[ Written nearly six years ago about the brutal French colonial
suppression of the Algerian population. Is the civilian population of
a colonial-settler regime ever a legitimate military target?]
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PORTSIDE CULTURE

ONE PERSON’S TERRORIST? REFLECTIONS ON ZOHRA DRIF’S MEMOIR OF THE
ALGERIAN REVOLUTION  
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Bill Fletcher Jr.
February 2, 2018
The Nation
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_ Written nearly six years ago about the brutal French colonial
suppression of the Algerian population. Is the civilian population of
a colonial-settler regime ever a legitimate military target? _

Arrest of Zohra Drif, Photo: Just World Books // The Nation

 

I have seldom felt compelled to write a review or an essay after
reading a book. I am often inspired, saddened, or reflective after
finishing a book, but normally I don’t feel compelled to publicly
think through issues that emerged for me in the course of reading
someone’s work.

Inside the Battle of Algiers
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Memoir of a Woman Freedom Fighter
by Zohra Drif
Translated from the French by Andrew Farrand
Foreword by Lakhdar Brahimi
Just World Books; 320 pages
Paperback:  $29.95
September 1, 2017
ISBN 978-1-68257-075-3

Just World Books
Zohra Drif’s _Inside the Battle of Algiers: Memoir of a Woman
Freedom Fighter_
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very different place. I grew up inspired by the Algerian national
liberation war against France and had, along with thousands of other
activists of my political generation, seen the famous Gillo Pontecorvo
film _The Battle of Algiers_—and Drif played a key role in some
wrenching scenes depicted in it. What I failed to grasp was how close
the film had actually been to the facts, at least as described by
Drif.

This is the gripping story of a woman who, in the very conservative
climate of colonial Algeria, became a revolutionary in the cause of
her country’s freedom.

Yet Drif’s book is striking less because of its connection with the
Pontecorvo film than because it is the story of a woman who, in the
very conservative climate of colonial Algeria, became a revolutionary
in the cause of Algeria’s freedom. Drif had to overcome the
reluctance that existed within her own family, in addition to the
repression carried out by the French authorities.

These issues, in and of themselves, would be enough to lead one to
appreciate Drif’s story. But it is her discussion of the armed
activities in which she was involved, including the bombing of
civilian targets, that sent chills up my spine and caused me to stop
and reflect.

Anyone who has seen _The Battle of Algiers_ will remember that the
urban guerrillas of the FLN (Front de Libération Nationale) carried
out bombings of civilian targets in retaliation for the torturing and
killing of Algerians by French troops and terror attacks against
Algerian civilians by French colonists. Every time I have watched
those scenes—and I have seen the film multiple times—I have been
deeply unsettled at the sight of settler civilians killed and wounded.
I wondered how Drif would handle this question in her book. To some
extent I was surprised by her direct and unapologetic approach.

Drif’s description of the Algerian Revolution can be more fully
appreciated when one looks at the entirety of the situation and,
especially, the treatment to which the Algerian people were subjected.
Algeria was among those colonies of Europe that could be defined as
“settler states” or “settler colonies.” These were colonies
where the Europeans not only controlled the territory and seized its
resources but where there had been a conscious decision to settle
Europeans. Other such settler states included Ireland, Kenya,
Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, South Africa, Palestine/Israel, Canada, the USA,
Australia, and New Zealand.

There are many noteworthy things about settler states. One is how
often God is referenced, as having allegedly given those territories
to the European settler population. That was particularly true in
Ireland, South Africa, Israel, and the United States.

A second is the manner in which the settlers psychologically and
physically displace the native population and redefine themselves
as _the_ legitimate population of that territory. In the United
States we are familiar with this, and the ramifications for the
American Indians. In Algeria the French encouraged poor southern
Europeans to migrate to Algeria and settle. As far as the settlers
were concerned, _they_ were now the Algerians, or, more
specifically, the French Algerians. The indigenous Algerians were the
equivalent of chopped liver.

The poor southern Europeans who settled came to be known as
the _pieds-noirs_ (black feet). They arrived after the French
military had defeated the indigenous forces and seized the best
land—a conquest that began in 1830. The settlers proliferated, and
the indigenous Algerians became their servants. Whenever the Algerians
rose in revolt, they were brutally suppressed.

The French government felt a special bond with the territory of
Algeria, ultimately declaring it to be a part of France. This
distinguished Algeria from many other territories occupied by France,
as well as territories colonized by other European powers. It was
along the lines of the way the United States claims Puerto Rico, after
having seized it from the Spanish in 1898.

