[Israel’s response to the Oct. 7 terror attacks has killed
thousands of civilians, and may strengthen the terrorist group ]
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HAMAS IS NOT AS POPULAR IN GAZA AS IT SEEMS. BUT ISRAEL’S TACTICS
WILL ENSURE THEIR SURVIVAL  
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Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib
November 26, 2023
Forward
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_ Israel’s response to the Oct. 7 terror attacks has killed
thousands of civilians, and may strengthen the terrorist group _

A family drink tea amid the rubble of a building destroyed in Israeli
bombing in Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip, on November 7, 2023. ,
AFP

 

As battered Gazans emerged from their destroyed homes in northern Gaza
after the temporary four-day cease-fire took effect, a Palestinian
reporter working for Hamas’ own TV station ironically captured
dozens of resentful civilians cursing Hamas
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the group of having destroyed their lives.

This isn’t an isolated example.

In a short BBC clip showing
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aftermath of a deadly Israeli strike that killed civilians in Gaza, a
grieving Palestinian mother screams in agony, “This is all because
of Hamas’ dogs.” A nearby man, likely a family member, can be
heard quickly telling her, “Enough!” He places his hand on her
mouth to prevent her from saying more.

Many Palestinians are either reluctant or fearful to express what they
are honestly thinking about Hamas, the Islamist group that has ruled
Gaza since 2007 and perpetrated the Oct. 7 terror attack on Israel.
The massive Israeli bombardment throughout the Gaza
Strip killed hundreds of people daily, many of whom were neither
Hamas members nor supporters. Most, including my family members, are
experiencing blowback for actions they didn’t commit, plan or
endorse.

Immediately after the horrific Oct. 7 attack on Israeli towns and
kibbutzim, I encountered dozens of social media posts from Gazans who
expressed immense concern, fear, horror and worry about what this
event would unleash. Hundreds condemned Hamas’ “adventures” and
reckless disregard for the well-being of its people in the coastal
enclave. They considered the attack a suicide mission that would
inevitably result in the total and utter destruction of the strip.

Unfortunately, so far their fears have proven accurate.

After the first massive Israeli strike on the Jabalia refugee camp
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Gaza, another short video
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man’s defiant outburst against Hamas during a press conference by
one of the group’s spokespersons, blaming the group for what has
befallen the coastal enclave.

“Why are they hiding amongst the people?” asked
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man inside a Gaza Hospital on Aljazeera’s live Arabic news channel,
referring to Hamas fighters. “Why don’t they go to hell and hide
there?” The interviewer quickly cut him off.

Hamas is deeply unpopular with the people of Gaza. But the way that
Israel is waging war in the strip will ultimately make things much
worse for both Palestinians and Israelis long-term.

HOW HAMAS USES THE GAZA STRIP

Hamas police mobilize in the street for a raid in Nuseirat, south of
Gaza City, on March 22, 2018. Photo by Mahmud Hams/AFP via Getty
Images

While ignoring its own people, Hamas has managed to insulate itself
and its patrons from the impact of Israel’s 16-year-long blockade.
There is rising anger among Gazans at this reality, as well as a
rejection of Hamas’ methods, beliefs, ideologies and governance of
the strip.

A recent popular Facebook post
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a frustrated Gazan inside the strip lambasts the “Iranian-back armed
factions” led by Hamas. “It doesn’t seem that we as civilians
are remotely considered in their plans or calculus,” he adds, saying
that militants “depict themselves as being perfectly fine” with
their tunnels and well-prepared supplies and stockpiles while no such
preparations were put in place to support the civilian population’s
needs.

The post called for the release of all hostages in exchange for the
complete withdrawal of IDF troops, stressing that the sanctity of
Gazans’ lives is more valuable than prisoner swaps or Hamas’
ideologies and beliefs.

