[In the early 1900s, Ford Motor Company commanded strong loyalty
from Detroit’s black workers. But the United Auto Workers broke
Ford’s stranglehold through patient organizing, cementing an
alliance that would bear fruit for decades.]
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HOW THE UAW BROKE FORD’S STRANGLEHOLD OVER BLACK DETROIT  
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Paul Prescod
October 23, 2023
Jacobin
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_ In the early 1900s, Ford Motor Company commanded strong loyalty
from Detroit’s black workers. But the United Auto Workers broke
Ford’s stranglehold through patient organizing, cementing an
alliance that would bear fruit for decades. _

A black autoworker installs engines into Ford automobiles. , Bettmann
/ Getty Imges

 

In December 1942, during the heat of World War II, a private report
trickled in from an investigator at the Office of War Information. The
department was busy monitoring the progress of defense production and
the potential explosive effects of racial discrimination in
employment. Discussing Detroit, the investigator noted, “It is
remarkable how thoroughly the whole Negro community supports and
believes in the UAW [United Auto Workers]. . . . The leadership of the
UAW . . . has converted them into a solid union asset.”

Just ten years earlier, most black Detroiters would have had a hard
time imagining this. The auto companies, especially Henry Ford
personally, commanded the loyalty of and hegemonic influence over the
city’s black workers through a sophisticated web of paternalism and
patronage. Most black workers were understandably skeptical of trade
unions given past discriminatory practices and their cynical use as
strikebreakers by employers.

But through patient, thoughtful, and skilled organizing, the UAW was
able to break through Ford’s stranglehold over Detroit’s black
workers and cement a productive alliance that would bear fruit for
decades.

This process, described in excellent detail in August Meier and
Elliott Rudwick’s _Black Detroit and the Rise of the UAW_
[[link removed]]_, _should
serve as inspiration for organizers today seeking to build broad
labor-based coalitions to counter corporate dominance. The story is
also a quintessential example of the emergence and consolidation of
the civil rights/labor alliance that was so critical for advancing the
cause of working people throughout the twentieth century.

“Enough to Make the Savior Himself Weep”

There was a material basis to Ford’s prestige and influence within
Detroit’s black population. The jobs provided by Ford Motor Company
were exceptionally good opportunities for black workers before and
during the Great Depression. Already by 1926, Ford employed twenty-six
thousand black workers in its Detroit area plants, far outpacing other
auto companies.

Black autoworkers were disproportionately concentrated in the more
difficult and dangerous jobs in the foundry, paint shop, and wet
sanding operations. While this was true at Ford as elsewhere, the
company was unique in opening up more skilled jobs for blacks as
bricklayers, crane operators, mechanics, electricians, and tool and
die makers.

Already by 1926, Ford employed twenty-six thousand black workers in
its Detroit area plants, far outpacing other auto companies.

Ford cleverly sought to ingratiate himself with Detroit’s important
black institutions to promote these economic opportunities. He did
this most effectively through cultivating contacts in the clergy. For
example, Reverend Robert L. Bradby
[[link removed]] was
pastor of Second Baptist Church, the oldest and largest black
religious institution in the city. In 1919, he was invited to a
luncheon with Ford and other company executives where he agreed to
begin recommending good workers.

Respected black figures were recruited to join the Ford Motor Company
cadre: policeman Donald J. Marshall was hired by the Ford Service
Department, for instance, and University of Michigan football
star Willis Ward
[[link removed]] was
placed on the personnel staff.

Eventually, it became virtually impossible to get a job without first
going through the conduit of an influential black minister or public
figure. Ralph Bunche explained this dynamic in _The Political Status
of the Negro in the Age of FDR_
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The fact is that the possibility of getting a job at the Ford Motor
Company has been the incentive in many instances of Negroes’ joining
[a] church. . . . It follows that the minister will cater to the
positions taken by the company which employs large numbers of his
flock.

Some were of course critical of black churches’ subservience to
Ford. National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
(NAACP) leader Roy Wilkins wrote in the _Crisis, _“The spectacle
of poor preachers, ministering to the needs of poor people whose lot
from birth to death is to labor for a pittance, rising to frenzied,
name-calling defense of a billionaire manufacturer is enough to make
the Savior himself weep.”