The indigenous Algerians—a population made up of a broad mixture of
African peoples including Arabs and Berbers—had a different point of
view, of course. They engaged in various forms of both violent and
nonviolent resistance to colonial oppression over the many decades of
French colonization. The forms of resistance mattered little to the
French government and the _pied-noir_ administrations. Resistance
was forbidden.

On May 8, 1945, French authorities carried out massacres in Sétif,
Guelma, and Kherrata, targeting thousands of unarmed Algerians.

In the immediate aftermath of World War II, a war during which France
was occupied by Nazi Germany, the Algerian people rose in protest. On
May 8, 1945, French authorities carried out massacres in the Algerian
cities of Sétif, Guelma, and Kherrata, targeting thousands of unarmed
Algerians. By 1954, a wing of the Algerian independence movement—the
FLN—chose to move toward armed struggle as the only means of
achieving total liberation from France and the elimination of the
settler-colonial regime.

When the oppressed are jailed, tortured, and murdered in
settler-colonial systems, the oppressor force treats this in one of
several ways. There may be outright denial, e.g., “No, we would
never have….” The incidents may be explained away, e.g., “We had
to take these steps because the natives were out of control.” The
actions of the oppressor state may be treated as an accident or as
collateral damage, e.g., “We didn’t mean to shoot those children
on the beach; we thought they were terrorists.” The incidents may
also be ignored, with no explanation ever given.

There is an additional response from the oppressor group that overlaps
each, which can be summed up as, “So what? Things happen.” In
other words, the lives of the so-called natives, be they racially,
nationally, or colonially oppressed, are in no way comparable to the
lives and experiences of the oppressor population. The suffering that
befalls the oppressor is always treated as of qualitatively greater
significance than anything that happens to the oppressed, at least
according to the settler/colonial framework.

That settler/colonial framework was of course at stake in the Algerian
Revolution, as it is in every national liberation movement. In the
debased morality of such a framework, to what extent can the oppressed
be understood as human beings, as opposed to an unidentifiable black,
brown, or yellow mass? To what extent should their pleas for freedom
be understood as eloquent demands for emancipation rather than the
inarticulate moans of suffering?

After numerous acts of brutality on the part of the pieds-noirs and/or
the French authorities, the FLN decided to retaliate.

The Algerian Revolution encountered this challenge on multiple levels.
After numerous acts of brutality on the part of
the _pieds-noirs_ and/or the French authorities, including but not
limited to a particularly ignominious terrorist attack against
Algerian civilians by a _pied-noir_ group known as the Ultras, the
FLN decided to retaliate. Their view was that such attacks on
Algerians would continue and the world would hear nothing and do
nothing until and unless the settlers suffered in like manner. As a
result, Drif and others made the fateful decision to place bombs
where _pied-noir_ civilians congregated.

It was at that moment in the book that I paused. I had to think about
the implications. I have always been someone who has felt very
strongly that civilians should never be the target of military
operations. Yet, here was one of the greatest national liberation
movements of the 20th century, and they made a very different
decision.

I found myself reflecting upon Native Americans/American Indians who,
in their battles with the expanding white settler populations of North
America, engaged in warfare that sometimes included kidnapping and/or
killing white settlers. With their backs to the wall, was there
another option? When white settlers, either formal military or
militia, carried out massacres against the Native population, which
they would later claim as military victories—massacres that were
commonly celebrated by the white civilians—did the indigenous have
any options?

The FLN bombings shook the settler population of Algeria in ways that
they had never expected to be shaken. The national liberation war was
now a reality that hit very close to home. The settlers were no longer
safe. And they certainly no longer had the luxury—if they ever
did—of remaining neutral, since, by their very presence, they were
asserting their right to the land, and control over the people, of
Algeria.

Military actions by the FLN throughout Algeria contributed to the
ultimate victory but, as the film _The Battle of
Algiers_ illustrated at the end, it was mass actions by native
Algerians throughout the country that made colonial Algeria
ungovernable. Finally, in 1962, to the pleasure of most of the world,
Algeria achieved independence.

Yet the moral/political conflict inherent in the decision to hit
civilian targets was not resolved, though the FLN members seemed
comfortable that they had made the correct decision. Drif certainly
believes that the decision was correct and not to be confused with
jihadist violence that we have seen in the more recent past around the
world.

