
Israel’s political metamorphosis
[[link removed]]. What might
have been negotiable in Rabin’s era had become unthinkable in the
2020s political climate.

Faced with the prospect of including an anti-occupation, non-Zionist
Palestinian bloc into the coalition, the Israeli center-left
preferred self-destruction
[[link removed]]. They chose
round after round of costly elections and eventual political oblivion
over legitimization of Palestinian political demands.

[Then-Blue and White party chariman Benny Gantz meets with Joint List
MKs Ayman Odeh and Ahmad Tibi to discuss the possibility of
establishing a minority government backed by Israel's Palestinian-led
parties, October 19, 2019. (Ofek Avshalom)]
[[link removed]] Then-Blue
and White party chariman Benny Gantz meets with Joint List MKs Ayman
Odeh and Ahmad Tibi to discuss the possibility of establishing a
minority government backed by Israel's Palestinian-led parties,
October 19, 2019. (Ofek Avshalom)
Then-Blue and White party chariman Benny Gantz meets with Joint List
MKs Ayman Odeh and Ahmad Tibi to discuss the possibility of
establishing a minority government backed by Israel’s
Palestinian-led parties, October 19, 2019. (Ofek Avshalom)

While critics rightly noted the Joint List’s strategy faced
insurmountable barriers in Israel’s ethnonationalist political
climate — evidenced by the center-left’s refusal to even consider
their most modest demands — this narrow focus misses the
coalition’s quieter achievements. The List proved surprisingly
effective at unifying the Palestinian community’s fragmented civic
and grassroots leaderships. Its establishment lent legitimacy to
politicians and associated activists, who could now credibly claim to
speak in the name of the entire Palestinian community.

Moreover, the Joint List’s impact extended beyond parliamentary
politics, reshaping Palestinian civil society in Israel. Like other
marginalized communities operating within neoliberal Western
countries, Palestinian citizens rely on a network of NGOs and activist
organizations that provide critical services — policy research,
advocacy, and grassroots mobilization. But while these groups had
always maintained some level of coordination, their efforts were
hampered by having to compete with each other for limited resources. 

Before the List’s establishment, every decision — which member of
Knesset to invite as a speaker, which organizations to partner with
— carried the risk of alienating rival factions or jeopardizing
funding. The Joint List changed this calculus entirely. By providing a
cohesive political framework, it allowed civil society to focus on
their work and collaborate without the constant burden of partisan
calculations.

We should not minimize the difficult circumstances the Joint List
faced, including its exclusion by potential political allies. Nor
should we discount the ways Netanyahu and the Israeli right incited
against, intimidated, and co-opted the List, contributing to its
eventual downfall. But to grow and rebuild unity, Palestinians — and
the Israeli left — must also learn from the List’s mistakes.

The Joint List’s experience revealed both the necessity and
difficulty of building inter-ethnic partnerships in Israel’s
fractured political landscape. While its outreach to the Zionist
center proved futile, it overlooked potential alliances with what
remained of the Jewish left — particularly Meretz and Labor, whose
shrinking bases included members open to equal partnership with
Palestinian leaders.

[Joint List MK Ahmad Tibi alonside Meretz MK Tamar Zandberg, in the
Knesset, in Jerusalem, June 2, 2021. (Olivier Fitoussi/Flash90)]
[[link removed]] Joint
List MK Ahmad Tibi alonside Meretz MK Tamar Zandberg, in the Knesset,
in Jerusalem, June 2, 2021. (Olivier Fitoussi/Flash90)
Joint List MK Ahmad Tibi alonside Meretz MK Tamar Zandberg, in the
Knesset, in Jerusalem, June 2, 2021. (Olivier Fitoussi/Flash90)

As the Knesset’s third-largest party, the List was well-positioned
to breathe new life into this camp, perhaps even assume its
leadership. Ayman Odeh
[[link removed]], the List’s
leader and chairman of its socialist faction, the Democratic Front for
Peace and Equality (known for its Hebrew acronym Hadash), made
tentative strides in this direction: accepting invitations to speak in
Jewish-majority cities, writing op-eds for liberal Israeli outlets,
and outlining his vision for a new Israeli “democratic camp
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ethnic hierarchy. But beyond these symbolic gestures, little was done
to harness and transform Palestinian electoral momentum into a
binational democratic movement premised upon full national and civic
equality.

The Joint List experiment showed that true political alliances cannot
flourish without careful cultivation. While the List’s leaders
shared fundamental objectives, they failed to overcome interpersonal
and ideological barriers. The absence of conflict resolution
mechanisms, deliberative decision-making structures, and codified
power-sharing agreements left the alliance vulnerable to the very
ideological and personal tensions it was meant to transcend.

Rather than treating the List as a framework for Palestinian unity and
cooperation, its leadership viewed it merely as a technical workaround
to Israel’s high electoral threshold. This, perhaps, was the
List’s fatal flaw, turning what should have been a transformative
platform into a fragile arrangement constantly on the brink of
disintegration. Future Palestinian coalition-building — whether
within Israel, across the occupied territories, or throughout the
diaspora — must learn from this experience: substantive unity
requires more than declarations of solidarity, and cannot survive
without building strong institutions that would foster consensus,
coordination, and cooperation.

A MOVEMENT IN WAITING

Israel’s political landscape has deteriorated sharply since the
Joint List’s 2022 collapse and the outbreak of war in Gaza. While
global attention rightly focuses on Gaza’s devastation, Palestinians
inside Israel face escalating persecution — intensified
surveillance, arrests, police violence, and suppression of dissent —
as Jewish allies are targeted and fragmented.

Attempts to revive the Joint List or forge new “big tent”
alliances have stalled. Some of its former leaders proposed splitting
the four majority-Palestinian parties into two blocs to clear the
electoral threshold, arguing that this would satisfy voters’ demand
for unity. But Palestinian voters, who remain highly diverse and as
disillusioned as ever with leadership squabbles, are unlikely to rally
behind such “technical” arrangements with the same energy they
once did. 

Recent efforts
[[link removed]-] by
the National Democratic Assembly and other parties to unite
anti-Zionist factions, while commendable, face the same old strategic,
ideological, and interpersonal divisions — gaps that run even deeper
among leaders than at the grassroots.

Yet it is precisely at the grassroots where hope remains. Palestinian
citizens of Israel, despite systemic discrimination, retain unique
leverage: access to Israeli institutions, economic networks, and the
ability to disrupt the status quo. Fear and anger currently paralyze
mobilization, but these emotions could be channeled into a powerful
movement — one that challenges apartheid from within while
connecting struggles across historic Palestine and the diaspora.

What’s needed is leadership bold enough to build substantive unity
— not just electoral alliances, but a shared vision that bridges
Palestinian factions, the progressive Jewish diaspora, and the small
but determined anti-apartheid Jewish-Israeli left, without
compromising on core demands: an end to the Israeli occupation in the
West Bank and Gaza, the dismantling of apartheid, and equality from
the river to the sea.

_Rida Abu Rass is a Palestinian citizen of Israel and a political
scientist originally from Tayibe, now based in Kitchener, Canada._

_+972 Magazine [[link removed]] is an independent,
online, nonprofit magazine run by a group of Palestinian and Israeli
journalists. Founded in 2010, our mission is to provide in-depth
reporting, analysis, and opinions from the ground in Israel-Palestine.
The name of the site is derived from the telephone country code that
can be used to dial throughout Israel-Palestine._

_Our core values are a commitment to equity, justice, and freedom of
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* Palestinians
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* Joint List
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* Israeli politics
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* Palestine
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* Israel
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* Ayman Odeh
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