Ford’s infiltration was common across all black institutions, not
just the church. Lloyd Harding Bailer remarked in his study _Negro
Labor in the Automobile Industry_
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is hardly a Negro church, fraternal body, or other organization in
which Ford workers are not represented. Scarcely a Negro professional
or business man is completely independent of income derived from Ford
employees.”

The Detroit NAACP was dominated by religious and business leaders tied
to Ford, and Henry Ford’s son Edsel made large contributions to the
chapter. National NAACP president Walter White remarked in his
autobiography _A Man Called White_ about the executive committee of
the chapter, “Most of its members at that time were businessmen,
doctors, and other representatives of the upper middle class of Negro
life.” The Urban League was no better, as it was financed in part by
the anti-union Employers’ Association of Detroit.

The UAW Makes Progress

Despite these many challenges and barriers, the UAW slowly made
progress with black workers. As was often the case with the Congress
of Industrial Organizations (CIO) unions, early defeats unearthed
critical lessons and worker leaders that would prove invaluable in the
future.

The UAW’s effort to organize black Ford workers in 1935–1936
failed, but through it the union established a cadre of younger
pro-CIO black activists. This converged with broader developments in
black politics that tipped the scales more in favor of trade unionism.
In 1936, a Detroit chapter of the National Negro Congress (NNC) was
created. A brainchild of black trade unionist A. Philip Randolph
[[link removed]],
the NNC worked to unite black union activists and promote the labor
movement within black communities.

Not many black workers were involved in the famous sit-down strikes
[[link removed]],
but there was an active group in the first one at Midland Steel Frame
Company in 1936. During the peak of the strikes, Detroit YMCA
secretary Wilbur Woodson hosted a debate on unions and the black
workers between minister Horace White and Ford personnel member Donald
Marshall. White broke from the ranks of the black clergy and endorsed
the cause of the UAW.

 

As it grew clear that there was no way to successfully organize Ford
without winning over black workers, the UAW became more deliberate in
its efforts to overcome racial division. Paul Kirk, a crane operator
and NNC activist, was the first paid black organizer hired in April
1937 to help organize the Ford River Rouge plant. Gradually more black
staff were hired, including Walter Hardin, a former Industrial Workers
of the World (IWW) and Communist Party member.

The new staff organizers created neighborhood committees to reach
black workers. The Ford Organizing Committee got creative and
sponsored radio programs that targeted black audiences, while also
hosting baseball games and band concerts.

Black union organizers played an important role in fostering continued
debate on the trade union question. For example, Kirk put together a
conference sponsored by the Michigan NNC and the Works Progress
Administration Union. Randolph was featured on a panel discussion
about what black workers could gain with the UAW. Here Randolph
declared, “The day the Negro depended upon the ‘good, rich white
man’ is gone — and gone forever!”

This debate spilled over into other black institutions and came to a
head at the NAACP annual conference in June 1937. In his
autobiography, Walter White recalls being met by an angry delegation
of black ministers who demanded that UAW activist Horace Martin be
removed from the convention program or else they would boycott. White
refused to bow to the pressure, and Martin was able to give his talk.
However, the convention still refused to formally endorse the CIO.

Even certain ministers began to express more openness to unions.
William Peck was a conservative pastor of Bethel A.M.E. Church, but
was willing to host pro-union speakers in his church. In February
1937, Peck opened up his doors to  Howard University
president Mordecai Johnson
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who made the case that black workers should not be afraid to join
unions that seemed supportive of racial equality.

Progress was slow-going, but there were signs that the auto
companies’ hegemony over Detroit’s black workers was starting to
break. In 1939, the UAW struck Chrysler
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and a lockout ensued. Predictably, the company attempted to develop a
back-to-work movement among the seventeen hundred black autoworkers at
the Dodge Main Plant.

It was clearly a strategy to heighten racial tensions, and fears of
racial violence were high. Minister Horace White sprung into action to
prevent the situation from deteriorating like it had so many times
before. He organized twenty-five prominent black leaders, including
two pro-union ministers, to distribute leaflets to black church
attendees that discouraged them from supporting the back-to-work
movement.

Black workers began to see some measurable progress in exchange for
their support of the union. After the Chrysler lockout was over,
certain UAW contracts won clauses prohibiting racial discrimination in
seniority and promotion. Some larger locals went a step further and
began including black workers at social events.

At Chrysler, the UAW was finally able to rally blacks to their side
and demonstrate their ability to fight discrimination on the job. The
stage was being set for a big showdown with Ford.