How does an emancipatory struggle gain world attention? How does it
point out to the oppressor group, whether settlers or simply
occupiers, that there can be no normality? And, most controversial,
when does a so-called civilian population become not merely an
instrument of an oppressive regime but an intrinsic and crucial weapon
of control?

The FLN saw their actions as retaliatory violence, and the settler
population as part of the enemy. This conclusion seems neither
illogical nor irrational.

The FLN saw their actions as retaliatory violence. But they also saw
the settler population as part of the enemy. This conclusion seems
neither illogical nor irrational. The overwhelming majority of
the _pieds-noirs_ believed in what they called “Algérie
Française.” On more than one occasion the settlers came close to
creating a civil war within France, including through the
establishment of a notorious crypto-fascist organization, the OAS (in
English, the Secret Army Organization), in order to permanently secure
Algeria to France.

Yet in striking at civilians, the challenges for the FLN included not
only the intrinsic ethical dilemmas posed by such attacks but also the
response of world opinion and the legacy they would have for future
generations. Though the mass base of the FLN may have supported
hitting civilian targets as a form of retaliation for state torture
and _pied-noir_ terrorism, the reality is that much of the rest of
the world either did not agree or did not understand. As far as much
of the rest of the world was concerned, these were civilian
establishments that were not engaged in the war and, therefore, should
have been considered off limits.

The battle against settler regimes is a unique fight because the
settlers are, in most cases, an unofficial component of the army of
occupation. In this sense, the _pieds-noirs_ were never a neutral
civilian population that had to make a choice between two sides (as
every population ultimately does during war). Certainly individual
settlers made choices, including the minority of settlers who chose to
enlist with the FLN. (Frantz Fanon, originally from Martinique but a
hero of the Algerian Revolution, devoted a chapter in his book _A
Dying Colonialism_ to the European minority and made the point that
they were not a monolithic bloc.) That said, the mass of settlers’
presence in a colonized land represents an act of aggression, an
invasion.

Settlers actually know this, if only subconsciously, which is why they
try so hard to claim or mythologize that there was allegedly no one on
the land before they arrived, as in the settler’s tales in South
Africa, Israel (“a land without a people for a people without a
land”), and the United States. The admission that there was a
population in existence, even if the justification is that the
population was “primitive,” raises myriad questions about how and
why the land was expropriated. The fact that settler-colonial states
generally go further and ensure that the settlers are armed, have
military training, and can frequently be enlisted in military
operations by the settler-colonial state is only the icing on an
already toxic cake.

In settler states the settlers have access to weapons, while for the
natives it is generally prohibited. Settlers have a racial or national
privilege that separates their existence from that of the natives,
whether in the form of housing, access to water, utilities, freedom of
movement, or education. The settler is living a completely different
life from that of the native, and attempts by natives to assert their
humanity and demand even a modicum of equality are perceived as
threats to settler privilege. The settlers, as a group, never see
themselves as aligned with the interests of the natives but rather
fight to assert their settler privilege, even going so far as to
proclaim themselves “nationalists,” insofar as they want the
settler state to remain a settler-dominated formation, no matter how
that state might change in formal terms.

To those not directly involved in a conflict with a settler regime,
the civilian settler is perceived not as an extension of the
repressive apparatus of the occupying regime but as a simple civilian
and, as such, a non-combatant. The conflict is perceived as being a
formal one between the apparatus of the occupier, on the one hand, and
the organization(s) of the native, on the other. In such a scenario,
the civilian settler is frequently perceived as being a neutral party
who only wishes to live well and be left alone.

While such a scenario is false on its face, it is what is often
believed and, in the Western media, what is frequently portrayed. The
oppressed are not given any “permission” to retaliate against
atrocities—often not even against the occupier’s military
forces—while any attack by the armed forces of the oppressor are
viewed as legitimate acts of self-defense.

The acts on the part of the FLN were historically understandable but
politically problematic, a point that must be reflected upon in
similar such struggles and which goes toward the legacy of the
Algerian Revolution. Liberation struggles never take place in
isolation, and they never involve only two sides. Surrounding any
conflict are “invisible” forces that interact with and influence
the parties directly engaged in the struggle. In some cases, such
forces are very active, for example US establishment support for the
ongoing Israeli colonization of Palestine. In other cases, they may
initially be neutral but then come to be engaged, for example, the
USSR in the Algerian Revolution (initially neutral but later
supportive of the national liberation struggle). The activities of the
other parties can be influenced by various factors, including but not
limited to the nature of the actual fight itself.