Right before Oct. 7, a survey by the Arab Barometer
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a continuing decline
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Gazans’ trust in Hamas’ governance along several metrics. Sadly,
the intensity of Israel’s military operation is overshadowing
dissenting voices, both those that existed before Oct. 7 and those
that are increasing as a result of the destruction of Gaza.

Interestingly, Hamas enjoys much more support among the West Bank’s
population
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lacking a robust presence in the territory. Resentment of settler
violence, Israel’s occupation and the impotent Palestinian Authority
likely fuel support for the violent resistance represented by Hamas’
ideology and tactics.

But despite the widespread suffering, the West Bank is light-years
ahead of Gaza in terms of quality of life. The violent reality that
Hamas rule would bring would seriously reverse support for the group.

Something that makes it difficult to assess Palestinian public
opinion, including in Gaza, is that the concept of “resistance”
enjoys widespread support, even if people dislike Hamas’ governance
and practices. Hamas exploits this, and hides its failures behind its
“acts of resistance,” which makes it possible to claim any
“achievement.”

This is precisely why Hamas launched its attack on Oct. 7. The attack
was not about settler violence in Jerusalem or seeking to break the
blockade. It was about stemming the tide of resentment and
discontentment.

A recent poll suggests that Hamas’ gambit may have worked.
Evidence suggests wide Palestinian public support
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the Oct. 7 attack. Despite the severe limitations of this survey, the
impending release of 150 Palestinian prisoners is already being spun
by Hamas as a victory despite the unbearable death toll and cost.

Top Hamas leader Khalil al-Hayya told _The New York Times_
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from Qatar — that the group’s goals are not to “run Gaza and
bring it water and electricity,” or to “improve the situation in
Gaza,” but rather to put the Palestinian cause back on the map.

In other words, Hamas aims to use Gaza as a citadel from which it can
drag 2.3 million people along in a “resistance” project that
entails continuous and permanent war and violence.

The people of Gaza know this. Poor and working-class residents of the
coastal enclave have paid the ultimate price in blood, misery,
suffering and hardship without any hope for a prosperous and peaceful
future. Amid the devastation of the IDF’s response to Oct. 7, more
Gazans have been criticizing
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actions and hold on power.

Thousands took to the streets in Gaza
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summer to protest against Hamas’ rule and their miserable living
conditions, a rare display of defiance. The Islamist group
quickly quashed the protests
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arresting and beating hundreds of people. This is the group’s
playbook whenever civilians demand improvements to dire living
conditions. And yet there are still people daring to speak out.

I know Gaza well, and have a deep understanding of its population. The
aforementioned anecdotes, my lived and professional experiences,
friends and family currently in the strip, Palestinian social media,
Hamas’ own statements, multiple past protests and the group’s
brutal rule clearly demonstrate deep unpopularity and disdain for
Hamas, both now and before Oct 7.

The unfortunate truth, however, is that the way Israel is waging this
war will prove ineffective in achieving long-term and sustainable
security. It is ultimately planting seeds for further violence,
extremism and hate while also making it difficult for anti-Hamas
activists and the general Gazan population to express what they truly
feel and to challenge the Islamist group’s rule.

A COUNTERPRODUCTIVE OPERATION

Hamas police block protesters from reaching the border fence east of
Khan Yunis in the southern Gaza Strip on May 15, 2019, during a
protest marking 71th anniversary of the Nakba. Photo by Said
Khatib/AFP via Getty Images

Many Gazans blame Israel for their displacement from the land their
families lived on for generations — about 70% of Gazans are
refugees or descendants of refugees from the 1948 _Nakba — _as
well as much of their current predicament. But they have no illusions
about Hamas’ nefarious intentions, incompetence and selfishness
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Israeli blockade as enabling Hamas to conveniently absolve itself from
its responsibility to govern effectively and provide for their needs.

If Israel were to wave a magic wand over Gaza and somehow dislodge
Hamas and remove its grip on power without civilian casualties, I am
willing to bet my life that at least half of the strip would welcome
such a move, and yell in unison: “Do us a favor!”