Showdown at Ford

The Ford organizing effort was renewed in earnest in September 1940.
CIO leader John L. Lewis added seven salaried black former autoworkers
as staff organizers to help with the drive. One staffer was even
assigned specifically to work with Detroit’s black ministers.

Emil Mazey [[link removed]], former
Briggs Local 212 president, was chosen to direct the effort. Though
Mazey was white, he had won the allegiance of black workers within his
local by fighting discrimination on many fronts.

Ford was the last major auto company holdout against unionization. The
River Rouge plant in Detroit, by far its largest operation, was the
most important for both its economic and symbolic power; it also had
the largest concentration of black workers. Clearly the Ford Motor
Company was not going to let the union in without a fight.

Black UAW organizers had to make contact with black workers at their
homes because of the harassment they would face in the plant. Besides
the progress the UAW made in the workplace, other organizational
developments also helped the union.

By the end of 1939, membership of the Detroit NAACP branch had risen
to six thousand members. Its president, James J. McClendon, was not
particularly pro-union but developed a broad base that included
left-labor activists on the board. But the real dynamism was found in
the chapter’s youth councils, which were more focused on labor
issues and exerted independence from the more moderate
members. Horace Sheffield
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one of the more skilled youth organizers and worked with his father at
the Ford River Rouge plant.

Two days before the Ford strike began, the Interdenominational
Ministers Alliance publicly endorsed Ford. But this did not fully
represent the mood of black Detroit. The NAACP chapter was divided,
with even the conservative former president Louis Blount endorsing the
UAW. The Detroit Urban League board had members like Geraldine
Bledsoe
[[link removed]] and
Beulah Whitby who were vocal union supporters.

With the situation still in flux, Sheffield attained a UAW sound truck
(without permission) so that the youth councils could urge blacks to
leave the plant. The Ford Motor Company, of course, was making their
own preparations. It recruited two thousand unemployed blacks as
strikebreakers, making sure to include many boxers and street
fighters.

The strike began spontaneously on April 1, 1941. Most black workers
did not cross the picket line, but a significant minority did. On
April 2, the UAW managed to get one thousand black strikebreakers to
leave the plant and put out a press release to clarify that it held
the company, not black workers, responsible for trying to break the
strike.

The UAW managed to get one thousand black strikebreakers to leave the
plant and put out a press release to clarify that it held the company,
not black workers, responsible for trying to break the strike.

The UAW continued to consolidate black support by holding a UAW
luncheon at the black YMCA on April 3. The meeting was noteworthy for
the broad spectrum of organizations in attendance. Clergy were
present, but also the Alpha Kappa Alpha sorority, the Michigan
Federated Democratic Clubs, and the Detroit Urban League. The meeting
did what would have been unthinkable just a few years before — it
released a joint statement that endorsed the UAW and criticized
Ford’s strikebreaking.

The UAW continued to put on radio broadcasts targeting blacks and
purchased advertisements in local newspapers. The NAACP played a
critical role by distributing ten thousand leaflets at churches on the
morning of April 6. While its message still was not a full-throated
endorsement of the union, it told black workers clearly to not let
themselves be used as strikebreakers. Walter White came to Detroit and
personally drove around the plant in a sound car urging workers to
leave.

On April 11, Ford relented and finally recognized the union; the UAW
signed a contract with Ford on June 20, 1941. The alliance between the
UAW and Detroit’s black workers was cemented and ready to pivot
toward enforcing fair employment.

Fair Employment

The coalition was immediately put to the test as a tight wartime labor
market was loosening by 1942. While government agencies like the Fair
Employment Practices Committee (FEPC) were by now in place, they had
little ability and resources to enforce employment laws.

The limitations of federal regulatory power made the importance of a
continued civil rights–labor activist coalition even more important.
Fortunately, both the UAW and black political organizations were
well-positioned for the task. By 1943, the Detroit NAACP had exploded
to twenty thousand members. Many of these members were black union
activists who poured into the chapter and gave it a decidedly
working-class character. The executive secretary, Gloster Current, was
interested in labor and worked closely with black union leaders.

 

Wildcat walkouts from white workers over the promotion or transfer of
black workers, often called “hate strikes,” tested the UAW’s
commitment to racial equality and involved an ongoing delicate dance
between the union, civil rights organizations, and the federal
government. As time went on, the UAW became more confident in their
ability to discipline the leaders of hate strikes.