Though an anti-settler movement can legitimately argue that the
settlers are complicit in oppression, in each case the movement must
determine the consequences of identifying targets. What, for instance,
will be the impact on potential allies—including not only other
governments but solidarity movements abroad—if civilians are
targeted? Will potential allies recognize a legitimate right of
retaliation, or will they look at such acts as terrorism?

During the so-called Troubles in Northern Ireland from the late 1960s
through the mid-1990s, the Irish Republican Army generally took great
pains to distinguish hard targets (military or government targets)
from soft targets (civilians). This did not mean that civilians were
not killed—there were some horrendous exceptions to this
policy—but rather that they were generally not the targets of
military activity. This, in fact, distinguished the IRA from the
loyalist paramilitary organizations, which disregarded the soft
target/hard target distinction and were quite comfortable attacking
nationalist/Catholic civilians. Such an approach made it difficult for
the British to successfully portray the IRA as terrorists, though the
British media worked overtime in support of the London government on
this issue.

The example of Ireland also illustrates an additional complication.
During the Troubles, the British would establish military
installations in or near civilian establishments, which I witnessed
first-hand in 1988, during a visit to Northern Ireland. This meant
that if the IRA were to carry out a military attack on a British
installation, there was a good chance that civilians would be killed
or injured, and the British could describe the attack as an act of
“terrorism.” The fact that the British created this situation was
generally missed by the media.

During the anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa, the African
National Congress took a similar approach toward military actions. The
basic policy was that civilians were not to be targeted, though there
was always a recognition that civilians might be killed or injured as
a result of an attack on a military or government target.

The fundamental challenge in decolonization struggles and national
liberation movements against settler-colonial regimes is that the
dilemmas of the oppressed are almost never given contemporary equality
with those of the oppressor. On the other hand, when viewed
retrospectively, actions by an oppressed or “righteous” group,
including against civilians, often receive some degree of
legitimation.

Thus, the question of the FLN’s campaign in Algiers must be viewed
in the context of the 1950s. What were the ethical considerations, and
to what extent would targeting settler civilians hurt the cause of
Algerian liberation? To what extent would it stop the French
and/or _pieds-noirs_ from further atrocities against the Algerians?
And, what would be the lingering impact on the Algerian Revolution
itself of authorizing attacks on civilian targets?

At the same historical moment, the Vietnamese left made a very
different decision. In both the war against the French and, later, the
war against the US puppet regimes, the Vietminh, and later the
National Liberation Front and the Vietnamese People’s Army—in
comparison with the apparatus of the respective regimes they
fought—worked to distinguish between hard targets and soft targets,
not always successfully. Their behavior had a major impact on the
manner in which the Vietnamese national liberation struggle was
perceived internationally.

The Algerian FLN won and Algeria became free. An outstanding question,
besides one of morality, is again, one of legacy and, specifically,
the conclusions arrived at by other movements for national freedom.
Were there specific challenges in the Algerian Revolution—in
comparison with other anti-colonial and anti-settler movements—that
necessitated a turn toward the killing of settler civilians?

Other movements in similar circumstances made very different choices.
This is not a matter of passing judgment, but an assessment. Did the
killing of civilians in Algeria’s anti-colonial war legitimize, in
the minds of those who became jihadists years later, the blurring of
the lines between hard targets and soft targets? Did it lead some to
conclude that through terror against a population one could force that
population to make certain choices?

These are the issues that Zohra Drif opens for consideration in her
critically important memoir. In her actions as a militant, Drif casts
aside the romanticization of revolution. One need not agree with her
conclusions in order to appreciate her courage and that of her other
comrades in the FLN, who fought what many people assumed at the
beginning of the struggle to be an unwinnable war of national
liberation. 

_[BILL FLETCHER JR. is a past president of TransAfrica Forum, a
longtime trade unionist, and a cofounder of the Ukrainian Solidarity
Network. He is a member of the editorial board of The Nation.]_

_Copyright c 2023 The Nation. Reprinted with permission. May not be
reprinted without permission
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* Algerian Revolution
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* Algeria
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* France
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* French colonies
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* French colonialism
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* Zohra Drif
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* imperialism
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* colonialism
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* colonial settlers
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* South Africa
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* Northern Ireland
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* Palestine
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* decolonization
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* national liberation
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* national liberation movements
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