However, I am not optimistic that we are on the course to achieving
anything close to that. Israel’s past political decisions
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poor strategic choices and the conduct of the current military
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in Gaza point to an uncomfortable and deeply disturbing inevitability:
Hamas will not be eradicated. And the group will survive as a cohesive
entity, ideology and component of the Palestinian national project.

Israel’s military actions in response to the Oct. 7 attack have
already killed over 14,000 people
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Many bodies, like that of my dad’s youngest brother, uncle Riyad,
57, are long buried under rubble. My uncle was killed in a massive
raid that destroyed our entire neighborhood. His body was only
extracted from the rubble after six days. Nothing and no one has been
spared, including aid workers
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many of whom are in southern Gaza.

The unprecedented death toll and destruction have expended most of the
international political capital that the Israeli government garnered
after Hamas’ horrendous attacks. The IDF estimates its operation
inside the strip has killed up to 2,000 Hamas
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(not including Hamas and other groups’ members killed on Oct. 7) out
of a force it estimates to be around 30,000 strong — a shockingly
low number of combatants killed relative to dead civilians. Former CIA
director and experienced counterinsurgency commander Gen. David
Petraeus cautioned that
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a real concern about the Palestinian people in Gaza,” especially as
the IDF gears up for a ground operation in the south of the strip.

Instead of carrying out a targeted, low-intensity, long-term operation
that could sustainably reduce Hamas’ military capabilities and
create conditions to introduce a new administration in Gaza, the
massive bombardment and destruction throughout the strip have set the
scene for what will be one of the most complicated predicaments
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Israel has ever found itself in: ambitious, difficult-to-achieve
tactical and strategic goals, continued occupation of a ruined Gaza,
and most importantly, a highly resentful and deeply antagonistic
Palestinian population that will be even more hostile to Israel and
more likely to embrace violence as a strategy.

HAMAS IS RESILIENT

Members of the Palestinian security forces loyal to Hamas take part in
a graduation ceremony for police officers in Gaza City, on Dec. 12,
2021. Photo by Mahmud Hams/AFP via Getty Images

Multiple analysts and observers, including an unnamed senior U.S.
defense official
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have stated that Israel’s campaign thus far hasn’t even “come
close” to eradicating Hamas’ mid- and senior-level leaders.

Unlike other Islamist groups, the official argued that Hamas has a
“deeper bench of experienced midlevel military leaders,” in
essence making it impossible to destroy the group by eliminating
individual commanders.

As a child growing up in Gaza, I remember vividly when Israel
assassinated founding and senior Hamas officials, including people
like Salah Shehade, Ahmed Yassin and Adnan al-Ghoul. The killing of
these leaders was thought at the time to be a fatal blow to Hamas.

Instead, the group’s arsenal
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capabilities, political clout and position grew exponentially and
expanded beyond what its founders could have ever dreamed of
achieving. Not only have I observed this over the last two decades,
but I am certain that Hamas today is militarily and politically
prepared to successfully withstand Israel’s onslaught in the
aftermath of the Oct. 7 attacks.

This isn’t to suggest that Israel cannot or shouldn’t seek to
weaken Hamas and target its terror infrastructure. Instead, thinking
critically and methodically is an operational and strategic imperative
to move forward meaningfully.

Tunnel warfare is dirty, complicated, costly and requires lengthy
efforts and campaigns, not the short and swift operations upon which
Israel’s military doctrine is built. Rather than weakening Hamas,
which is underground, the current Israeli military operation in the
strip is killing supporters and opponents of the group alike,
inflaming the region, exacerbating anti-Israel sentiments worldwide,
silencing political opposition to Hamas inside Gaza, complicating
efforts at normalizing relations with Arab countries and achieving
precisely what the group wanted in the first place: to reinvigorate
the Palestinian cause and force Israel to act in a manner that in
essence proves Hamas’ claims.