The union often displayed courage in its willingness to stand with
black workers at the risk of losing the support of white workers. At
Dodge Truck in June 1942, twenty-six blacks were transferred, and a
few hundred white workers walked out. The union went as far as to make
sure the leaders of the walkout were fired. At Hudson, Local 154 dealt
with the issues by putting up signs that read, “Violators cannot
expect to get the support of Hudson Local 154, UAW-CIO in any
discipline they may suffer.”

Sometimes the international got involved when local union leaders were
obstinate. At a Chevrolet plant in late 1941, 240 black janitors were
being denied transfer rights. When it became clear they would not get
help from the local, international officials like Victor Reuther
inserted themselves. Rallies were held, and eventually the transfers
took place.

The UAW’s actions during this period earned the praise and deepened
trust of Detroit’s black workers. As Meier and Rudwick state, “The
union was an organization whose top leadership was far in advance of
other sectors of the white community in its racial attitudes.”

The culmination of this fair employment work came during the fight
specifically for black women autoworkers. In contract talks with Ford,
the UAW proposed that black workers make up at least 7 percent of the
women hired, especially at the Willow Run plant. The company refused,
claiming that hiring black women would create “disturbances.”
Local 600 officials even met with white women workers and got them to
acknowledge (in front of Ford management) that integration wouldn’t
create any problems.

Wildcat walkouts from white workers over the promotion or transfer of
black workers, often called ‘hate strikes,’ tested the UAW’s
commitment to racial equality.

But Ford still refused, and the coalition sprang into action. Black
leaders in Local 600 worked with civic groups to picket Ford’s
employment offices. Repeatedly, FEPC investigators were brought to
Detroit to monitor progress. The peak of this activity came in April
1943 when over five thousand marched in Cadillac Square and joined a
rally of ten thousand against discrimination in war plants.

While progress was often slow and incomplete, the UAW successfully
allayed the fears of many black workers that the union would not look
after their interests. As the battles within the plant gates raged on,
the coalition turned to address issues outside the workplace.

“Warmest and Most Dependable Ally”

The war brought with it not just dramatic changes to employment, but
also an explosive housing situation. The federal government
constructed public housing projects to deal with the influx of defense
workers, and the racial basis of this housing became a thorny topic.

In January 1942, the Detroit Housing Commission, whose
secretary-director, George Edwards, was a former UAW organizer, was
authorized to assign the Sojourner Truth housing project to blacks.
Just two weeks later, this decision was reversed on the claim that it
would cause a race riot.

In response, the Sojourner Truth Citizens Committee was formed, its
leadership including black UAW activists. Sheffield from Local 600
organized black foundry workers to send five hundred postcards to
President Franklin D. Roosevelt, and the local made a big financial
donation to the committee. White UAW members participated in
interracial picket lines at City Hall and the Detroit Housing
Commission offices. By April, the activists had won, and blacks began
to move into the housing project.

Campaigns such as these yielded an enduring close political alliance
between black Detroiters and the UAW that took shape in mayoral and
city council campaigns. This rich history gives proof to Meier and
Rudwick’s claim that, “It was in the UAW that the black community
found its warmest and most dependable ally.” Horace White later
acknowledged that, “The CIO has usurped moral leadership in the
[black] community.”

The long-standing relationship between black workers, the auto
industry
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and the UAW have their roots in these early struggles. By the
mid-1960s, the auto industry was the second-largest employer of black
semiskilled production workers, surpassing one hundred thousand in
1966. Even today, black workers make up 16.6 percent of autoworkers
(as compared to 12.5 percent of workers in the economy as a whole). A
casual glance at video footage and pictures from the current UAW Big
Three strike shows that black workers still have a strong presence
within the UAW.

The UAW’s work in Detroit is just one more example of how closely
intertwined the fate of black communities and the labor movement has
always been. Their successful campaign at Ford is an important lesson
that corporate hegemony is not necessarily permanent or immovable.

_PAUL PRESCOD is a Jacobin contributing editor._

_Subscribe to JACOBIN [[link removed]] today, get
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* elections
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* Labor
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* unions
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* UAW
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* Detroit
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* National Negro Congress
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* NAACP
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* CIO
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* race
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* Racism
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