Despite our mistakes during the global war on terror, the U.S. took
numerous steps to minimize civilian casualties. Consider the raid on
bin Laden’s compound in Abbottabad in 2011. Instead of flattening
the entire building, the U.S. surgically raided the structure and
methodically separated bin Laden’s family from his guards and
defenders, sparing the lives of women and children. 

Even if Hamas operates near civilian targets, making it difficult to
clearly identify the group’s combatants, international and
humanitarian law does not absolve the IDF of its responsibility to
operate with due regard for civilians’ lives. If an active shooter
is rampaging through a shopping mall, the response would not be to
call an airstrike that levels the whole complex. Rather, the
counterattack’s top priority would be eliminating the threat while
minimizing civilian loss of life.

DEFEATING AN IDEOLOGY — AND WHAT COMES NEXT

A Palestinian walks through destruction in Gaza City’s al-Karama
neighborhood on Oct. 11, 2023. Photo by Mahmud Hams/AFP via Getty
Images

By indirectly and inadvertently allowing Hamas to cement its rule
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Gaza, Israel helped the group further entrench itself as an
indisputable component of the Palestinian national project.

Even if the IDF were to permanently occupy Gaza at the end of this war
— an option politically and diplomatically untenable —  the
moment it leaves, Hamas would find a way to reconstitute. Remember,
the Taliban survived 20 years of U.S. occupation in Afghanistan. Plus,
an occupation will always entail some degree of populace resistance,
including through violent means.

Unconventional and creative thinking is the only way to stop the
massive bloodshed and stabilize the strip. Secretary Blinken stated
recently
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“there may be a need for some transition period at the end of the
conflict.” Before then, greater U.S. and European pressure on the
Israeli government to minimize civilian suffering, protect hospitals
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and allow for more humanitarian aid to make its way into Gaza could
help achieve meaningful outcomes. Vengeance is not a productive
military strategy.

U.N. peacekeeping troops, with Arab and international support and
participation, could provide a transitional period that stops the war
and provides Israel with an offramp. Deploying these forces along
Gaza’s borders with Israel to prevent future infiltration and
attacks against Israel, and acting as a quasi-government while Gaza
rebuilds, could allow for the emergence of a capable Palestinian body
that can govern the strip. The U.N. could operate aerial and maritime
corridors over the Mediterranean Sea to facilitate the movement of
people and cargo, using existing U.N. infrastructure, protocols, and
commonly deployed practices after wars and natural disasters.

Many have taken issue with calls for a cease-fire, fearing that it
would freeze the conflict, abandon the remaining hostages and allow
Hamas to re-attack Israel. But short-term and temporary cease-fires,
not localized and inconsistent “pauses,” can allow for
negotiations to release more hostages, revision of battle plans,
further evacuations of civilians in Gaza and the delivery of
desperately needed humanitarian aid. The impending four-day cease-fire
is an example of this.

My brother, who works for a British medical NGO in Gaza City and has
lost his home, told me that in addition to enduring heart-stopping
daily bombardment, his family sometimes had to drink salt water
(seawater) and boil grassy plants to sustain themselves in Gaza City.
How is his suffering and that of hundreds of thousands of innocent
civilians going to help eliminate Hamas?

Thousands of innocent Gazans are paying with their lives for a sin
they didn’t commit
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Israel and its international partners should actually implement steps
that will weaken and eventually marginalize Hamas. The group and its
extremist ideology will never be entirely eliminated in a military
operation, just like the U.S. could not destroy the Taliban even after
20 years. However, there are practical steps to take that would give
Gazans a fighting chance for political self-determination and
stability in the strip.

_Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib, a U.S. citizen from Gaza, is a Middle East
political analyst. He has a master’s degree in intelligence studies
from American Military University. He has written and contributed
extensively to publications on Gaza’s affairs in U.S., Israeli,
Jewish and Arab outlets._

* Israel-Hamas war
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* Palestinians
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* Hamas
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* political struggles
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